sonal estate; for the word estate was genus generalissimum, and included all things real and personal. 65. Even the words personal estates will pass freehold lands, if it appear that the testator used them in that sense. Bucknor, 6 Term R. 66. But where a person gave 4,000l. to trustees in Doe v. trust for certain persons, and by a residuary clause gave the res of his estate and effects, of what 610. nature soever, toA. and B., their executors and administrators, in trust to add the interest to the principal, so as to accumulate the same; it being his will that the residue should not pass, but at the time and manner as the principal sum of 4,000 l. was directed to be paid. It was held that these words did not extend to a freehold house, of which the testator was seised. And Lord Kenyon relied on the following words of the clause, "to add the interest to the principal, so as to accumulate the same." The interest and principal were to make one consolidated sum of the same nature; but these were terms wholly inapplicable to a real estate. 67. The words, all my rents, are sufficient to pass Allmy Rents. real estates; for it is according to the common phrase and usual manner of speaking of some men, who name their lands by their rents. Cro. Ja. 104. 68. A person having let several houses and lands Kerry v. Derrick, for years, rendering several rents, made his will in these words: "As concerning the disposition of all my lands and tenements, I bequeath the rents of D. to my wife for life, remainder over in tail." The question was, whether by this devise the reversions passed, with the rents of the lands. For it was contended that the rents, divided from the reversions, were not devisable within the statute, the devisor having no reversion therein. All I am worth. Huxlop v. The Court resolved that the land itself passed by the devise; for it appeared to be the intention of the testator to make a devise of all his lands and tenements, and that he intended to pass such an estate as should have continuance for a longer time than the leases should enure; and the words were apt enough to convey it, according to the common phrase and usual manner of some men, who name their land by their rents. 69. The words, all I am worth, without any other words to control them, will pass real as well as personal estate. 70. A testator having given all the overplus of his 1Bro. R.437. money to the son and daughter of I. S., proceeded in these words, "I give and bequeath to them all I am worth, except 207. which I give to my executor." It was contended, that there being no expression in the will which pointed at the real estate, the personalty could only pass. But it was decreed that these words carried both the real and personal estate. The word Hardacre v. R. 716. 71. The word legacy may be applied to a real estate, if the context of the will show that such was the testator's intention. 72. A. by will gave two legacies of 150 l. each to Nash, 5 Term his son and daughter, to be paid when they attained the age of 21. He then gave all his realty and personalty to his wife for life, and after her death he gave one freehold estate to the son, and another to the daughter; but if either or both of his children should die before the wife, then those legacies which were left to them should return to the wife. Lord Kenyon said, the question was, whether those words of remainder operated on the real estates before given to the son and daughter, or only referred to the pecuniary legacies. The Court had considered the whole of the will, and was of opinion that those words acted upon the real estates before given to the son and daughter. Considerable stress had been laid on the word legacies, and it was argued that it was an appropriate term, applicable to personal estate only. But the same technical and correct expressions were not to be expected from unlettered persons, as were usually found in wills drawn by professional men. Even if there were no decision to warrant the Court in saying, that the word legacy might be applied to a real estate, if the context required it, he should have had no difficulty in making such a determination for the first time. But that construction had already been put on the word legacy in the case of Hope v. infra, c. 12. Taylor; and the Court fully subscribed to the doctrine there laid down. 73. The words, all the residue or remainder of my Residue of effects, my estate, or, my property, will pass real Estate, Proestates of every kind. perty, or Effects. 5 Burr. 2638. 74. A person devised all the rest and residue of Roe v. his estate, whatsoever and wheresoever, to his wife. Harvey, It was contended that the word estate did not necessarily mean real estate; but Lord Mansfield answered, that the word estate carried every thing, unless tied down by particular expressions. 1 H. Black. 75. A person devised all the rest and residue of Doe v. her estate, of what nature or kind soever. It was Chapman, contended that these words only applied to the 223. personal property of the testator, because they were accompanied with limitations peculiar to personal property. But the Court said, they could not restrain the meaning of those words to personal property, and negative the operation of them as to real estates. Jackson v. 3 Bro. Parl. Ca. 388. 76. G. Jackson being seised of several real estates, descendible freeholds, and chattels real; gave to his mother, Mary Jackson, some particular estates for life, without liberty of committing waste; he afterwards gave several legacies and an annuity of 30l. to his heir at law, and then proceeded thus,-" I also give and bequeath unto my dearly beloved mother Mary Jackson, all the remainder and residue of all the effects, both real and personal, which I shall die possessed of." The question was, whether this last clause passed all the testator's freehold estates to his mother in fee simple. The Court of King's Bench in Ireland gave judgment in favour of the heir at law. This was reversed by the Court of King's Bench in England; upon which a writ of error was brought in the House of Lords. It was contended on behalf of the appellant to be an established rule, that an heir at law should not be disinherited but by express words, or necessary implication. The residuary clause in this case contained no express devise of the real estates; the word effects being properly applicable only to personal estate. The subsequent words, "which I shall die possessed of," supported and strengthened this construction; because the express allusion of those words to a future acquisition was inapplicable to real estates, as none acquired after the publication of the will could pass by it; and the word possessed properly related only to personal estate; as to the word real, annexed to the word effects, it applied expressly to the chattels real left by the testator: nor was there any necessary implication that any greater interest in the real estates was intended for the mother, than the estate for life, without power of waste, expressly devised to her, in two of the denominations. Such an implication, so far from being necessary, was incompatible with, and would merge and destroy, and in fact revoke, the mother's express estate for life, and restriction from waste; and would break through another rule, as well of law, as of common sense, which says, that what is expressed shall not be destroyed by implication. Another rule of construction was, that where words used by a testator are indifferently applied to real and personal estates, they should not, if there was any thing to satisfy them, receive a construction prejudicial to the heir. Now in the present case the words bequeath, effects, and possessed of, were indisputably much less applicable to real, than to personal estate; they had never been admitted to apply to the former, but where insurmountable arguments of such an intent, afforded by other parts of the will, rendered that construction necessary. But here the other parts. of the will were so far from requiring such a construction, that they were destroyed if it were admitted. The words, in their most proper sense, applied to personal estate; and the chattels real which the testator left, showed his reason for annexing the word real to effects, which otherwise properly meant moveables only; and fully satisfied those words: they could not therefore be extended to real estates. It was also an established rule that general words in one part of a will should be so construed as not to defeat the plain intention of the testator, to be collected' from any other part of his will. of his will. Now in the present case the devise to the mother for life, without power of waste, was incompatible with an intent on |