Dissenting Opinion: Miller, Woods, Matthews, Gray, JJ. Other objections of a technical character are also raised, but we do not deem it necessary to notice them. Our views of the merits of the case are such that, whilst the complainant has not seen fit to take an appeal, and, therefore, can only ask for an affirmance of the decree, yet that no mere formal objections ought to stand in the way of such affirmance. A decree cannot justly be rendered for the defendants. The decree of the Circuit Court is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE MILLER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE WOODS, MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS, and Mr. JUSTICE GRAY, dissenting. In a great many of the States of the Union a period is allowed of from twelve to fifteen months to redeem real estate from sale under execution, by payment of the amount for which it was sold, and interest on that amount. In nearly all these States this right of redemption attaches in sales made under chancery decrees as well as judgments at law. In such cases, whether the statute, as in Massachusetts, provides that the conveyance shall be made by the sheriff or other officer immediately after the sale, or, as in many of the western States, only at the end of the time allowed for redemption, the title of the purchaser does not become absolute until that time has expired. In the case before us, it is not denied that the appellant received the sheriff's deed in accordance with the law of the State, and that the appellee failed to redeem within the time allowed. It is of the utmost importance where this redemption law prevails, that the right thus granted should be strictly exercised according to the statute. For, in addition to the sanctity which the law concedes to judicial sales, founded on well-considered reasons of policy as old as the law itself, the favor of allowing the debtor one year more to save his land, after judgment and sale under execution have fixed his rights, only adds to his obligation to exercise the right thus granted in strict accordance with its terms. In the case before us the judge who rendered the decree below stated that the conspiracy charged in the bill was not Statement of Facts. proved, nor did he rely upon any act of fraud, and for that reason he refused to set aside the sale, but permitted, under a new prayer in the bill, the appellee to redeem on payment of the debt, interest and all costs, including fees of counsel. The counsel of appellee in the brief expressly declines to rely upon an actual fraud on the part of Graffam. In our opinion there is no evidence of such misconduct on his part as afforded any ground, in law or equity, to justify appellee in her failure to redeem from the sale. There is no reason why she did not pay the judgment rendered against her, of which she had full notice. Certainly no obstruction was interposed to her exercise of the right of redemption, and no promise made to induce her to forego it. Yet, after Graffam had acquired a complete legal title under judicial proceedings which were unimpeachable, the court treats the case as if the whole matter was still in fieri, and gives further time for redemption. I do not deem it appropriate to enter into the discussion of the evidence in this case, but I dissent from the judgment and the opinion of the court as leading to evil results, in discrediting judicial sales, and embarrassing the due and just exercise of the right of redemption, by turning it into a question of judicial discretion.. JUSTICES WOODS, MATTHEWS and GRAY concur in this opinion. AKERS, Executor v. AKERS. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE. Submitted March 1, 1886.-Decided March 8, 1886. A suit cannot be removed from a State court under the act of March 3, 1875, unless the requisite citizenship for removal existed when the suit was begun, as well as when the application for removal was made. Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U. S. 561 affirmed and applied. This cause was commenced in State court. of Tennessee in March, 1882. In the following October an order for its re Opinion of the Court. moval into the Circuit Court of the United States, founded on a petition of defendant's, which averred, among other things, "that the controversy in said suit is between citizens of different States, and that the petitioner is a citizen of the State of Kentucky," was made. The Circuit Court on the 25th October, 1882, made the following order and judgment. "The petition for the removal of this case from the State court to this court failing to aver that the parties were citizens of different States at the commencement of this suit, and it further appearing from the admission of said parties that both plaintiff and defendant were citizens of Tennessee at the time said suit was commenced, the court entertains the opinion that it is without jurisdiction, and doth thereupon order and adjudge that the cause be remanded to the Circuit Court of Davidson County, the tribunal from which it came; and it is further considered by the court that the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant his costs incurred in this court, for which execution is awarded; to which judgment of the court the defendant then and there excepted." The defendant sued out this writ of error to review that judgment. On motion of the defendant in error the cause was advanced under Rule 32, and was then submitted. Mr. S. Watson for defendant in error. No appearance for plaintiff in error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The order remanding this cause is affirmed on the authority of Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U. S. 561, it being admitted that both the plaintiff and the defendant were citizens of Tennessee at the time the suit was brought. Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. JOHNSON v. KEITH & Another. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI. Submitted March 2, 1886.-Decided March 8, 1886. A judgment of reversal in a State court, accompanied by an order remanding the cause for a retrial, is not a final judgment for the purpose of a writ of error to this court. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 4, affirmed. This was a motion to dismiss a writ of error "because the record and mandate of the said Supreme Court of Missouri in this cause, brought up by such writ of error, shows on the face thereof that no final judgment or decree was rendered or made in this cause by said Supreme Court of Missouri; but on the contrary thereof, it appears from such record and mandate, that the judgment and decree of the inferior court, to wit: The said Circuit Court of Lafayette County, Missouri, was, by such Supreme Court of Missouri, reversed; and that this cause was by such Supreme Court of Missouri remanded to the said Circuit Court of Lafayette County, Missouri, for further proceedings to be had therein, in conformity with the opinion of said Supreme Court of Missouri in this cause delivered. Such writ of error was prematurely and improvidently sued out and issued." Mr. F. M. Cockrell for the motion. No one opposing. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This motion is granted. A judgment of reversal, accompanied by an order remanding the cause for a retrial, is not a final judgment for the purposes of a writ of error to this court. Houston v. Moore, 3 Wheat. 433; Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 4, and cases there cited. Motion granted. Opinion of the Court. HARWOOD & Another v. DIECKERHOFF & Another. ORIGINAL MOTION IN A CAUSE PENDING IN THIS COURT. Argued March 2, 1886.-Decided March 8, 1886. Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 17, affirmed and applied to this case. On the authority of that case the court declines to increase the amount of the bond given on appeal in this case, or to require additional securities. This was a motion, founded upon accompanying affidavits, "to increase the amount of the bond to be given on appeal, and to require additional securities, or in default thereof, that the appeal taken by the above-named appellants to review the decree of the United States Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit and Northern District of Florida, rendered at the December Term, 1884, that is to say, the 9th day of May, 1885, be dismissed, upon the ground that by reason of the death of N. B. Harwood, one of the appellants, since the date of said decree, the property therein decreed to be sold for the satisfaction of the sums found due to the complainants, has greatly depreciated and is constantly depreciating, and for the want of the care and attention which it had in the lifetime of the said N. B. Harwood, and would now have, but for his death, the security is altogether inadequate; and for such further or other relief or order as may be proper in the premises." Mr. C. J. Babbitt and Mr. W. E. Earle for the motion. Mr. John J. Walker was with them on the brief. Mr. Henry Jackson opposing. Mr. L. I. Fleming was with him on the brief. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This motion is denied on the authority of Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 17. "The circumstances of the case, or of the parties," have not been so changed by the death of N. B. Harwood, one of the appellants, as to make "the security, which, |