EXECUTORS AND ADMIN-

ISTRATORS.

See, also, Wills.

Interest on account, see Interest.

FACTORS AND BROKERS.

Real estate agents-Commissions.
1. Where plaintiffs, real estate agents,
showed certain property of defendant to a
purchaser, and afterwards obtained from de-

Revival of action, see Limitation of Ac fendant authority to sell at a fixed price estab-
tions, 3.

Settlement and accounting.

1. Where the executor of an estate appeals
from the decree of the probate court allowing
his account, and assigns as error the refusal
to allow the amount claimed for extraordinary
services performed by him, and a legatee also
appeals, and assigns as error the allowance of
several sales and disbursements made by the
executor, and an allowance of anything for
extraordinary services, after the legatee has
waived a jury on all the questions except that
of compensation, the two causes should be
consolidated.-Wisner v. Mabley's Estate,
(Mich.) 262.

lished by him, without any fraud on their
part, though they did not inform him that
they had any one who would probably buy the
property, they are entitled to their commis-
sion.-Barrington v. Stoltz, (Minn.) SOS.
the land, and he had entered into negotiations
2. Defendant had authorized plaintiff to sell
with one who afterwards bought it, although
the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses is con-
flicting as to the terms of plaintiff's employ-
ment, the case should be submitted to the
jury. Ferguson v. Glaspie, (Minn.) 352.*
3. Where purchasers, whom plaintiff had
procured to buy land, failed to buy by reason
fendant had represented as existing, and by
of the non-existence of advantages which de-
2. Where an executor appeals from the de- reason of defendant's failure to stand by offers
cree of the probate court allowing his account, which he had made, defendant is liable for the
and assigns as his ground of objection the re-service.-Hannan v. Moran, (Mich.) 909.*
fusal to allow his claim for pay for extraordi-
nary services, it is a general appeal, not sub-
ject to dismissal.-Id.

3. Under How. St. Mich. § 9015, providing
that the executor shall receive for his services
one dollar per day and expenses, and, in cases
of unusual difficulty and responsibility, such
further sum as the court may deem reason-
able and just, the question of the allowance
of extra pay is for the court, and not for the
jury.-Id.

4. Agreements for commissions for the
services of a real-estate broker do not come
within any provision of the statute of frauds.
-Waterman Real-Estate Exch. v. Stephens,
(Mich.) 685.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
Arrest without warrant.

1. The offense of maliciously injuring any
4. The claim of an executor for extra allow-dam, reservoir, canal, etc., created by How.
ance should state particularly the services for
which such compensation is asked.-Id.
5. Evidence of the social standing of dece
dent's family, and their domestic relations,
is not relevant to an executor's claim for ex-

tra allowance.-Id.

6. On an appeal from the decree of the pro-
bate court, fixing the extra allowance of an
executor at $1,500 for one year's services, in
addition to the commissions allowed by law,
which were $3,500, the circuit court, after ad-
mitting much irrelevant evidence, increased
the allowance to $6,500. The estate invento-
ried over $500,000, and consisted chiefly of in-
terests in mercantile houses, which the execu-
tor had sold without unusual difficulty or re-
sponsibility. Held, that the allowance of the
circuit court was in excess of its discretion in
the premises, and that its decree should be re-
versed, and that of the probate court affirmed.
-Id.

EXEMPTIONS.

St. Mich. § 9168, being punishable by impris-
onment in the state prison, and not being de-
clared a misdemeanor, is a felony as regards
the right of an officer to arrest without war-
"felony," when used in any statute, shall be
rant; section 9430 providing that the term
offender shall be liable to punishment by death
construed to mean an offense for which the
or by imprisonment in the state prison.-Fire-
stone v. Rice, (Mich.) 885.
Probable cause.

2. Representations that a dam had been cut,
and that the informers had tracked two per-
sons to the house of Z., for whom and for an
unknown person they had a warrant, were
made to a sheriff in the night, and no reason
appeared for doubting their truth. At the
house of Z. the shoes and pantaloons of Z. and
plaintiff, who were the only male occupants,
were found to be wet, and the shoes were
claimed by informers to correspond with the
tracks. A wet spade was found in the house,
on which was sand, claimed to resemble that
of the dam. Held, that the sheriff had rea-

From taxes, see Constitutional Law, 11, 12. sonable cause for arresting plaintiff for the

Selection by debtor.

An execution debtor is not obliged to select
mortgaged property for his exemptions, and
a mortgagee of the debtor may, as against the
execution creditor, properly release from his
mortgage property selected by the debtor as
exemptions.-Ganong v. Green, (Mich.) 661.

offense.-Id.

3. Where two prisoners, arrested for felony
on a dark night by two officers, to whom they
were not known, and who were informed that
they were "slippery" and desperate, had to be
taken 80 rods along a winding wood road to a
buggy, and it was a night's drive to their des-
tination, and there was nothing to show ma-
lice or ill will on the part of the officers, they

were justified in using handcuffs, though it | company, is insufficient, as not showing any
afterwards appeared that the prisoners were
inoffensive and reputable.-Id.

4. The statements of the prosecutor, before
and at the time of the arrest, are competent
upon the question of probable cause for mak-
ing the arrest, and that of the reasonableness
of the use of handcuffs.-Id.

Liability of one aiding sheriff.

5. Under How. St. Mich. $$ 591, 9250, au-
thorizing the sheriff to call upon citizens for
aid in apprehending a person for crime, and
providing a penalty for the refusal to furnish
such aid, a person is justified in aiding the
sheriff in making an arrest, when so required,
if he does nothing wantonly nor beyond what
he is required to do, though the sheriff's acts
are without authority.-Id.
Indictment.

6. An information charging that defendant
"with force and arms did make an assault in
and upon one E. P., then and there unlawfully
and injuriously, and against the will of her,
and without any legal warrant, authority, or
reasonable or justifiable cause whatever, did
imprison, and detain so imprisoned, her there
for the space of one hour next following, "etc.,
although it may not charge the specific offense
of false imprisonment as defined by Rev. St.
Wis. § 4387, does sufficiently charge the offense
of false imprisonment as a misdemeanor at
common law.-Davies v. State, (Wis.) 722.

FALSE PRETENSES.
Indictment.

causal connection between the false repre-
sentations and the giving of the notes.-Peo-
ple v. Brown, (Mich.) 916.

4. An information for obtaining goods by
false pretenses must contain an allegation that
the pretenses are false in fact; and an in-
formation charging that defendant, by means
of false representations concerning a mort-
gage, induced parties to give him certain goods
where the only allegations of the falsity of
in exchange therefor is fatally defective
the pretenses are that in truth and in fact de-
fendant well knew that all his representations
were false.-People v. Reynolds, (Mich.) 923.
Evidence.

5. Evidence that defendant, on a former oc-
casion, committed a like crime against the
same person as now alleged in the indictment,
is competent, as bearing on the question of in-
tent.-State v. Jamison, (Iowa,) 509.
the loan, received and retained the excess,
6. Evidence that defendant, who negotiated
paid the interest thereon as it fell due, and
altered the coupons before giving them to the
mortgagor, is admissible on the question of

intent. Id.
Instructions.

7. An instruction that if defendant, on a
former occasion, committed a like 'crime
against the same person as alleged in the
present indictment, that fact is to be consid-
ered in determining his intent in doing the
acts for which he is now on trial, does not
state that defendant committed such anteced-
ent crime, and is proper.-Id.

8. An instruction that "there must be an in-
1. Under Code Iowa, § 4073, providing that tent to defraud, but actual defrauding is not
if any person, by false pretense, and with the necessary to be shown, provided the intent be
intent to defraud, obtain the signature of any proven," is not error, since, when properly
person to any written instrument, the false construed, it means only that no actual pecun-
making of which would be punished as a for-iary loss need have happened.—Id.
gery, he shall be punished, etc., an indictment
charging that defendant, being a loan agent,
employed to make a loan of $300 to plaintiff,
the same to be obtained from the Davenport

Fences.

Savings Bank, secured by false representation By railroads, see Railroad Companies, 23, 24.

the delivery by S. to himself of a mortgage

for $400 therefor, is sufficient, and does not
import that defendant received such mortgage

Fire Insurance.

as S.'s agent, and so omit the essential fact See Insurance.
of delivery.-State v. Jamison, (Iowa,) 509.

2. An indictment need not state that land,
described in a mortgage alleged to have been
fraudulently obtained, belonged to the person
who executed that instrument, since Code
Iowa, § 3917, provides that if any person, with
intent to defraud, falsely make any instru-
ment in writing, purporting to be the act of
another, by which any pecuniary demand or
obligation is created, he shall be demed guilty
of forgery. Id.

3. An information charging the obtaining
of the signature of a person to two certain
promissory notes on false and fraudulent rep-
resentations as to the Bohemian Oat & Cereal
Company, of which defendant claimed to be
agent, which does not state the consideration
of the notes, to whom they were payable, and
whether negotiable or not, or whether they
were used in any dealings between the maker
and such company, or respondent and the

Variance.

FORGERY.

be dated January 7, 1885, but the copy set out
1. Where a forged instrument purported to
in the indictment showed it to be dated Jan-
uary 7, 1884, it was proper to charge that such
variance was not material.-State v. Blanch-
ard, (Iowa,) 519.
Evidence.

2. On the trial of one indicted for forgery,
it was proper for the court to charge the jury
that the facts that the instrument purported
to have been executed in M county, and
that defendant had it in possession in that
county at about the time it purports to have
been executed, were competent evidence to be
considered by the jury in determining wheth-

er the offense was committed within the fraud the creditors of the debtor.-Ellwood v.
county.-Id.

FRAUD.

May, (Neb.) 793.
Knowledge of grantee.

2. In an action by a creditor to set aside cer-
tain deeds for fraud, where there is evidence

See, also, Deceit; Fraudulent Conveyances. showing that certain intermediate convey-
What constitutes.

ances between the debtor and the last pur-
In an action for fraud in a sale of land, it but such last purchaser is shown to be a bona
chaser are tainted with fraud as to creditors,
appeared that plaintiff purchased the land of
defendant, who alone received the considera- fide purchaser for value, and without actual
tion, but that plaintiff made inquiries of anoth-or constructive notice of plaintiff's claim,
er in reference to the land. Held, that if plain- plaintiff's bill will be dismissed.-Halverson
tiff was influenced in making the purchase by V. Brown, (Iowa,) 123.*
the information thus received, and defend.
ant was really acting as agent, in making the
sale, for the person giving such information,
plaintiff may recover on showing fraud on the
part of defendant.-Norris v. Kipp, (Iowa,)
152.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Purchase of goods, see Sale, 3.

Between husband and wife.

3. Where plaintiff, believing his son-in-law
to be possessed of considerable wealth, and,
under false representations, has advanced
large sums of money to him, a voluntary con-
veyance by the son-in-law of all his land to his
wife, in pursuance of a common design be-
tween husband and wife to defraud plaintiff
of his money, will be set aside.-Taylor v.
Branscombe, (Iowa,) 400.

Action to set aside.

Promise to pay the debt of another. 4. Defendants contended that plaintiff gave
1. Where the debtor of both plaintiffs and no consideration for his mortgage, and that it
defendant absconds, leaving property with was given to hinder, delay, and defraud cred-
defendant, who promises orally to pay plain-itors. The court refused to charge the jury
tiffs' claim, on being informed that plaintiffs
would attach, the promise is without consid-
eration, and within the statute of frauds,
whether defendant appropriates the property
to his own use or not, since plaintiffs had ac
quired no title to or lien on the property that
would pass to defendant on plaintiffs' relin-
quishing their right to attach.-Stewart v.
Jerome, (Mich.) 895.*

Agreement relating to land.

2. A contract for the sale of real estate was
made by parol, and a deed thereunder made
by the grantor, and left in the hands of his
agents to await the arrival of the grantee's
money. Held, that as there was no delivery

of the deed, that it was not available as a
memorandum of a contract; nor would a cer-
tain mortgage and notes executed by the
grantee, but not delivered, constitute a part
of such memorandum. - Wier v. Batdorf,
(Neb.) 22.

Agreements not to be performed in

a year.

3. An oral agreement between father and
son, by which the latter is to support his pa
rents during their lives, is not within the stat-
ute of frauds, as it may be performed within
a year.-Carr v. McCarthy, (Mich.) 241.*

FRAUDULENT CONVEY-

ANCES.

See, also, Creditors' Bill.

Payment of debt by stock.

1. A creditor of an insolvent debtor may
obtain from him payment in full of a bona
fide debt in property, provided its fair value
does not exceed the amount of the debt, and
such creditor will not, for that cause alone,
be chargeable with intending to delay or de-

that they should consider the fact that the
mortgage covered a large amount of property,
and that if they found that it was largely in
excess of an amount sufficient to cover the
mortgage debt they should consider this as
a circumstance, with other facts proven, as
bearing upon the bona fides of the parties. -
Ganong v. Green, (Mich.) 661.

5. A creditor is not entitled to have a fraud-
ulent conveyance or incumbrance of his debt-
until he has obtained judgment at law for such
or's property set aside in favor of his claim
claim, or has otherwise exhausted his legal
remedies.-Goode v. Garrity, (Iowa,) 150.
Evidence.

6. Notwithstanding the provision of Code
Iowa, § 4074, that any person who knowingly
is a party to any conveyance of goods made
with intent to defraud creditors shall be fined
and imprisoned, defendant in an action to en-
force a chattel mortgage executed by him in
dence that plaintiff gave no consideration for
fraud of his creditors may show by parol evi-
such mortgage, and that he took it with the
intent and purpose of defeating a judgment
creditor of defendant. - Galpin v. Galpin,
(Iowa,) 156.

7. Plaintiff was being cross-examined as to
certain property of the mortgagor not in-
volved in the suit, which he took into his pos-
session after the levy, and was asked to "tell
the jury why, with all this degree of business
ability, you have not looked after that prop-
erty, and secured what was due you." Held,
that under the issue of plaintiff's bona fides
in his transactions with the mortgagor, the
court erred in excluding this question.-Ga-
nong v. Green, (Mich.) 661.

8. Where vendee testifies that he obtained
money from his brother to pay for goods sold
to him, as is claimed in fraud of creditors, the
admission of judgment rolls in causes against
his brother, for the purpose of disputing the

and been required to enter into a recognizance
to keep the peace, and it is shown that the
threats were made by him, he will not on ha- Signature of wife, see Mortgages, 2.
beas corpus be discharged.-State v. Banks,
(Neb.) 830.

4. Chapter 43, Gen. Laws Minn. 1887, pro-
3. An instruction that in a mutual combat,
viding that parties petitioning for a highway where both parties are in the wrong, both are
shall pay for the damages, is not in conflict
with the constitution, article 1, § 13, as a tak-responsible for the result of their acts, and
ing of property without compensation first
paid.-Id.