Shines forth the slender leaves between; I prayed God bless you, love; and when he

From The Fortnightly Review.
NORWAY AND SWEDEN.

I.

THE CASE FOR NORWEGIAN LIBER

ALISM.

greeable surprise.

prize of the contest. It had been said that Norway once before had been "conquered" when Karl Johan invaded Holstein and dictated the Treaty of Kiel. But it was allowed to be WITH the knowledge which we now rather a stretch of language to call a possess regarding the military and po- country conquered which had not yet litical conditions at the time when the seen a single foreign soldier on its soil, union between Norway and Sweden and of which not one rod of land had was accomplished, we cannot wonder yet been occupied. But now, Norway that Karl Johan acted as he did. It was for the second time conquered cannot surprise us that he offered and according to all the rules of the peace and reconciliation after a cam-game-in the country itself. Sweden paign of fourteen days, in which he had now the double rights of treaty had apparently made good progress, or and of conquest; what should prevent that he concluded the convention of it from taking possession of its own? Moss (14th August, 1814), acknowledg- Yet, in spite of all this, Sweden did not ing the constitution which the Norwe- gain the much coveted extension of gian people had given themselves, the frontier to the west as a compenand further, that an extraordinary Stor-sation for the loss of Finland. Northing was convened in accordance with way not only did not become a Swedish the provisions of this constitution, province, it did not even become a defounded on the sovereignty of the peo- pendency-Sweden had obtained no ple. With this extraordinary Storthing rights over it. Karl Johan was to negotiate the terms No wonder that this was felt as of the Union. But it acted as a fully a bitter disappointment, a most disasovereign National Convention; inIt took a good stead of acknowledging the union of long while before the conditions on Norway with Sweden as an already ex- which the union between Norway and isting judicial fact, it entirely ignored Sweden had been accomplished became the treaty of Kiel and everything con- widely known among the general pubnected therewith, but it elected the lic in Sweden. But it became plain by king of Sweden as king of Norway, degrees that Sweden had obtained no after having by its own sovereign other extension of its power than what power made those changes in the con- follows from a defensive alliance, the stitution which it deemed necessary. stability of which is guaranteed by a The union of the two countries thereby common dynasty; the joy with which absolutely got the character of a volun- the union had at first been received tary agreement between equal parties gave place to a deep and widespread with equal rights. It is not surprising dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction that Karl Johan gave way in all essen- was particularly directed against Karl tials to a Storthing acting in this man-Johan, who was suspected of having, ner. He had very good, and perhaps from dynastic or purely personal movery forcible reasons for doing so, as we can now see. But to his contemporaries, and more particularly to the Acquiescence in the state of things contemporary Swedes, it must have which had been established sprang only seemed wonderful, and almost inexpli- from the confident hope that it was cable. In Sweden they only learnt but provisional, a transition to a more that the Norwegian "insurrection ""real" union of the countries, one had been completely crushed after a more in correspondence with the interfortnight's campaign, the Norwegians ests of Sweden. Norway was thought had only been left what the victor to be too small and too poor to stand would in his grace allow them. One on its own legs. The Norwegians did might consequently feel sure of the not get credit for having either the

tives, conceded to Norway, at the expense of Sweden, such favorable terms.

ability or the will to maintain an inde- | Union to cry over." In text-books for pendent existence. They must feel the schools the Swedish youth were themselves deeply indebted to Sweden, told that Norway was conquered in which, in 1814, had treated them with such great generosity instead of punishing them for their "rebellion." This thankfulness, together with the painful feeling of the insufficiency of their own resources, which must make itself felt, when "the intoxication of independence " was over, would no doubt by and by bring them nearer to Sweden and make them throw themselves into the arms of the greater and stronger ally.

1814, and that by rights it ought to have become a Swedish province, as it had before been a Danish province, but that Sweden had been lenient. It had suffered the Norwegian “rebels” to retain a certain amount of independence, but nothing could be more black than the want of gratitude on the part of the Norwegians, etc., etc.

This was sowing the dragon seed of hate; thereby was the Union weighted with all these misunderstandings, all The development has, however, gone these distortions of its true meaning, in quite the opposite direction. The and of the conditions under which it national and economic power of Nor- came into existence. And to this is it way was strengthened under the influ- due, that instead of being a tie which ence of the free constitution. The should bind the peoples together it has "intoxication of independence" did become a never-ceasing bone of connot wear off with the Norwegians, tention between them, a never-failing rather the contrary. It became mani- source of strife. fest that nothing could be further from their thoughts than to become Swedes, that they persisted in remaining Norwegians, a feeling which became stronger as time went by.

They thought, and rightly too, that they owed Sweden no gratitude, certainly not sufficient to renounce on that account anything of their political or national independence. They became very loyally attached to the union in the form which it had once received; but far from being willing to have it extended, they were most jealously on their guard against all ideas and tendencies which pointed in the direction of a closer union between the countries. This produced gradually in the Swedish people, in addition to the dissatisfaction with the conditions of the

union, as not sufficiently advantageous to Sweden, a bitter feeling against the Norwegians, who were thought to have shown themselves ungrateful, suspicious, and narrow-minded.

news

This bitterness and dissatisfaction was nursed and encouraged by the press. There were Swedish papers and Swedish journalists who for years made it their principal aim to agitate against the Norwegians and the Union; the latter was called "a

As we have stated, the Union between Norway and Sweden was based on the principle of the absolute equality and equal rights of both countries. Section 1 of the Rigsakt runs thus:

The kingdom of Norway shall be a free, independent, indivisible, and inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one king.

From the unrestricted independence thus established there follows as a consequence a similarly unrestricted equality in rights with Sweden, as it is a principle long ago fully acknowledged in international law, that every sovereign or independent state, is, outwardly and inwardly, really and formally, equal in rights with all other sovereign states.

This sovereignty of Norway and her equality with Sweden was not, however, fully realized from the beginning

in all details. It was affirmed as a theoretical principle; but in a single, and highly important region, it was allowed to remain an unrealized promise. For on the establishment of the Union the Norwegians did not take steps to establish their own management of foreign affairs, and to appoint

1 The fundamental statute passed by the Norwe gian Storthing and the Swedish Riksdag in 1815.

their own representatives abroad. On | after the establishment of the Union the contrary, they suffered it to happen this question was frequently mentioned that the foreign minister of Sweden, in the Storthing, and both Storthing as a matter of fact, also became the foreign minister of Norway, and that Swedish envoys and consuls became representatives of both countries.

It is uncertain what the explanation of this remarkable negligence on the Norwegian side may have been. The still prevalent opinion, that the management of foreign affairs is the particular provision of the crown, may have been the dominant consideration, for as the crown belonged equally to both countries, it might seem less necessary to maintain the principle of equality in this particular matter. But it is also possible that the framers of the Union had in view the practical difficulties of settling these things in a manner fully consonant with the principle of equality, and left this subject purposely in abeyance, to avoid accepting a formal compromise on this principle.

and government repeatedly addressed to the common king of the countries demands for an arrangement of these affairs in a manner more agreeable to the interests of Norway and the principle of equality. Nothing was obtained, however, except that a royal decree of April 13, 1835, obtained permission for the Norwegian Statsminister residing in Stockholm to be present in the Swedish "Ministerielle Statsraad," and that it gradually became the practice for Norwegians to receive appointments in the diplomatic and consular services. This did not, of course, make these services common to both countries, nor did they cease to be branches of the purely Swedish administration, remaining as they did under the supreme direction of the Swedish foreign minister. A draft for a new Unionsakt, which was prepared in 1839 by a NorwegianWhat is quite certain is, that Norway Swedish committee appointed on Norhas not by one single syllable, com-wegian initiative, proposed to place at mitted itself to the control by Sweden the head of the foreign affairs of the of the foreign policy of the two kingdoms. The Rigsakt is silent on the question; and in the revised Grundlov, which was passed by the extraordinary Storthing of 1814, there are clauses which run directly counter to an arrangement by which Norway is represented in foreign States by a Swedish foreign minister, Swedish envoys, and Swedish consuls. And it is certain, that from the Norwegian side it has always been maintained, that no deviation from the principle of equality must be construed as being more than an acknowledgment in fact, but not in principle, or otherwise than as something quite provisional, to be redressed as soon as possible in conformity with the main principle of this Union.

It was not long before the Norwegians commenced the work of realizing their rights with regard to the management of their foreign affairs, and their representation abroad. Quite early

1 Statute of the Constitution.

United Kingdoms a common foreign minister, a Norwegian or a Swede, and responsible both to the Norwegian and to the Swedish representatives. This draft was shelved by the Swedish government, no doubt because it was considered far too favorable to Norway. It proposed great extensions of the points of union between the countries, but at the same time it carried out with great stringency the principle of their equality, and it was not in this spirit that the ruling parties in Sweden desired to see the Union extended or "improved."

The draft for a new Unionsakt, which had been prepared in 1866, on the initiative of the Swedish Riksdag, had a clause which runs thus:

The Swedish foreign minister continues, as before, to be the head of the Foreign Office, and to watch over the foreign affairs of the United Kingdoms. In his absence his office shall be administered by that member of the Council of State, whom the king orders to do so.

But the Swedish constitutional reform of 1885 made a settlement of the question unavoidable. Before this reform it was provided in the Swedish constitution, in regard to the so-called "Ministerielle Sager," that is to say, all questions appertaining to the relations of the country with foreign powers, that the king might "let them be prepared in such manner as he thinks proper.'

If this draft had become law, Nor- the Norwegian side, in spite of the fact way would have been bound by con- that the Norwegians had very good tract to the Swedish supreme direction reasons for being dissatisfied with the of the foreign policy of the countries, existing arrangement. and of our representatives abroad. But, so far from being willing, on the Norwegian side, to accept anything like this, this clause was pointed to as the great stumbling-block, on which the draft must be wrecked, as indeed actually happened. The leader of the majority declared that this point alone must be sufficient to cause the defeat of the whole draft. "True, it had, as a matter of fact, up to that time been the case, that the foreign affairs of Norway had been directed by the Swedish foreign minister; but behind this fact lay Norway's right to take these things into her own hands, when she would, against which no rightful objection could be raised by Sweden," and on those premises the decision was taken.

These questions were submitted to the king by the foreign minister, in the presence of one other member of the Council of State; the other members of the Council did not get any more information than the king thought fit to give them, and there was no opportunity for the representatives of the people to exercise any control. By Such was the state of things at the the reform of 1885 the Ministerielle time when the last great Norwegian Statsraad was in the first instance constitutional conflict broke out; the strengthened, as it was in future to Norwegians had not succeeded in car- consist of three instead of two memrying out the rights belonging to Nor-bers. It was further placed under full way as a sovereign State, as far as constitutional responsibility towards foreign matters were concerned, but the Swedish Riksdag.

they had not, on the other hand, al- From a Swedish point of view this lowed themselves to be persuaded to reform must be acknowledged as rather make any fundamental concessions in opportune and legitimate. But from respect of these rights. During the the point of view of the Union it was constitutional conflict the attention of nothing short of an outrage, displacing the Norwegian public was fully occu- suddenly the limits of equality between pied in other directions. The Union the countries, and aggravating the polay, as already remarked, behind this sition of Norway within the Union to conflict, but it turned directly on other such an extent that it must be proquestions, such as an internal settle- nounced perfectly intolerable to a free ment between Norwegian powers of nation, jealous of its own honor. Not State and Norwegian parties. The only were there now three Swedes in question of a satisfactory arrangement the Ministerielle Statsraad against the of the management of the foreign one Norwegian who only had access in affairs of the countries was thus left accordance with a royal decree, that is out of sight, and we were rather unpre- to say, at the good pleasure of the pared for it, when it again came on the king, but, what is worse, the power tapis, owing to the Swedish constitu- and authority over diplomatic questions tional reform of 1885. We had gone both those purely Norwegian, and through a prolonged and exasperating internal struggle, and longed so much for peace that it is not at all probable that this question would have been opened for a long time to come, from