STATEMENT.

I called to see the President on official business on the morning (Monday, 16th August,) before the first Veto Message was sent in. I found him reading the message to the Secretary of the Treasury. He did me the honor to read the material passages to me. Upon reading that part of it which treats of the superior importance and value of the business done by the late Bank of the United States in furnishing exchanges between the different States and sections of the Union, I was so strongly impressed with the idea that he meant to intimate that he would have no objections to a bank which should be restricted to dealing in exchanges, that I interrupted him in the reading, and asked if I was to understand, by what he had just read, that he was prepared to give his assent to a bank in the District of Columbia, with offices or agencies in the States, having the privilege, without their assent, to deal in exchanges between them, and in foreign bills. He promptly replied, that he thought experience had shown the necessity of such a power in the Government. I could not restrain the immediate expression of my gratification upon hearing this avowal. I said to the President at once, that what I had feared would lead to fatal dissensions among our friends, I now regarded as rather fortunate than otherwise; that his veto of the bill then before him, would lead to the adoption of a much better one. I also congratulated him upon the happy circumstance of the delay which had taken place in sending in his veto message. The heat and violence which might have been expected if the veto had been sent in immediately on the passage of the bill, would now be avoided. Time had been given for cool reflection, and as the message did not exclude the idea of a bank in some form, no unpleas ant consequences would be likely to follow. He expressed his great surprise that there should be so much excitement upon this subject; said that he had had his mind made up upon the bill before him from the first, but had delayed his message, that there should be time for the excitement to wear off; that nothing could be more easy than to pass a bill which would answer all necessary purposes; that it could be done in three days. The next day, having occasion to see the President again, he requested me to furnish him with such information as the War Department afforded of the embarrassments attending the transfer and disbursement of the public revenue to distant points on the frontier, in Florida, &c. He at the same time requested me to draw up a brief statement of my views upon the subject, showing the practical advan tages and necessity of such a fiscal institution as he had thought of proposing. Such information as I could hastily collect from the heads of the principal disbursing bureaux of the Department, I handed to him on the evening of the same day, knowing that time was of the utmost importance, in the state in which the question then was. He received the statements I gave him with manifest indifference, and alarmed me by remarking that he had began to doubt whether he would give his assent (as I understood him) to any bank.

The next day, (Wednesday, 18th August,) was the stated time for the weekly meeting of the Cabinet with the President. Mr. Webster, Mr. Ewing, and myself, went at ten o'clock in the morning, and were informed that the President was engaged with Mersrs. Berrien, Sergeant, and, I think, Mr. Dawson, of Georgia. We waited until they retired, and the President made his appearance about three quarters of an hour afterwards. Mr. Badger came in soon after the President joined us. Messrs. Crittenden and Granger did not attend. The conference which ensued was a long one, lasting two hours at least, according to my recollection. I cannot pretend to detail all that was said; neither can I undertake to give the language employed by the President upon every point, nor of the members of the Cabinet. I can only state the substance of what was said upon those points which most attracted my attention.

The President commenced by stating that he had been waited upon that morning by a committee of Members of Congress, who desired to know his views upon the subject of a bank - such an one as he could sanction. He had given them no satisfaction upon that subject, but had informed them that he would first consult with his constitutional advisers his Cabinet-through whom he thought it most regular that his views should be communicated. He asked the opinion of his Cabinet upon the correctness of the ground he had taken; remarking at the same time, that the habit of expressing his views to Members of Congress upon subjects of so much interest subjected him to great embarrassment and much misrepresentation. That question being disposed of, the President adverted briefly, but without much connexion, to the relation in which he stood to the Bank question, and his disposition to go as far as he could to comply with the wishes of his friends. He spoke of the relation that existed between him and his Cabinet, and how necessary it was that he should have their support. Would they stand by him? He much preferred that the whole subject should be postponed until the next session; but if it was necessary to act now, he thought a plan might be devised, which, with their coöperation, might be carried through. He wondered why the Senate continued to postpone acting upon his Veto Message, which was yet to be disposed of. He supposed it might be to hold it as a rod over his head; and had some doubts whether it was proper that he should consider further upon the subject until the Senate had decided what they would do with the bill then before them. Some one present assured him that the postponement of the question pending in the Senate was intended to give time for reflection, and to prevent an intemperate debate.

The President then gave the outline of such a bank or fiscal institution as he thought he could sanction. It was to be in the District of Columbia, to have the privilege of issuing its own notes, receive moneys on deposite, and to deal in bills of exchange between the States and between the United States and foreign States. But he wished to have the opinion of his Cabinet upon it. His own consistency and reputation

must be looked to. He considered his Cabinet his friends, who must stand by and defend whatever he did upon the subject. He appealed particularly to Mr. Webster for his opinion upon the point of consistency; and whether there was not a clear distinction between the old Bank of the United States A Bank of Discount and Deposite- and the one he now thought of proposing; and whether the constitutional question was not different. He reminded us that, in all his former speeches and reports, he had taken the ground that Congress had no constitutional power to charter a bank which had the power of local discount. Mr. Webster pointed out the distinction between the two plans in a manner which appeared to be satisfactory to him. The substance of what he said was, as I understood him, as follows:- He had a decided preference for a bank upon the plan then proposed over either of those which had been previously spoken of. He reminded the President that he had expressed his preference for a bank which should be restricted in its dealings to bills of exchange, when certain gentlemen from the city of New York were present several weeks before. He then thought, as he did now, that it would answer all useful purposes. One ground of this preference was, and it had great weight with him, that the plan did not contemplate the consent of the States as, in any way or at any time, necessary to its existence or efficiency. He thought the plan proposed at the commencement of the session, generally known as Mr. Ewing's bill, as incongruous and objectionable on this ground. His general course of thinking on such subjects led him to prefer that, whatever power this Government asserted, or was authorized to assert, should be exercised independently of State authority, and of the interference of the States. He thought there could be no doubt of the constitutional power to charter such a bank as was then proposed, according to the President's own mode of thinking upon that subject, if he understood them. Certainly there was a clear distinction between such a Bank and the late Bank of the United States. The one proposed was to be limited in its operation to such objects as were clearly within some of the provisions of the constitution, or such as were clearly nec essary in the executions of others. The privilege of issuing its own notes, dealing in exchanges, and of receiving moneys on deposite, all appeared to have immediate reference to, or connexion with the power given in the constitution over commerce between the States, over the currency, and the necessary fiscal operations of the Government in the collection, safe-keeping, and disbursement of the public revenue. These were all subjects of national, and not local or State concern. The distinction between this plan and the late Bank of the United States lay in this: the privilege enjoyed by the old Bank, of dealing in local paper, or discounting notes having circulation, as it might be, but between the different streets of commercial points of the same city, had no connexion with the trade or commerce between the States and remote sections of the Union, nor with the transfer of the public money from one point to another; and it had, therefore, no necessary connexion with any of the great national objects, for which the bank was chartered; nor could it

be claimed as an incident to any of the powers given to Congress by the constitution. That privilege, he apprehended, was conferred upon the late bank from the belief, that without it, the stock of the bank could not be profitable; and it was therefore considered as a necessary incident to an institution which was itself but the offspring of an incidental power. Experience, he thought, had shown clearly, that such a privilege was no longer important or necessary. By confining the discounting privilege of the proposed bank to bills of exchange between this country and foreign States, and between the several States of the Union, this objection would not lie against it.

The President expressed his regret, that he had not used the words "bank of discount and deposite "in his late message, so that the distinction he now took might be clearly inferred from that message, and he could not then be charged with inconsistency. Mr. Badger said he thought nothing would have been gained by the use of terms " bank of discount and deposite " in his message; for as to the charge of inconsistency, it might and probably would be made against him, for party effect, if he sanctioned the bill then proposed by him, inasmuch as dealing in or buying bills of exchange would be discounting, and to that extent make it a bank of discount.

When all the material points appeared to be disposed of, and the members of the Cabinet present had expressed their approbation of the plan the President had suggested, he said that, after all, he would not sanction a bank in the form just agreed upon, if he supposed that it would be made the groundwork or basis of a bank with all the powers of the late Bank of the United States. He never would give his sanction to the power of local discount. He feared that, at the next or succeeding session of Congress, the Whigs would be bringing forward amendments engrafting this power upon any charter he might now approve, and he appealed to his Cabinet to know if they would stand by him, and use their influence in preventing any such movements while his Administration lasted. Mr. Webster and others gave him all proper assurances on this point.

The President thought a capital of fifteen millions of dollars would be sufficient.

A name, he said, was important. What should it be? Fiscal Institute would do. It was objected to, and the name of Fiscal Bank preferred by a member of the Cabinet. He replied, that there was a great deal in a name, and he did not wish the word "bank" to appear in the bill.

The President then inquired if he was understood. He said there must be no misunderstanding of what he proposed to do. Addressing himself to Mr. Ewing, he asked him if he thought he understood his views fully. Mr. Ewing understood the President to have no objection to a bank in the District of Columbia, with offices of discount and deposite in the States, with their assent. The President interrupted him abruptly, by saying he did not understand him at all; he was not willing to sanction any such bank. I understood his objection to be to the

power of local discount. I supposed Mr. Ewing intended to say, that he understood the President had no constitutional objections to such a bank. Mr. Ewing, however, without explaining, went on to say, that he now understood the President to have no objection to a bank in the District of Columbia, with the power to issue its own notes, receive moneys on deposite, with offices or agencies in the States, having the privilege, without their assent, of dealing in bills of exchange drawn in one State or Territory and made payable in another State or Territory of the Union, and in bills between the United States and foreign states or nations.

The President said he was then understood. He requested Mr. Webster particularly to communicate with the gentlemen who had waited upon him that morning, and to let them know the conclusions to which he had come. He also requested Mr. Ewing to aid in getting the subject properly before Congress. He requested that they would take care not to commit him by what they said to members of Congress to any intention to dictate to Congress. They might express their confidence and belief, that such a bill as had just been agreed upon would receive his sanction; but it should be as a mattter of inference from his Veto Message and his general views. He thought he might request that the measure should be put into the hands of some friend of his own, upon whom he could rely. Mr. Sergeant was named, and he expressed himself satisfied that he should have charge of it. He also expressed a wish to see the bill before it was presented to the House, if it could be so managed.

I then said, addressing myself to Messrs. Webster and Ewing, that no time was to be lost in communicating with gentlemen of Congress; that there was danger that Mr. Ewing's bill would be taken up and reported to the House immediately after the bill sent back to the Senate with the President's objections was disposed of.

As the members of the Cabinet rose to depart, or just before, the President requested Messrs. Webster and Ewing, as they had turned their attention more particularly to the subject, to furnish him with written arguments upon the points they had been discussing. He wanted them to fortify his own opinion, and to lay up for future reference. JOHN BELL.

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1841.

Letter of Mr. Badger, Secretary of the Navy, to the Editors of the National Intelligencer.

Messrs. GALES & SEATON: I deem it proper to offer a public explanation of some of the reasons which led to my resignation, on the 11th instant, of the office of Secretary of the Navy, and, for that purpose, ask a small space in the National Intelligencer.

At the Cabinet meeting held on the 18th of August last, (the Attorney-General and the Post-master-General being absent,) the subject of