with an appeal to this court it is the duty of this court to give ef-
fect to that purpose and uphold the lawful authority of the court so
created and to also correct abuse of power when it appears. United
States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 306.

3. Duty to follow mandate of this court; Court of Claims.
After this court has reviewed the judgment of the Court of Claims and
affirmed it, the Court of Claims, like any other court whose judg-
ment has been reviewed by this court, must give effect to it and
carry it into effect according to the mandate without variation or
other further relief. (In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S.
247.) Eastern Cherokees v. United States, 572.

4. Claim based on award of reparation of Interstate Commerce Commission
cognizable in what courts.

Under the act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, 554, c. 309, the state
courts as well as the appropriate Federal courts can take cogniz-
ance of a claim based on an award of reparation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Darnell v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 243.

5. Conflict between state and Federal in construction of will; case where
Federal should have followed state court.

In this case, in which the Circuit Court of Appeals construed a will as
giving testator's son a life interest only with remainder that he
could not affect, and the state court construed it as giving him the
estate subject to the divesting clause, held, that the construction
given by the state court was right and that the Circuit Court of
Appeals should have followed it. Messenger v. Anderson, 436.

6. Federal and state; duty of former to follow construction by latter of
state statutes.

In determining whether, under a state statute, failure to comply with
its terms renders a contract void or merely acts as a bar to main-
taining an action thereon, the Federal court must follow the inter-
pretation given the statute by the highest court of the State.
David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club, 489.

7. Power to except one of class affected from operation of police regula-
tion.

Where, in the exercise of the police power, the municipal authorities
by ordinance determine that a certain class of resorts should be
prohibited as harmful to the public, the courts cannot except from
the operation of the statute one of the class affected on the ground

that his particular place does not produce the evil aimed at by the
ordinance. Murphy v. California, 623.

1. Arraignment; regularity a matter of substance.

Whether the prisoner was properly arraigned is not a matter of form
but of substance, and should be shown by the record. (Crain v.
United States, 162 U. S. 625.) Johnson v. United States, 405.

2. Arraignment; what constitutes.

There is no explicit provision in the laws of the United States describing
what shall constitute an arraignment; but so far as it is expressed
it has a definite meaning. Ib.

3. Arraignment; what constitutes.

In this case what was done, as shown by the record, did constitute an
arraignment. Ib.

4. Conspiracy; indictment; sufficiency of.

If the indictment under § 5440, Rev. Stat., sufficiently charges the
commission of overt acts within the district, it is sufficient even
if it states that the place where the conspiracy formed is unknown.
Brown v. Elliott, 392.

5. Conspiracy; commission of overt act necessary under § 5440, Rev. Stat.
While under the ancient rule of conspiracy the gist was the conspiracy
itself and the crime was complete without any overt act, § 5440,
Rev. Stat., prescribes as necessary to constitute an offense under
it not only the unlawful conspiracy but also an overt act to effect
the object by at least one of the conspirators. Hyde v. United
States, 347.

6. Conspiracy as continuing offense; bar of limitations.

United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, followed to the effect that a

conspiracy under § 5440, Rev. Stat., may be a continuing one, and
that the offense is not barred on the expiration of the period from
the date of the conspiracy itself. Ib.

7. Conspiracy as continuous crime; relation of overt acts to all conspirators.
A conspiracy entered into in violation of § 5440, Rev. Stat., may be a

continuous crime, and, if it was designed to be, and was, con-
tinuous, every overt act was the act of all the conspirators by
reason of the terms of their unlawful plot. Brown v. Elliott, 392.

8. Conspiracy; successive overt acts; computation of period of limitation.
Where there are successive overt acts during the existence of the con-
spiracy, the period of limitation must be computed from the date
of the last of them properly specified in the indictment, although
some of them may have occurred more than three years before the
indictment was found. Ib.

9. Conspiracy; effect of relation of master and servant.

The fact that one of the conspirators was the servant of another con-
spirator does not preclude there being a conspiracy between them;
and, until there is an affirmative withdrawal from the conspiracy
by the servant, his acts bind his employer and co-conspirator so
far as preventing the statute of limitations from running. Hyde
v. United States, 347.

10. Conspiracy; agency; quære as to.

Quare as to the extent of agency between persons conspiring in viola-
tion of § 5440, Rev. Stat. Ib.

11. Conspiracy; place of trial.

In determining the place of trial there is no oppression in taking the
conspirators to the place where the overt act was performed rather
than compelling the victims and witnesses to go to the place where
the conspiracy was formed. Ib.

12. Conspiracy; place of trial of one as place of trial of all conspirators.
Overt acts performed in one district by one of the parties who had
conspired in another district in violation of § 5440, Rev. Stat.,
give jurisdiction to the court in the district where the overt acts
are performed as to all the conspirators. (Brown v. Elliott, p. 392,
post.) Ib.

13. Conspiracy; place of trial; Sixth Amendment.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution does not preclude the place
of trial of conspirators indicted under § 5440, Rev. Stat., being in
any State where an overt act was performed. (Hyde v. United
States, ante, p. 347.) Brown v. Elliott, 392.

14. Conspiracy; conscious offending; bar of limitations.

Until a conspirator affirmatively withdraws from a continuing con-

spiracy there is conscious offending that prevents the statute from
running. Hyde v. United States, 347.

15. Conspiracy; withdrawal from; what amounts to.

A disclosure to the Government by a conspirator does not amount to
a withdrawal that would start the statute running if he thereafter
commits overt acts, and whether there was acquiesence in the later
acts of another conspirator is for the jury to determine. Ib.

16. Conspiracy; individual liability; when legality of conviction of one not
considered.

Whether the conviction of one of several persons charged with con-
spiracy can ever be illegal will not be considered when it appears
that more than one have been convicted. Ib.

17. Conspiracy; individual liability; admission of evidence.

While there may not be a conspiracy by one person alone, it is possible
that some of the evidence may be admitted as against individual
defendants and not against all; and it is not error for the court to
charge that the jury might convict any one of the defendants alone,
if accompanied by the statement that his instructions related to
the sufficiency of evidence produced as to each defendant. In this
case the charge of the court in regard to the conviction of one or
more of the defendants was not to their prejudice but in their in-
terest. Ib.

18. Conspiracy; evidence; immateriality of objection as to.

An objection to the admission of testimony in a trial for conspiracy
offered exclusively as against one of the defendants becomes im-
material if that defendant is acquitted. Ib.

19. Conspiracy; evidence; relevancy of.

Even if a letter addressed to one of the defendants charged with con-
spiracy were improperly taken from the mails the fact is not rele-
vant to the question of the guilt of the conspirators. Ib.

20. Conspiracy; evidence; importance on appeal of evidence as to one
acquitted.
While any evidence affecting a particular defendant in a trial of several

for conspiracy may be important to him while on trial, it ceases
to be so in the reviewing court, if that defendant was acquitted. Ib.

21. Conspiracy; coercion of jury; misconduct of jury.

In this case it does not appear that the jury was coerced by the court

into agreeing on the verdict or that the conviction of some of the
defendants and acquittal of others was the result of an improper
agreement between the jurors. Ib.

22. Continuing offenses; place of trial.

Where a continuing offense is committed in more than one district,
the Sixth Amendment does not preclude a trial in any of those dis-
tricts. (Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56.) Ib.

23. Criminal Code of 1909; application to District of Columbia.
Some of the provisions of the Criminal Code approved March 4, 1909,
35 Stat. 1088, c. 321, apply to the District of Columbia and other
provisions do not. Johnson v. United States, 405.

24. Criminal Code of 1909; provision for qualification of verdict; applica-
tion to District of Columbia.

The provision in § 272 of the Criminal Code of 1909 permitting the
jury to qualify the verdict of guilty in certain cases punishable by
death by adding "without capital punishment" does not supersede
the provisions in the District Code in regard to punishment for
murder. Ib.

25. Criminal Code of 1909; effect to supersede local codes.
The provisions of the Criminal Code which deal with offenses Federal
in nature, wherever committed, whether in places under Federal,
state or territorial control, supersede the District Code; provisions,
however, in regard to offenses under state jurisdiction if committed
in a State or over which Congress has given local control to the
Territories, and in regard to which it has adopted a separate code,
as for Alaska, do not supersede the District Code. Ib.

26. Offenders; solicitude of courts for; limitation upon.

In construing criminal laws, courts must not be in too great solicitude
for the criminal to give him immunity because of the difficulty in
convicting or detecting him. Hyde v. United States, 347.

27. Place of commission of crime under § 5339, Rev. Stat.; District of
Columbia as.

As used to define the place where a crime may be committed the words,
"within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or any other place
or district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States" include the District of Columbia. Johnson v.
United States, 405.