Select Committee in either public or executive session.) In addition, during an April 14 1973 meeting between the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Ehrlichman stated that Magruder told him that Mitchell orally approved Liddy's third proposal, but that the approval was reluctant and that they (Mitchell and Magruder) felt "bull-dozed" into it by Colson. (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 585)

5. Financing the Operation. When Magruder returned to Washington the following day, April 1, he took certain actions that indicated his belief that the plan was approved. He told Robert Reisner, his administrative assistant, that Liddy's project had been approved and asked him to notify Liddy. He called Strachan, telling him the project was approved, and informed Hugh Sloan, FCRP Treasurer, that Liddy was authorized to draw $250,000 during the campaign and would probably initially need a sizable amount. (2 Hearings 795)

Liddy quickly requested $83,000 from Sloan. (2 Hearings 539) Sloan testified that he first checked Liddy's request with Magruder, who told him that it was in order and to comply. Sloan became concerned because the quarter million dollar budget was to come from cash funds kept in a safe in his office that represented cash received prior to April 7, 1972, the effective date of the new Campaign Fund Reporting Law. Since $83,000 was "totally out of line of anything we had ever done before," Sloan took the matter up with Stans, Director of FCRP. Stans told Sloan he would check with Mitchell. After meeting with Mitchell, Stans confirmed that Magruder had authority to make this kind of decision and that Sloan should pay the funds to Liddy. Responding to Sloan's concern about the purpose of such a payment, Stans, according to Sloan, said "I do not want to know and you don't want to know." (2 Hearings 539) Although Stans disputed the context in which Sloan placed the remark he agreed that it was "the substance of what was said." (2 Hearings 727) Mitchell, however, testified that he only told Stans that Magruder had authority to pay money to Liddy and that there was no mention of substantial funds. (5 Hearings 1616-1617) Stans' meeting with Mitchell to clear the cash payment occurred only a few days after the March 30 meeting in Key Biscayne among Mitchell, Magruder and LaRue.

6. Transmittal of Information to Strachan. Magruder testified that he "completely apprised" Strachan of the Liddy quartermillion dollar plan, including the fact that its first target

was the Watergate DNC headquarters. (2 Hearings 826) In his March 13, 1973 meeting with the President, Dean told the President that Strachan had prior knowledge of the Watergate burglary. Nixon immediately concluded: “Well, then, he probably told Bob. He may not have." (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 146) Dean assured the President Strachan would not testify against Haldeman: "He was judicious in what he relayed, but Strachan is as tough as nails. He can go in and stonewall, and say, 'I don't know anything about what you are talking about.' He has already done it twice you know, in interviews." (Ibid.) Strachan testified that Magruder told him only that a "sophisticated political intelligence gathering system had been approved with a budget of $300,000." (6 Hearings 2441) Strachan stated that he prepared political action memorandum #18* for Haldeman that relayed this information. Strachan said that, when the memorandum was returned for filing, Haldeman had checked the item concerning this matter, indicating that he had read it. (6 Hearings 2453) Haldeman, however, claimed he did not recall seeing such an item. (8 Hearings 3036)

Four days after the March 30 meeting in Key Biscayne, Haldeman and Mitchell met. Strachan testified he prepared a talking paper for Haldeman for the meeting that included a section respecting CRP's $300,000 intelligence plan. (6 Hearings 2454) Haldeman testified he does not recall directing Strachan to prepare this talking paper; nor did he recall seeing such a document. Haldeman and Mitchell both testified that a CRP intelligence plan was not discussed at the April 4 meeting. Haldeman testified that his meeting with Mitchell on April 4, 1972 was in connection with a meeting with the President and Mitchell which "covered the ITTKleindienst hearings and a review of Mitchell's plans for assigning campaign responsibilities. They [his notes] indicate no discussion of intelligence." (7 Hearings 2881; e.g. Exhibit 121, 8 Hearings 3372)

Also in April, according to Strachan, Haldeman called him into his office and told him to inform Liddy to transfer whatever intelligence capability Liddy had for Muskie to McGovern. Haldeman, Strachan said, had a “particular interest in discovering what the connection between McGovern and Senator Kennedy was." (6 Hearings 2455) Strachan said he made a note of the instruction, called Liddy to his office and literally read the statement to him. (6 Hearings 2455)

*The transcript of Strachan's testimony at this point refers to memorandum #8, a typographical error that should read #18. (See e.g., 6 Hearings 2459)

D. EVENTS LEADING TO THE BREAK-IN

1. The McGovern Headquarters Attempts. In addition to the DNC offices at Watergate and propitious targets at the Miami Convention, the Watergate conspirators hoped to bug Senator George McGovern's Washington campaign headquarters. (1 Hearings 185) This target appears consistent with the instruction Liddy received from Haldeman through Strachan in April "to transfer whatever capability he had from Muskie to McGovern," although bugging was not specifically mentioned in that instruction. McCord said he was involved in several attempts to bug McGovern's headquarters. (McCord DNC Deposition, April 30, 1973, p. 157)

On May 15, McCord and Tom Gregory, a student Hunt had hired to infiltrate the McGovern campaign, walked through the McGovern headquarters in order to acquaint McCord with the office layout. (1 Hearings 164) Later, on the evening of May 26, McCord and Baldwin drove to the McGovern headquarters and, through the use of walkie-talkies, rendezvoused with another car occupied by Hunt, Liddy and others. The group had planned to break into the McGovern headquarters that evening but, because of Gregory's absence and the continued presence of a man standing in front of the headquarters, the mission was cancelled. (Baldwin Interview, March 30, 1973, p. 7) The Watergate conspirators also unsuccessfully attempted to bug the McGovern headquarters on May 28. McCord had hoped that the offices of Frank Mankiewicz and Gary Hart would be vacant so that bugging devices could be installed. (McCord DNC Deposition, April 30, 1973, pp. 157-58) But the mission this time was aborted because persons were working late inside the headquarters, and Gregory, who had been instructed by Hunt to stay outside and report when they left, was asked by a policeman to leave the area. (Watergate Trial Transcript, pp. 37-39, 488-90)

2. The First Watergate Break-In. Liddy and Hunt then turned to the main target of the "Gemstone" plan-the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate Office Building. They planned the break-in for the Memorial Day weekend. Hunt alerted his Cuban-American contact in Miami, Bernard Barker, to be prepared to bring a trained burglary team to Washington. Barker, who had performed this same type of mission for Hunt in the Ellsberg break-in, had also served under Hunt in the Bay of Pigs operation. He was a refugee from his native Cuba and considered himself a patriot committed to the mission of freeing Cuba from Castro.

The Cuban-Americans he recruited for Hunt's projects were cut from the same cloth. The motivations of Barker and his crew were clearly stated by Barker: “. . . E. Howard Hunt, under the name of Eduardo, represents to the Cuban people their liberation. I cannot deny my services in the way that it was proposed to me on a matter of national security, knowing that with my training, I had personnel available for this type of operation. I could not deny this request at the time." (1 Hearings 365)

On May 10 or 12, McCord and Hunt reconnoitered the Watergate Office Building by walking through it in the early evening after work and, again, around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. (Hunt Executive Session, December 17, 1973, pp. 17-19) On May 17, Martinez purchased six one-way tickets to Washington, from Miami, for Frank Carter (alias for Barker), J. Granada (alias for Reynaldo Pico), Joseph di Alberto (alias for Sturgis), Raoul Godey (alias for Gonzales), Jose Piedra (alias for De Diego), and G. Valdes (alias for Martinez). (Gray Confirmation Hearings, Feb. 28, 1973, p. 51) On May 22, the Miamians registered at the MangerHamilton Hotel in Washington and, on May 26, moved to the Watergate Hotel, where they stayed until May 30. (Ibid.) Barker testified that he met with Hunt at the MangerHamilton Hotel shortly after his arrival in Washington, and Hunt explained to him the general nature of the mission. Barker, however, did not relay the nature of the assignment of his team until just before entry into the DNC headquarters. (1 Hearings 377) At that time, the different tasks of the participants were discussed. (McCord DNC Deposition, April 30, 1973, pp. 106-108)

By the early morning hours of May 28, the Watergate conspirators, after two frustrated attempts, completed their first break-in of the DNC (1 Hearings 156) The entry was made late on May 27 when Gonzales picked the lock of the ground floor door of the Watergate Office Building. (Sturgis Executive Session, May 15, 1973, p. 430) The burglary team then went to the 6th floor offices of the DNC headquarters. McCord placed electronic bugging devices in the form of miniature transmitters in the telephones of DNC Chairman Larry O'Brien and another official, Spencer Oliver (1 Hearings 156-157), and Barker and his team photographed papers from DNC files. (Barker Executive Session, May 11, 1973, pp. 165-7; 1 Hearings 358)

3. The Fruits of the First Break-in. After the DNC telephones were tapped, Alfred Baldwin, a former FBI agent recruited by McCord, monitored intercepted telephone conversations

from a room in the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge across the street from the Watergate Office Building. (1 Hearings 401) He typed the conversations almost verbatim and gave the logs to McCord. (1 Hearings 409-410) McCord gave the logs to Liddy who had several retyped by his secretary, Sally Harmony. Liddy told McCord he wanted them in final form before his discussions with Mitchell and other recipients of the logs. (1 Hearings 233)

The Gemstone project had its own stationery with the word, "Gemstone" printed in large letters at the top. (Exhibit 16, 2 Hearings 464, 877) Sally Harmony testified that she used Gemstone stationery when she retyped the telephone logs. (2 Hearings 467) Harmony also said she saw a stack of 8" by 10" photographs of documents from the DNC headquarters held by fingers in rubber gloves. (2 Hearings 462)

Ms. Harmony testified that she began to type certain general intelligence memoranda for Liddy in April that led her to believe that CRP had infiltrated the headquarters of McGovern and Muskie. (2 Hearings 482-483) In keeping with the spy motif that characterized Liddy's operations, code names referring to information sources were used in the intelligence memoranda. The three code names she could recall were Ruby 1, Ruby 2, and Crystal. (2 Hearings 462)* Magruder testified that, after Liddy's project was approved, he did not hear from Liddy until after May 27, when Liddy reported the DNC break-in and installation of the telephone tapping devices. (2 Hearings 796-99) Magruder said that he reported the May 27 entry to Strachan, but, at that time, gave Strachan no further details. (2 Hearings 826)

After the May 27 DNC break-in, Magruder received from Liddy two installments of documents embodying the fruits of the break-in. The installments included summaries of phone conversations on Gemstone stationery and photographs of documents. (2 Hearings 796-97) Magruder testified that he showed these Gemstone materials to Mitchell in a regular 8:30 morning meeting with him in his office in either CRP headquarters or his law firm, which was located in the same building. (2 Hearings 797)

According to Magruder's testimony, Mitchell found the documents of no use and called Liddy to his office and told him that the materials he received "were not satisfactory and it was not worth the money that he had been paid for it." (2 Hearings 797) Magruder said Liddy explained there was a technical problem with one wiretap and that one had These "sources" are discussed in more detail in Chapter IV of this report. [Chapter V in this edition.]