it, we generally understand a disposition, not merely to return suffering for suffering, but to inflict a degree of pain on the person, who is supposed to have injured us, beyond what strict justice requires. So that revenge seems to differ from resentment rather in degree than in kind; in other words, it is unrestrained or excessive resentment. It is true, however, that it generally implies something more than mere excess. It commonly exhibits the aspect of coolness and deliberateness in its designs; and is as persevering in the execution of its hostile plans, as it is deliberate in forming them. If resentment, when properly regulated, may be considered, on the principles of nature, as morally right; revenge, which is the unrestrained or inordinate form of resentment, is always morally wrong. It is a passion, which is not only greatly inconsistent with the due exercise of the other powers of the mind, but is equally condemned by enlightened conscience and the Scriptures.

§. 163. Illustrations of the malevolent passions.

It would not be a difficult matter to bring forward some affecting illustrations of the unrestrained and undue indulgence of the malevolent passions, which have thus far come under our notice. In the tragedy of Othello, the pen of Shakspeare has successfully employed itself in developing the workings and the results of the fatal passion of Jealousy; and if this great poem be styled a fiction, considered in relation to history, it will probably be admitted to be immutable truth, considered in relation to nature. Revenge, in its morc determined and persevering exhibitions, is a passion at least equally dreadful. Among Savage tribes in particular, as we learn from the frequent testimony of those who have travelled among them, to take vengeance, deep, unabated, ample, would seem to be the surest passport to an honorable place and name. But it is not among Savage nations alone, that revenge is found, even in its most embittered forms. There is mention made in the writings of Garcilasso of a Spanish gentleman, named Aguire, who, having on some occasion offended a Governor of one of the cities of South America, was sentenced to be ignominiously scourged in public. The citizens took an interest so far as to interpose and entreat a re

mission of the punishment'; and the person himself implored, that death might be substituted instead of it, but without effect. "Aguire, esteeming himself eternally disgraced, retired from the military service, and patiently awaited the expiry of the governor's appointment; when he followed him incessantly as his shadow. The governor warned of his danger, armed himself in mail, and hurried from place to place, in quest of safety. But no sooner had he hopes of rest, than he found his implacable enemy treading on his footsteps, He fled again; and again Aguire pursued him. Thus did three years elapse, while many hundred miles were traversed by both. At last Aguire ventured to enter the governor's house, and finding him asleep in an inner chamber, he pierced him with his dagger, where unprotected by his armor."

Such are the deplorable evils, that are likely to result, when the malevolent passions gain an ascendency. And as, in the present fallen state of man, there is a constant proneness to inordinate malevolent action, it becomes the more important to restrain and duly regulate a tendency so unfavorable, by allowing their full weight to the forgiving and benevolent principles of the Gospel.

§. 164. Nature of the passion of fear.

We conclude this review of this portion of the Affections with a single other notice. The passion of Fear, like the other passions or affections that have past under examination, embraces both a simple emotion of pain, caused by some object which we anticipate will be injurious to us, and also, additional to the painful emotion, the desire of avoiding such object or its injurious effects.--The question might suggest itself with some appearance of reason, whether Fear,in view of the definition just given, should be included under the general head of the Malevolent passions. And this is one of the cases referred to in separating the Affections into the twofold division of the Benevolent and Malevolent, when it was remarked, it might not in all respects be easy to carry the arrangement into effect in its details. Nevertheless the fact, that we experience pain, in viewing the object feared, accompanied with a desire of avoiding it, seems very clearly to involve the idea, that it is an object of greater or less

aversion. In other words, that we have more or less of illwill towards it. It is certainly the case, if the object is of such a nature that its presence is painful, that we can hardly be said to love it. So that at least it would seem to come more naturally under the head of the malevolent affections, than under the other class.

But to return to the nature of the passion itself. The strength or intensity of fear will be in proportion to the apprehended evil. There is a difference of original susceptibility of this passion in different persons; and the amount of apprehended evil will, consequently, vary with the quickness of such susceptibility. But whatever causes may increase or diminish the opinion of the degree of evil, which threatens, there will be a correspondence between the opinion which is formed of it and the fearful passion.

When this passion is extreme, it prevents the due exercise of the moral susceptibility, and interrupts correct judgment of any kind whatever. It is a state of mind of great power, and one which will not bear to be trifled with. It may serve as a profitable hint, to remark, that there have been persons thrown into a fright suddenly, and perhaps in mere sport, which has immediately resulted in a most distressing and permanent mental disorganization. In cases, where the anticipated evil is very great, and there is no hope of avoiding it in any way, the mind exists in that state which is called DESIRE. But the consideration of this deplorable state of mind, so far as it may be necessary to meet the objects of the present Work, will more properly come under the head of Disordered or Alienated Sensibilities.

CHAPTER SEVENTH.

THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

§. 165. Of the nature of love or benevolence in general.

We proceed now to the consideration of the other great division of the Affections. As the original principle of Resentment is the basis of the Malevolent affections; so Love, in its more general form, appears to be at the foundation, as a general thing at least, of those, which are termed, by way of distinction, Benevolent. The affection of Love, like the other affections, is a complex state of mind, embracing, FIRST, a pleasant emotion in view of the object, and, SECOND, a desire of good to that object.Hence there will always be found in the object some quality, either some excellence in the form, or in the relations sustained, or in the intellect, or in the moral traits, or in all combined, which is capable of exciting a pleasurable emotion. This emotion is the basis of the subsequent desire; but it is the strict and indissoluble combination of the two, that constitutes the Affection properly so called.

It is proper to remark here, that there are many modifications or degrees of this affection; such as the unimpassioned preference of friendly regard and esteem, the warmer glow of friendship in the more usual acceptation of the term, and the increased feeling of devoted attachment. There are not only differences in degree, but the affection itself, considered in respect to its nature simply, seems to be modified, and to be invested with a different aspect, according to the circumstances, in which it is found to operate. The love, which children feel for their parents, is different in some respects

from that, which they feel for their brothers and sisters. The love of parents for their children possesses traits, difficult to be described in language but recognizable by Consciousness, which distinguish it from their love to mankind generally, or their love to their country or their friends. Hence we are enabled, in consistency with what is the fact in respect to them, to consider the Affections under different forms or heads, viz, the Parental affection, the Filial affection, the Fraternal affection, Humanity or the love of the human race, Patriotism or the love of country, Friendship, Gratitude, and Sympathy or Pity.

§. 166. Love, in its various forms, characterized by a two-fold action.

Love, not only in its more general form, but in all the varieties, which, in consequence of our situation and of the relations we sustain, it is made to assume, is characterized, like the opposite principle of resentment, by its two-fold action. It is sometimes seen, particularly in parents and children, to operate INSTINCTIVELY; that is to say, without deliberation or forethought. At other times it is subjected to more or less of regulation, being either stimulated or repressed in its exercise, by the facts and reflections which are furnished by reasoning; and then it is said to possess a deliberate or VOLUNTARY exercise.- This trait or characteristic, which pervades the whole series of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, has been so often referred to, that it is unnecessary to delay upon it here.

§. 167. Of the parental affection.

The principle of benevolence, love, or good-will, which in its general form has thus been made the subject of a brief notice, is susceptible, like the malevolent affection of Resentment, of various modifications. One of the most interesting and important of these modifications is the Parental Affection. The view, which we propose to take of this modification of benevolence or love is, that it is an original or implanted principle. In support of this view, a number of things may be said.

I.

It is supported, in the first place, by the consideration, that the relation between the parent and child is much

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