NEVIUS v. BANK OF LANSING BURGH.

upon facts shown is a question of law; and any rule which leaves it indefinite must always leave parties in doubt concerning their legal rights and liabilities. It is doubtless as easy to serve a notice personally a little. beyond a city line as within it; but if any extension is made requiring service beyond, the law must determine how far beyond such service is required, and for this we have no rule furnished. Any rule adopted must be in some respects an arbitrary one, and we think the established one is the safest. We are aware that in Newberry v. Trowbridge, 4 Mich. 391, upon a supposition that the post office laws imposed no duty to deliver any letters except those transmitted by mail, it was held service could not be made by depositing a letter in the office which was not to be sent to another office. This being a question of United States law, we think the decision in the case of the Bank of Columbia v. Laurence, 1 Pet. 578, sufficiently declared that such a use of the post office is lawful. Provision was made for postage on drop letters as early as 1825 (Act of 3d March, 1825, § 36), and now postage is required to be prepaid. There can be no doubt of the duty of postmasters to deliver such letters. And as regards the question of convenience, such a method is entirely reasonable. A person is more likely to receive a drop-letter than one transmitted to him from a distance, because he escapes the risks of the road.

It was claimed in this case that, inasmuch as the notice was actually received, all further proof was unnecessary. But the proof did not show it to have been received the day after the dishonor of the note; and the case must stand upon the sufficiency of the delivery through the post office.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial must be ordered.

The other Justices concurred.

INDEX TO CASES REPORTED IN THIS VOLUME.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
See DEEDS, 4, 5.

ACTION.

1. To warrant any recovery in an action upon contract, a right of action must arise upon a contract made by a party to the record.Litchfield v. Garratt, 426.

2. Suit was brought in the name of parties to a written contract, for the benefit of assignees of such contract, and was sought to be supported by proof of labor done by the assignees in pursuance of an arrangement between them and the contracting party, modifying the terms of the contract, which arrangement was not shown to have been authorized or assented to by the assignor. Held, that the action could not be maintained, as the modified contract was not a contract between the parties to the record.Ibid.

3. Where suit was brought against a public officer, for balances reported against him at three several times, it was held that the action must be deemed to have accrued against him at the date of the last balance.-Gorham v. Wing, 486.

4. An action on the case for obstructing a navigable stream, though local at the common law, is transitory under the statute.Barnard v. Hinkley, 458.

ADMINISTRATOR.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN CHANCERY, 19.

ADULTERY.

Homicide committed under provocation of. See CRIMINAL LAW, 10 to 18.

AMENDMENT.

Of Indictment or Information. See CRIMINAL LAW, 7, 8.

Of Assignment of Errors. See PRACTICE IN SUPREME Court, 7.

Of Bill in Chancery. See PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE IN CHANCERY, 1.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

APPEAL IN CHANCERY.

An appellant in Chancery cannot complain of errors not affecting his own interests.-Griggs v. D. & M. Railway Co., 117.

A decretal order allowing a general demurrer to a bill in chancery, but not in terms dismissing the bill or awarding costs, is not a final decree from which an appeal can be taken to this Court.-Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 398.

The order of the Circuit Court in Chancery opening for review a decree for permanent alimony in a divorce case, and ordering a reference to a Circuit Court Commissioner to take proofs, &c, and to report thereon, is not a final order from which an appeal can be taken to this Court.-Perkins v. Perkins, 425.

An appeal in chancery will not be dismissed for the failure of the Register to cause a copy of the record to be transmitted to this Court within the time provided by the statute, if such copy is actually filed before the motion to dismiss is made. — Garratt v. Litchfield, 451.

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Nor will it be dismissed for the failure on the part of the appel
lant to serve notice thereof on co-defendants, as required by
Supreme Court Rule 14, when such failure is sufficiently excused.
Ibid.

On an appeal in Chancery from a hearing on pleadings and proofs, all matters of mere form are to be disregarded, if the pleadings are good in substance. - Dye v. Mann, 291.

APPEAL FROM SUPERVISORS AND AUDITORS.

See COUNTIES, 4.

ARBITRATION.

See AWARD.

ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT.

See CRIMINAL LAW; 5, 6.

ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 10 to 18.

ASSESSMENTS.

See EQUITY.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 1, 2, 7.

ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE.

1. Where a contract is assigned for the sole purpose of enabling the assignees to collect and apply certain moneys coming due to the assignors thereon, and then to be re-assigned, the assignees are not authorized without the consent of the assignors to assume the performance of the contract, or to change its terms by agreement with the contracting party.-Litchfield v. Garratt, 426. See MORTGAGE, 7, 8, 9, 10.

1.

2.

3.

ATTACHABLE INTERESTS IN LANDS.

The interest of a mortgagee in lands is not subject to attachment. Columbia Bank v. Jacobs, 349.

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Where lands are conveyed by deed absolute on its face, for the purpose of securing a debt, and a written defeasance is given back by the grantee, and the deed is recorded but the defeasance is not, such defeasance is not made void by the statute (Comp. L. (2751), except as to purchasers for a valuable consideration, without actual notice of its existence. — Ibid.

An attaching creditor is not a purchaser within the meaning of the recording laws, until the property attached has been sold in pursuance of law, and purchased in by him. - Ibid,

4. The provision in the attachment law, that "Real estate shall be bound, and the attachment shall be a lien thereon, from the time when it was attached, if a certified copy of the attachment, with a description of such real estate, shall be deposited in the office of the Register of Deeds " "within three days after such real estate was attached," only gives the creditor a lien on the debtor's attachable interest in the lands, and in no way interferes with the previously acquired rights of third persons.Ibid.

5.

Trust estates are not liable to execution. - Gorham v. Wing, 486.

1.

ATTACHMENT.

A. sued out of the Circuit Court an attachment, which was levied upon the property of his debtor. At the time of suing it