So that during the last five years, at least, the amount required for Civil Services has largely increased, while that demanded for the Army and Navy has considerably diminished, and this difference will probably be much larger in the Estimates which are now being prepared for presentation to Parliament, soon after it assembles. In contrasting these figures, and comparing them with those previously quoted for 1841 and 1851 it must not be forgotten that the cost per head for the Naval and Military services has gradually increased, and that the expense of constructing ships, and building forts and barracks, is much heavier now than it was twenty, or ten, or even five, years ago. Our soldiers and sailors are much better clothed, fed, paid, and housed than they were formerly; were we now to see a soldier of 1841, we should hardly believe it possible that our troops were so badly clothed and armed, or that they were then so much less cared for than they now are.

Neither must it be forgotten that there are many heavy charges on the present Estimates for the Army and the Navy which did not appear in those for a quarter of a century ago, or even in those for 1851. To say nothing of the sums required for docks and forts, and new works, being greatly in excess of what they formerly were, we find on looking at the Navy Estimates for 1865-66, such items as:

£915,000 for Coast Guard Service, Naval Coast Volunteers, and Royal Naval Reserve.

£150,000 for iron and armour-plates for ships. £275,000 for coals and fuel.

£171,000 for steam engines,

and we notice in the Army Estimates such sums as £334,000 for volunteers,

£163,000 for Military education,

which amount altogether to more than two millions. There are many other important items which are spread over different parts of the Estimates, which in the aggregate come to nearly a quarter of a million more.

It is true that on the whole we spend much more money now than we did, but we spend it much more honestly. The jobs and sinecures which existed several years ago have now disappeared, and though there is still much pruning to be done to the Estimateswhether Navy, Army, or Civil-it can be done only by devoting the closest attention to the work. Even Sir Cornewall Lewis, whose acuteness, ability and uprightness every one acknowledged, was obliged to confess that after the most anxious and impartial investigation of the subject, he had arrived at the conviction that our large establishments could not be maintained on the existing scale at less than the existing charges.

There are, in fact, many considerations to be taken into account, in speaking of the cost of governing and protecting the country, which may not strike the casual observer, and which appear to have

escaped the notice of several writers on this subject. In alluding to the Navy, for instance, it ought to be remembered that, independently of the force which we are compelled to maintain at home, or near home, not only for the protection of our shores, but also with reference to the strength of the navies kept up by other European Powers, we are obliged to have men-of-war stationed in all parts of the world, and that, as the extent of our colonies increases, so also does the necessity for protecting our fellowcountrymen who may have settled in those out-lying parts of the , empire. Englishmen naturally expect to be guarded by the flag that has braved the battle and the breeze in whatever part of the world they may happen to be, whether pursuing their travels in Italy and Greece, and captured by brigands, or driving a glorious trade at Valparaiso, and threatened to be bombarded by the Spaniards.

With so many new Members in the House of Commons, it is impossible to conjecture what will be the policy pursued in the present Parliament; but we sincerely trust that it will not be different from that pursued under the auspices of the late Premier, and that our Naval and Military Establishments will be maintained in the same state of efficiency as when he was at the helm. Our newly elected representatives will do well to bear in mind what he said in May, 1862, when an attempt was made to reduce the Army and the Navy to what has been most improperly styled a peace footing. "There has been," Lord Palmerston then said, "no panic in the country. There has been a deliberate conviction, calinly and very wisely arrived at, that it was necessary for this country to be in a state of readiness as to its armament, both by sea and land, which would enable it to defend itself in case of attack," and he might have added to avoid the enormous outlay and sacrifice of life which took place when we suddenly found ourselves at war with Russia in 1854.

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A KNOWLEDGE OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES TO MILITARY MEN.

No. 1. Geology, Physical Geography, Meteorology. Nothing can be more stringent and comprehensive than the details of the scientific qualifications required in staff-officers, as set forth in the Queen's Regulations for the army; and if they be as rigorously enforced as they are comprehensively expressed, decidedly the British staff-officer must be second to none in existence. Besides a thorough knowledge of his special profession and his special department, a staff-officer, like a lawyer, cannot know too much of any other subject whatever. For want of a knowledge of "things not generally known" to military men, the best devised U. S. MAG. No. 447, FEB. 1866.

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plans of operation may be disconcerted and the very safety of armies compromised.

In the course of instruction given at our Staff College, we observe the following item, "Elements of natural philosophy, chemistry, and geology, as applied to the Military sciences," and we propose to make it the text of a few observations in one or two departments of science of common and ready application.

If, as Sir John Herschel has remarked, the study of the physical sciences shows us how to avoid attempting impossibilities, secures us from committing important mistakes in attempting what is in itself possible by means either inadequate or actually opposed to the end in view; finally, induces us to attempt, and enables us to accomplish, objects which, but for such knowledge, we should never have thought of undertaking if such be the result of an adequate acquaintance with the physical sciences, it is obvious that no class of men need their aid more than the military, who have very frequently to suffer far more from physical causes than the actual

shock of battle.

Now, of all the sciences, geology is by far the most important to Military men, and therefore it is the one to which their attention should be principally directed. On the nature of the country depends, to a vast extent, the success of our operations, not only in all our own arrangements and combinations, but also as to the probable manœuvres of the enemy. Its geological structure and composition must necessarily influence any movement, the quartering and other matters connected with the subsistence of troops.

For instance, in choosing ground for an encampment, especially for any length of time, when the drainage would become of importance, geology lends its aid in many ways. It shows us the indications which should enable us to avoid wet clays, on the one hand, and where to find dry sand and limestone, on the other. No one acquainted with geology could possibly blunder in this selection; or, if the site must absolutely be selected, the knowledge of the liability of danger would lead to the adoption of prompt and decisive measures of precaution. If Wellington's chosen position, after the campaign of Talavera, in the Valley of the Guadiana, was imperative, in spite of its malaria, causing a large amount of sickness amongst his troops, a knowledge of our modern sanitary laws and expedients would have forefended or mitigated the evil, which could have been calculated upon in advance.

Fuel is an indispensable necessary for armies in campaign as well as in barracks; now, in cases of scarcity of wood for fuel, geology points out where peat will most probably be found; occasionally it might even discover a bed of coal by infallible indications.

The permanent condition of roads is an important consideration in a campaign; the reconnoitring officer has to observe their composition, and whether they are likely to become impassable in bad weather; in this matter geology can lend him valuable assistance.

When operating in a mountainous country, it is often most important to know whether a valley in the vicinity of the enemy can be safely traversed by troops, or whether it would be dangerous to attempt it, in consequence of not being able to occupy the heights on either side. Now, it happens that whether this is possible or not will depend entirely upon the geological aspects of the case-namely, upon the nature and hardness of the rocks, and their power of resisting decomposition, for it is known that those rocks which weather' easily will have smooth sloping sides, and this is especially the case where soft rocks are understratified with hard ones.

A geologist can judge with tolerable certainty as to the nature of a valley, and whether its lateral summit is likely to be accessible.

Mountains are generally most easily ascended from the sides towards which the strata dip. Chains of mountains are imperceptibly connected by smaller mountains or by hills, and, considered in a military light, they constitute advantageous boundaries to a country, as forming a species of almost inaccessible ground, on which not armies, but small corps only are capable of acting, although in such places all kinds of stratagems and ambuscades may be practised to advantage.

Chains of mountains are generally longer than they are broad, and usually run from north-east to south-west; to this direction, exceptions, however, sometimes occur.

In some cases the highest mountains which form the chain lie close together, hence it is, that the source of lakes and rivers may be positively or probably inferred and traced.

The most beautiful woods, meadows, valleys, eminences and variations of ground, may be counted upon in the vicinity of branches of mountains; but although they are less obstructive to military operations on a large scale than chains, they still restrict them in a certain degree. An army may, however, always appuy to advantage one of its wings on a branch of mountains, if all the heights are sufficiently covered by light troops, and all the passes in its possession.

Ridges of low mountains usually possess a fertile soil, produce the best herbs and plants, and afford good pasturage. These ridges may therefore be calculated upon as advantageous positions for an army, or even appropriately chosen as fields of battle, especially if they are not covered with wood, and command the surrounding country.

A high mountain is sometimes surrounded by a number of lower eminences; and when this is the case, that which commands them all must never be left unoccupied, constituting, as it were, the key of the position.

For camps and similar positions, ridges of hills, if long, and if they can be entirely occupied from advantageous situations, and

as far as relates to tactics, ought always to be selected for that purpose. The ridges of hills are in general, curved, and at some parts lower than at others; for this reason, those places should be more especially chosen where a flanking fire can be obtained.

The extent of valleys may be approximately inferred from the figure of the mountains that surround them; for the most part they are several times as long, in various directions, as they are broad.

Chains and branches of mountains terminate sometimes in heights of extraordinary elevation; in this case, the exterior sides are either not very steep, or they consist of rocks, and are then more perpendicular.

The operations carried on near large chains of mountains should be principally conducted by light troops, and on the hills or lower mountains which separate these chains from the level parts of the country.

A valley generally consists of fertile soil, and rivers or rivulets almost constantly run along them. If they extend but a short distance they are nearly straight; but if this be increased, they become exceedingly curved, and often form acute and obtuse angles.

The

Valleys are always favourable for military operations; but care should be taken, in conducting them in such situations, to prevent any part of the army from being out-flanked or taken in rear. various branches into which valleys frequently divide, and the various directions these branches often take, render it absolutely necessary that every officer commanding troops in places of this nature, should have a perfect knowledge of all the local circumstances connected with them, in order to guard against surprises; and instead of sustaining any particular losses from the ambuscade formed by the enemy, to be able to weaken his forces by such

manœuvres.

The connection of mountains with valleys is effected in very different ways; but small valleys are usually inclosed by steep moun tains, and vice versa. The mountains which bound plains are also in general very steep, particularly if they are high. All the parts of a country which connect mountains with valleys and plains, may commonly be passed by light troops; and in this case, they are likewise serviceable to appuy a wing upon, if properly defended by that description of forces.

In looking for passes from one valley to another, either to turn the enemy's position, or to take precautions against being turned, it should be remembered that most of them are made by excavations in slate. If, therefore, a bed of slate can be discovered, it should be followed up to the top of the ridge, and a pass will most likely be found.

Valuable indications may be gathered from the vegetation of localities. Brushwood indicates fenny grounds, usually impassable for cavalry, except when very dry, and when the bushes are neither