1.

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT.

See JUSTICES COURTS; PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS, 7, 8, 9.

CONFUSION OF GOODS.

The party guilty of a fraudulent admixture of saw logs owned by himself with those owned by another, so that it is impossible any longer to identify his own, loses all interest in them, and is remediless if such other person appropriate the whole mass to his own use. Per MANNING J., CHRISTIANCY J. concurring. CAMPBELL J. dissented, holding that, where the evidence showed the logs to be of a uniform value per thousand feet, the person who had intermingled them was entitled to reclaim from the common mass an equivalent to his own logs. MARTIN CH. J. gave no opinion on this question.-Stephenson v. Little, 433.

2. Per MARTIN CH. J., the person whose property another has fraudulently admixed with his own, has the right to take possession of the whole mass for the purpose of separating and securing, or of disposing of, the portion belonging to himself; and if it cannot be separated, and he advertise and sell his interest in the whole, he does not thereby render himself liable to the other for the conversion of his property. He has, at the very least, as respects the property so commingled, the rights of a tenant in common.-Ibid.

CONSIDERATION.

See CONTRACT, 4; EVIDENCE, 9.

1.

CONSPIRACY.

An information for a conspiracy to do an unlawful act must set forth the unlawful thing agreed upon, but it need not specify the means to be resorted to for that purpose. People v. Clark, 310.

2. And therefore an information which charged defendant and a person unknown with having conspired "by divers false pretenses, subtle means and devices, to obtain and acquire to themselves of and from one W. a sum of money, to wit: the sum of ten dollars, of the moneys of said W., and to cheat and defraud him the said W. thereof," was held sufficient. — Ibid.

3.

4.

It is not essential to the offense in such case that the cheat designed be by means of a token, writing, or similar device.Ibid.

Nor is it necessary that the means should be of any specific character. The crime may be complete notwithstanding the

conspirators leave the particular means by which the fraud is to be accomplished to be determined by circumstances. — Ibid.

5. Under an information for a conspiracy to defraud, if the conspiracy is proved the case is made out, whether any fraud was committed in pursuance of it or not. - Ibid.

6.

It is not essential that the pretenses by which a fraud is accomplished be expressed in words. Falsehood when deliberately acted is the same as spoken falsehood. - Ibid.

CONSTABLE.

Arrest by without warrant: See CRIMINAL LAW, 5, 6.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF; STATUTES CONSTRUED AND COMMENTED ON.

CONTEMPT IN REFUSING TO TESTIFY.

See WITNESS, 1, 2, 3.

CONTRACT.

1. The validity of a contract made in another State and payable there, will be determined by the law of that State.-Collins Iron Co. v. Burkam, 283.

2. And where such a contract is usurious, but the law of that State does not avoid it on that ground, but only affects the remedy upon it, the courts of this State can enforce the contract, but by no other remedies than those afforded by our own laws. -- Ibid.

3. The provisions of the Ohio statutes which provide for the recovery or appropriation of usury paid upon a contract, form no part of the contract, but relate solely to the remedy which will be afforded by the courts of that State to the party from whom usury is taken. - Ibid.

4.

5.

Where on a settlement of certain bills of exchange, an amount is included in a new bill given for the balance, as statutory damages for the dishonor of the bills settled, and the statute allows no such damages, the new bill is to that extent without consideration. — Ibid.

A contract by which parties undertake to pay for the care and board of a lunatic so long as he shall continue in the Asylum, and to remove him therefrom whenever his room shall be required

for preferred patients, is not terminated by a notice that the parties will no longer be responsible for his care and board To relieve themselves from liability they must remove him from the Asylum. Wetmore v. Aldrich, 515.

Of Guaranty: See GUARANTY.

Of Indemnity: See INDEMNITY.

Of Insurance, Condition in: See INSURANCE.

Rights of Assignee: See ASSIGNOR AN ASIGNEE.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See COUNTIES, HOMESTEAD,

CONVEYANCES.

See DEEDS; RECORDING LAWS.

CORPORATIONS.

See PLANK ROAD COMPANIES.

COSTS.

See CERTIORARI TO JUSTICES COURTS, 2; PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN CHANCERY, 19; PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COUrts, 6.

COUNTIES.

1. Fractional townships, as surveyed by the United States, are townships within the meaning of the clause in the State Constitution which provides that organized counties shall not be reduced to "less than sixteen townships as surveyed by the United States," unless the act providing therefor be submitted to and ratified by the people of the counties. Rice v. Ruddiman, 125.

2.

A county may be created and have existence as such, notwithstanding it has no county officers. Per MARTIN CH. J.-People v. Carleton, 250.

3. Where a new county is created by setting off for that purpose organized townships from existing counties, the supervisors of these townships are thenceforth supervisors of the new county, their powers being conferred and duties imposed by the general laws of the State, instead of by the act creating the new county. Per MARTIN CH. J. and MANNING J.-Ibid.

4. The Constitution having provided that the action of the Board of County Auditors in adjusting county demands should be subject to no appeal, the Supreme Court cannot revise their action

by mandamus, and compel them to allow a demand which they have rejected on the ground that the services charged for were not performed. - People v. Auditors of Wayne, 307.

COUNTY CLERK.

See COUNTIES, 2; OFFICERS.

1.

COVENANT.

One member of a firm covenanted with the other to pay the debts of the firm, and save the other harmless therefrom. Such a covenant is not one of indemnity merely, but an omission to pay the creditors as their demands became due would constitute Dye v. Mann, 291.

a breach of it..

See INDEMNITY.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. Where in a criminal case exceptions are taken to the admission of evidence and to the charge of the Court, and after conviction and before judgment the case is brought to the Supreme Court for review upon the exceptions, the sufficiency of the information is necessarily in question. - People v. McKinney, 54.

2. Where an information contains several counts for the same offense, some of which are bad and the others good, the good counts will support a general verdict of guilty and judgment thereon.Ibid.

3. The statute (Comp. L. 5954) which provides that "The term 'felony' when used in this title, or in any other statute, shall be construed to mean an offense for which the offender on conviction shall be liable by law to be punished by death, or by imprisonment in the State prison" is only a legislative definition of the term "felony," as used in those provisions of the statute where neither the particular offense, nor its grade, is otherwise indicated than by the use of this term; and where, therefore, the definition became necessary, as it was not intended to be used in the common law sense. Those acts which were felonies at common law remain such notwithstanding this section, though by statute they may be subjected to a less punishment than that here mentioned. Drennan v. People, 169.

4. And therefore larceny, though of property to the value of less than twenty-five dollars, being a felony at the common law, is still a felony in this State. - Ibid.

5.

A constable who has knowledge that a warrant has been issued for the arrest of a person for felony, may himself lawfully make

6.

7.

8.

9.

the arrest without having the warrant in his possession. But he should inform the person arrested of the facts, or at least of the offense for which he is arrested. - Ibid.

Where an officer, attempting to make an arrest on reasonable suspicion of felony, is asked for his authority, and says he has a warrant, but refuses to produce it, and gives no explanation whatever, but makes the arrest with circumstances of violence, and the person arrested resists and kills the officer, he is not guilty of murder in so doing. — Ibid.

A Prosecuting Attorney, having discovered an error in an indictment, corrected it without the leave of the Court, and the case went to trial on the indictment as corrected. Attention being called to the alteration on the trial, the Court below decided that the alteration by the Prosecuting Attorney in a material point would vitiate the indictment. Held erroneous. People v. Cook, 164. The defendant might object to allowing such an amendment to stand, and the effect of his objection would be to restore the indictment to its original shape. But the prosecuting officer could not treat it as a nullity; and if the cause was tried and defendant acquitted on the indictment as amended, the acquittal would be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, provided the indictment, as it read at the time of the trial, was sufficient. I bid:

The question of the sufficiency of an indictment can not be referred to the jury as a question of fact — Ibid.

10. In a prosecution for an assault with intent to murder, the actual intent to kill must be found, and that under circumstances which would make the killing murder. Maher v. People, 212.

11. Malice aforethought is as essential an ingredient of the offense of murder as the act of killing, and the presumption of innocence applies equally to both ingredients of the offense. Hence the burden of proof, as to each, rests upon the prosecution. — Ibid. 12. If a homicide be committed under the influence of passion, or in heat of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual control, and is the result of the temporary excitement by which the control of reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition, the offense is manslaughter only, and not murder.Ibid.

13. To reduce the offense to this grade, the reason must, at the time of the act, be disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might render an ordinary man, of fair average disposition, liable to act rashly, or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion rather than judgment. I bid.