4. A deed to consummate an execution sale, executed before the time of redemption has expired, is void. — Ibid. 5. The act of Congress of May 19th, 1828, adopting for the final process of the United States Courts the laws of the several States on the subject, having by the act of August 1st, 1842, been made applicable to the States afterwards admitted, is to have the same effect in the new States as if originally adopted at the last mentioned date. It is therefore to be construed as adopting such laws of Michigan on the subject as were in force August 1st, 1842.Ibid. 6. On sales made by the United States Marshal in Michigan on demands accruing in 1842, for moneys collected by a public officer, or for misconduct or neglect in office, two years redemption was allowed. - I bid. SALES UNDER DECREE IN CHANCERY. Setting aside: See PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE IN CHANCERY, 14 to 18. SANITY. See EVIDENCE, 3, 4, 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. SEAL. Imports a consideration: See EVIDENCE, 9. SET OFF IN EQUITY. A bill to have a set off allowed to a decree in equity, can not be sustained where the demand sought to be set off would have constituted a defense in the former chancery suit, and where it is not alleged that the facts upon which the set off is claimed were then unknown.- McGraw v. Pettibone, 530. Nor can it be sustained unless the party seeking to obtain the benefit of the set off is the real owner and has control of the counter claim, so that the creditor who sues him is his debtor as to the claim offered in reduction. Ibid. One who receives a conveyance of lands with covenant against incumbrances, and gives back a mortgage for the purchase price, can not, in a suit to foreclose his mortgage, set off the amount of prior incumbrances which he has neither paid nor shows that he has been or is in danger of being damnified by. — Griggs v. Detroit and Milwaukee Railway Co., 117. He does not show that he is damnified by setting up the foreclosure in Chancery of an incumbrance, and the sale of the mortgaged 5. premises, but without alleging that he was a party to the suit or in any way bound thereby. - Ibid. Where a mortgage was given by a railway company to trustees for the bond holders, and these trustees purchased on the foreclosure of a prior mortgage a parcel of land which had been conveyed to. the company, and the purchase was made by them in their own right, and not as trustees, it was held, that the purchase could not be treated as a payment of the mortgage by them as trustee mortgagees, so as to entitle the amount to be set off against a mortgage given by the railway company for the purchase price of the land. - Ibid. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. Where land contracted to be conveyed, is deeded away to a third person, both the party to the contract and the person to whom the land has been conveyed, are necessary parties to a bill for specific performance. Dailey v. Litchfield, 29. Bill for the specific performance of a contract to exchange certain lands of defendants for other lands of complainants. The bill alleged complainants to be owners in fee simple of the lands to be exchanged by them. Held a sufficient statement of what the title was. Ibid. 3. Held further, that if defendants intended to deny the title, or to insist on incumbrances as an objection to performance, they should put the title or encumbrances in issue by their answer And the burden of proof would then be upon them to show defects. — Ibid. 4. Complainants notified the other party to the contract to meet them at the office where the contract was drawn, and exchange deeds-that place having been agreed upon between them for that purpose at the time the contract was entered into. They went to the office at the time specified, executed a deed of the land to be conveyed by them, and left it there for delivery-the other party not having appeared. They afterwards notified him of what they had done. Held equivalent to a tender of their deed, and a sufficient request for a deed from the other party. It is not necessary in such case for the party claiming specific performance to prepare and tender a deed to be executed by the other party.--Ibid. 5. 6. In a bill for the specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of land, a part of the consideration for which was certain clearing and fencing, a general allegation that the same has been performed by complainants in accordance with the contract is sufficient. Ibid. One of the defendants held under a contract of purchase the land agreed to be conveyed by him. Instead of taking a deed to himself, he had it made to the other defendant, his wife, who had 7. notice of the agreement to convey to complainants, and paid no consideration. Held, not necessary to demand a deed of the wife before filing a bill for specific performance. In such a case the wife can have no right of dower. — Ibid. Where by the terms of a contract a sum is mentioned as "liquidated damages" for the non-performance of several distinct stipulations of very different degrees of importance, and this sum is to be payable equally on a failure to perform the least as of that to perform the most important, or the whole of them together, it is in legal effect a penalty, and not stipulated damages; and the fixing of such a penalty by the contract is no objection to specific performance. - Ibid. STATE TREASURER. See EMBEZZLEMENT BY STATE TREASURER, 1. 2. STATE TREASURY. What is. See EMBEZZLEMENT BY STATE TREASURER, 8. STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF. A law must be understood as beginning to speak at the moment it takes effect, and not before. If passed to take effect at a future day, it must be construed as if passed on that day, and ordered to take immediate effect. Per CHRISTIANCY J., CAMPBELL J. concurring. Rice v. Ruddiman, 125. The act organizing the county of Muskegon, approved February 4, 1859, not being ordered to take immediate effect, went into operation under the Constitution, May 16, 1849. The act provided for an election of county officers "at the annual township meeting to be held in April next." This must be construed to mean the April next after the law took effect; and in the absence of proof to the contrary, individuals acting as county officers in October, 1860, must be presumed to have been elected in April, 1860, and not in April, 1859. Per CHRISTIANCY J., CAMPBELL J. concurring.-1bid. ý 3099; Petition of Guardian for license to sell lands, 3191-3; Filing of Chattel Mortgages, 3292 et seq.; Control of married women over their property, Surt by married woman for exempt property, Ú 3436-7; Finding of Facts by Circuit Judge, 3438; Cases Made after judgment, 3596; Appeal in Chancery, 4160, 4172; Suit against several parties to bill or note, 4339; Who not an incompetent witness, 4344; Venue in action for obstructing navigable stream, 458 4441; Confession of judgment, 272 §§ 4464, 4465; Exemption of provisions, and of food for stock, 538 ýý 5771-2; Embezzlement by State and County officers, 5783; False pretenses, 54 310 341 125, 250 372, 395 400 LAWS OF 1859: Page 459; Bequests to Religions Societies, LAWS OF 1861: Page 169; Statement of prisoner, how far evidence, ACTS OF CONGRESS Of May 19, 1828, and August 1, 1842, relative to final process from U. S. Courts, STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. STIPULATED DAMAGES. See LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 212 486 SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS TO RECOVER LANDS. 1. The complaint in summary proceedings against tenants and others to recover possession of land, may be in general form, without setting forth the particular facts making a case within the statute; but it must show that complainant is entitled to the possession of the premises at the time of the making of the complaint.—Bryan v. Smith, 229. 2. Where the complaint only showed that complainant became entitled to the possession upwards of fourteen months before the proceeding was instituted, it was held not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Commissioner to try and determine the case.-Ibid. 3. And where the complaint was insufficient to confer jurisdiction, but the Commissioner nevertheless proceeded to hear the case, and gave judgment for the complainant, and the defendant appealed to he Circuit Court, which decided that the complaint did not confer jurisdiction and reversed the judgment; it was held that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to render a judgment for costs in favor of the defendant.-Ibid. SUPERVISORS, BOARD OF. See COUNTIES, 3, 4. |