trip from St. Louis when said contract was made, and it being intended by said contract that said molasses would be taken on board said steam-boat on her return and up trip to St. Louis. The breach alleged is "but neither on said appointed day nor at any time did the said master call for, take on board, or convey said molasses as he had agreed to, but in all respects he failed to keep and carry into effect said contract." The case has been heard on an exception to the jurisdiction, and the question is whether an unexecuted contract of affreightment gives a lien. This question is well settled in the negative. The Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 How. 188; Vandewater v. Mills, 19 How. 82; and see The Lady Franklin, 8 Wall. 329; The Keokuk, 9 Wall. 517; The Prince Leopold, 9 FED. REP. 333.

The learned proctor who brings the libel in this case relies entirely, to maintain the jurisdiction, on The Pacific, 1 Blatchf. 569. In regard to that case, it should be noticed that the maritime contract for passage had been so far entered upon that the passage money had been paid, and one demand of the libel was for the return of the money. It is very probable that in just such a case jurisdiction would be maintained now. In our case no freight has been paid, no goods delivered, nor the maritime contract in any sense entered upon by the ship. The whole case is that the master contracted for the ship that on the return trip the molasses should be shipped. There is no case that I am aware of that gives a maritime lien for entire breach of such a contract.

The exception will be maintained, and the libel dismissed, with costs in both courts.

THE IMOGENE M. TERRY.

(District Court, D. New Jersey. February 2, 1884)

1. ADMIRALTY-MARITIME LIEN-CAPTAIN OF VESSEL.

The rule of law that the captain of a vessel has no lien upon it for his wages is not applicable to a person who, though calling himself captain, neither contracts directly with the owners, nor has charge of freights and moneys, but is, except in name, an ordinary seaman.

2. SAME-PLEADINGS-AMENDMENTS.

It is in the discretion of a court of admiralty to allow amendments in the pleadings even with respect to matters of substance, by a party who shows merits.

In Admiralty. Libel in rem.

Bedle, Muirheid & McGee, for libelants.

E. A. Ransom, for respondent.

NIXON, J. In the above libel the libelant, with some self-complacency, describes himself as master of the sloop Imogene M. Terry. But courts of admiralty deal with things, and not with words. If the proofs show that he is in fact an ordinary seaman, under the control of the master, his calling himself the captain ought not to hinder him from invoking the seaman's remedy for the collection of his wages. It is well settled in the admiralty that the captain has no libel in rem upon the vessel for his wages. The Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175. Two reasons are ordinarily assigned for this: (1) Because the freights of the ship pass through his hands, on which he has a lien for payment; (2) because his contract for hire is with the owners, and he is supposed to bargain with reference to their personal responsibility, and not with an intention to look elsewhere for satisfaction. The Grand Turk, 1 Paine, 73. The evidence shows that both these reasons failed in the present case. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. The libelant was not hired by the owners, but by the master of the Frank C. Barker. He earned no freights, and no money passed through his hands from the earnings of the vessel. When the crew of the Barker was made up by Capt. Raynor, he was employed with other fishermen, and at the same rate of compensation, to-wit, $25 per month, and three cents for every thousand fish caught. To carry on the fishing operations, some of the men were placed on board the Barker to aid in taking the fish, and others on two tenders, by which the fish were transported from the vessel to the respondent's manufactory on the shore. The libelant had charge of the tender Imogene M. Terry, but was as much subject to the orders and the control of Capt. Raynor as if he had remained on board the Barker. The same attempt was made to charge him with the cost of his grub, over three dollars per week, that was sought to be imposed on the other men. There was also a refusal to pay anything to him on account of the bonus for fish caught, although the fact that Capt. Raynor went with a num

ber of the crew to the owners on July 1st to receive payment on account of the dues for fish then taken, and the additional fact that he suggested that the number should be estimated, for convenience, at 500,000, show quite clearly that he did not understand when the men were hired that they would be expected to wait until the end of the season before any payment on account should be made.

The proctor of the libelant, at the hearing, asked leave to amend the libel, in order to have the allegations harmonize with the proofs. In admiralty practice there is not much limit to the discretion of the court in this respect. In section 483 of Benedict's American Admiralty, it is said that "on proper cause shown omissions and deficiencies in pleadings may be supplied, and errors and mistakes in practice, in matters of substance as well as in form, may be corrected at any stage of the proceedings, for the furtherance of justice. Where merits clearly appear on the records, it is the settled practice in admiralty not to dismiss the libel, but to allow the party to assert his rights in a new allegation. The whole subject rests entirely with the discretion of the court, as well in relation to the relief to be granted as to the terms on which it shall be granted. Amendments may be made on application to the court at any time, as well after as before decree, and at any time before the final decree new counts or articles may be added, and new and supplemental allegations may be filed."

The libel may be amended as proposed, and a decree entered in favor of the libelant. If necessary, a reference will be ordered to ascertain the amount of monthly wages and bonus due to the libelant to the date of the order given by the captain upon the owners for the payment of the sum due.

POLLOK and others v.. LoUCHHEIM and others.

(Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois. November 21, 1883.)

JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT-RIGHT OF REMOVAL-SEPARATE CONTROVERSY. One of several attaching creditors joined the others as defendants in a suit to set aside certain judgments obtained against the debtor by confession. Held, that they were necessary parties to the controversy between the plaintiff and his debtor; and that, as they were citizens of the same state with the debtor, the cause could not be removed to the United States court.

In Equity.

Flower, Remy & Gregory, tor complainants.

Mr. Shehan and L. Schissler, for defendants.

DRUMMOND, J. On the twenty-seventh day of September last Louchheim was a merchant, engaged in business in Galena, in this state, and about that time three several judgments were rendered by confession in the circuit court of Jo Daviess county against him, in favor of different parties, amounting altogether to a little more than $15,000, upon which executions issued and were levied by the sheriff upon a stock of goods in his possession. Shortly after this had taken place various creditors of Louchheim, including these plaintiffs, sued out attachments from the same court, which were also levied upon the same property by the sheriff, and thereupon the plaintiffs filed a bill in the same court against Louchheim, the sheriff, and the various creditors who had sued out the attachments. The bill alleged an indebtedness to them on the part of Louchheim, for which their attachment had issued, and declared that the judgments confessed by Louchheim were in whole or in part fraudulent as against the plaintiffs, and asked that a receiver should be appointed and the property sold, and the proceeds distributed in accordance with the equities of the parties. The plaintiffs in the bill were and are citizens of Wisconsin, the defendants are all citizens of Illinois except two, who are alleged to be citizens of New York. The bill was filed on the sixteenth of October, and an injunction issued in conformity with a prayer to that effect contained in the bill. On the twenty-fifth of October last the plaintiffs made application, under the act of 1875, for the removal of the case from the circuit court of Jo Daviess county to this court, which application, it is admitted, was refused by the court, and the plaintiffs now ask leave of this court to file a transcript and docket the case, on the ground that it was properly removable from the state court.

The principal objection made to this application is that the attaching creditors, who have been made defendants, are only nominal defendants, but are really plaintiffs, when they come to be arranged according to the principle laid down by the supreme court in The Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, on opposite sides of what is the real controversy in this case, without regard to the position they occupy in v.19,no.7-30

the pleading as plaintiffs or defendants; and it is insisted that when so arranged the interests of the attaching creditors and of the plaintiffs in this bill are identical, and that, as some of them are citizens of the same state as the plaintiffs in the suits, upon which judgments by confession were entered, but who are defendants to this bill, consequently this court has no jurisdiction of the case. It is manifest, if this court takes jurisdiction of the suit, all the attachment suits brought by the various parties against Louchheim must necessarily come into this court for adjudication if the purpose of the bill is to be accomplished. The bill is not filed simply to remove the obstacles in the way of the prosecution of the attachment suits and the collection of judgments, which may be obtained therein, caused by the other judgments heretofore mentioned, rendered upon confession, but to take possession and dispose of all the property covered by the various executions and attachments already referred to. It is important, therefore, to ascertain whether this position of the defendants is well taken. The only allegation in the pleadings bearing upon this part of the case, and which is contained in the bill, is "that as to whether the respective sums for which said attachments issued are actually owing by the said Abram J. Louchheim to the above-mentioned firms, or as to whether the same, or any part thereof is now past due, your orators have no information, and make them defendants hereto for the purpose of determining such facts and of ascertaining whether or not they have liens prior to or equal with the lien of the attachment issued in favor of your orator, and for the purpose of determining and settling in this suit their respective rights and interests;" and in the prayer for relief, the bill requests "that the attachment creditors herein before named, and each of them, be required to establish and show what, if anything, is due to them upon their claims against the said Abram J. Louchheim, and the nature and extent of their respective liens, if any they have." It is manifest, therefore, that in order to accomplish the object of the bill it was indispensable that the attachment creditors should be made parties; and the real question is whether, as the record now stands, they are really plaintiffs or defendants. It may be assumed from the allegations of the bill, if the judgments entered by confession are held to be valid, there will be little or nothing left for the attaching creditors, including the plaintiffs to this bill. It is not stated that the bill is filed as well for the benefit of the plaintiffs named therein as of the other attaching creditors, nor is it stated that any application was made to the latter to join these plaintiffs in the prosecution of the present bill; and so far as it now appears, if the plaintiffs shall prove the allegations of their bill and get rid in whole or in part of the judgments entered by confession, the result would operate for the benefit of the attaching creditors as well as of the plaintiffs to the bill, unless some special equity should be obtained by the plaintiffs, from the fact that they alone of the creditors have proceeded in chan