not inconsistent with the opinion. Westinghouse Co. v. Wagner
Mfg. Co., 604.
7. Objections to evidence not considered when record silent as to nature of
testimony.
This court cannot pass on an objection that hearsay evidence was
received and not communicated to the alien where the record does
not disclose the nature of the testimony. Low Wah Suey v. Backus,
460.
8. As to declaring rules of executive officers unduly arbitrary.
This court is not prepared to declare the rules of the Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor in regard to proceedings for deportation of aliens
to be so arbitrary as to deprive the alien of a fair hearing and be-
yond the power of the Secretary to make under the authority
given by the statute. The statute expressly provides for a sum-
mary hearing. Ib.
9. Who may attack constitutionality of state statute.
One whose sales are so large as to require stamps far in excess of the
minimum amount to be issued is not prejudiced by the require-
ment to purchase such minimum amount of stamps. Savage v.
Jones, 501.
10. Who may attack constitutionality of state statute.
One attacking a state statute as unconstitutional must show that he
is within the class whose constitutional rights are invaded, and
one admittedly doing a large business cannot be heard on the plea
that the act discriminates against those doing a small business.
Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 540.
11. Who may be heard to complain; right of one to complain of operation
of known police power.
One cannot be heard to complain of his money loss by reason of the
legislating out of existence of a business in which he had invested
and which is not protected by the Federal or state constitution and
which he knew was subject to police regulation or prohibition.
Murphy v. California, 623.
12. Who may be heard to complain of unequal protection of the law.
One who does not keep a hotel with less than the specified number of
rooms, cannot be heard to complain that a statute denies the
owners of the smaller hotels the equal protection of the laws, it not
appearing that the provision was inserted for purposes of evasion
or that the ordinance was unequally enforced. Ib.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 1, 5, 6;
See BANKRUPTCY;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 4-9.
PRESUMPTIONS.
See CONFLICT of Laws, 2;
PRIVITY OF PARTIES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19;
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 7.
PROPERTY RIGHTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9-15.
PROSTITUTES.
See IMMIGRATION, 5.
1. Assigns within meaning of § 2 of act of June 16, 1880.
An assign within the meaning of § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, 21
Stat. 287, c. 244, is one who becomes invested with the entryman's
right in the land through the voluntary act of the latter. United
States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 219.
2. Assign within meaning of act of 1880; recovery of purchase price.
One for whom an entryman initiates and obtains an allowance for an
entry, and to whom the entryman gives a quitclaim deed is an
assign within the meaning of § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, and
entitled to recover the purchase price if the entry cannot be con-
firmed, provided the arrangement was not forbidden by law. Ib.
3. Coal lands; administration of act of June 16, 1880.
Equity usually looks upon that as done which ought to have been done.
The act of June 16, 1880, proceeds upon equitable principles and
should be administered accordingly. Ib.
4. Coal lands; construction of act of 1880; return of money erroneously
A remedial statute, such as § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, should be
interpreted with appropriate regard to the spirit which prompted
it; and that act is therefore construed so as to return money erro-
neously paid for an entry that cannot be confirmed to the party
entitled to receive it. Ib.
5. Coal lands; right of one to enter for another.
Under §§ 2347-2352, Rev. Stat., providing for coal-land entries, one
cannot enter for another who has had the full benefit of the law;
but, in the absence of evasion of restrictions as to quantity, there
is no prohibition, express or implied, against an entry by a qualified
person for the benefit of another person fully qualified to make the
entry in his, or, if a corporation, in its, own name. Ib.
6. Coal lands; corporation as association of persons.
A corporation is an association of persons within the meaning of the
coal-land entry provisions of §§ 2347-2352, Rev. Stat. Ib.
7. Coal lands; legality of entry by one for another; effect of false affidavit.
Where it does not appear that a corporation had previously entered
its full amount of coal lands under §§ 2347-2352, Rev. Stat., an
entry made on its behalf by a qualified entryman is not illegal;
and an affidavit that the latter was not making the entry for
another, the falsity of which is disclosed on a contest, becomes
harmless and does not affect the right of the entryman or his
assign to recover the price paid under § 2 of the act of June 16,
1880. Ib.
8. Fraudulent entries; assigns not entitled to recover purchase price under
82 of act of 1880.
Under § 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, the assign of an entryman can-
not recover the purchase price paid if there was any fraud prac-
ticed by it in connection with the entry; an entry fraudulently
obtained is not one erroneously allowed. Ib.
While the phrase "public lands" is a term ordinarily used to designate
lands subject to sale under general laws, it is sometimes used in a
larger sense, and as used in § 2 of the act of July, 1862, it includes
lands within Indian reservations. Congress so intended and such
has been the construction placed on the words by the Interior De-
partment. Kindred v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 582.
10. Railroad grants; effect of act of March 3, 1875, as grant in præsenti.
The act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482, c. 152, granting rights of way
and station grounds for railroads through the public lands was a
grant in præsenti of lands to be thereafter identified. (Railroad Co.
v. Jones, 177 U. S. 125.) Stalker v. Oregon Short Line, 142.
11. Railroad grants; evidence of appropriation.
The right of way becomes definitely located by actual construction,
which is unmistakable evidence and notice of appropriation. Ib.
12. Railroad grants; approval of selection; relation; rights of entryman
under claim initiated pending approval.
A selection and location of station grounds under the act of March 3,
1875, filed with the Secretary of the Interior after construction of
the railroad, is subject to approval by the Secretary, but the ap-
proval relates back to the date of filing and thereupon the selection
becomes superior to the intervening claim of an entryman initiated
while the selection was pending approval. Northern Pacific R. R.
Co. v. Doughty, 208 U. S. 251, where the station grounds selection
was made prior to actual construction of the railroad, distin-
guished. Ib.
13. Railroad grants; construction of act of March 3, 1875.
The construction now given to the act of March 3, 1875, is in accord-
ance with the settled practice of the Land Department; any other
construction would defeat the purpose of Congress in regard to en-
couraging the building of railroads through the public lands. Ib.
14. Railroad grants; effect of failure of subordinate of Land Department
to perform duty.
The failure of a subordinate of the Land Department to comply with
the regulations of the department and note selections properly
made by a railroad company cannot affect the rights of the com-
pany and permit the entry of the land pending approval of the
selections by the Secretary. (Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360.)
Ib.
15. Railroad grants; right of entryman under patent issued in violation of
law.
A patent, issued to an entryman whose claim was initiated while the
selection of a railroad company was pending for approval, is not
an adjudication, but if, as in this case, the selection is approved,
such a patent is issued in violation of law and is inoperative to pass
title. Ib.
PUBLIC OFFICERS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 14.
PURE FOOD AND DRUGS ACT.
Scope of; liberty of State to legislate.
Although the Food and Drugs Act prohibits misbranding it does not
require publication of ingredients, and in that respect the field is
left open for state legislation. Savage v. Jones, 501.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 11, 12;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 14.
QUALIFICATION OF VERDICT.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 24, 30.
RAILROAD GRANTS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 10-15.
1. Right of way; estoppel of purchaser of land within, to set up want of
notice of railroad's claim.
Purchasers of land, over which a railroad has been constructed and
operated, cannot claim that they purchased without notice of the
claim of the railroad to own the right of way, Kindred v. Union
Pacific R. R. Co., 582.
2. Right of way; effect of establishment on right of vendee of owner of land
taken; who entitled to compensation.
Where a railroad company enters upon the land of another and con-
structs a railroad thereover, under a statute entitling it to do so on
condition that compensation be made to the owner, and the latter
permits the construction and operation of the railroad without com-
pliance with that condition, a subsequent vendee of the owner
takes the land subject to the burden of the right of way, and the
right to exact payment therefor from the railroad company belongs
to the owner at the time of entry and construction. Ib.
See INDIANS, 15;
JURISDICTION, A 5, 6; F 7, 8, 9; PUBLIC LANDS, 10-15.
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