51) Ehrlichman said he then asked Cushman what Hunt's assignment was and Cushman said he did not know. According to Ehrlichman, he (Ehrlichman) then said that he would take responsibility for terminating the CIA's assistance to Hunt and if there were any "squawks or kickbacks from anyone in the White House to simply refer them to me." (Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Testimony of John Ehrlichman on May 30, 1973, p. 239) Shortly after this telephone call, CIA assistance to Hunt was terminated.

4. Project Sandwedge. The Committee to Re-elect the President was gearing up for its own political intelligencegathering program around the same time as the Ellsberg break-in. In September 1971, John Dean asked Jeb Stuart Magruder to join him for lunch with Jack Caulfield. (2 Hearings 786) Caulfield, a White House investigator who had conducted numerous political investigations, some with Tony Ulasewicz (6 Hearings 2268), wanted to sell Magruder his political intelligence plan, "Project Sandwedge," for use by CRP. (2 Hearings 186) Magruder had been organizing the campaign effort since May 1971, having received this assignment from Mitchell and Haldeman. (2 Hearings 784) In essence, the Sandwedge plan proposed a private corporation operating like a Republican "Intertel”* to serve the President's campaign. (3 Hearings 924) In addition to normal investigative activities, the Sandwedge plan also included the use of bag men and other covert intelligence-gathering operations. (3 Hearings 925)

Project Sandwedge had been proposed to the White House by Caulfield in the spring of 1971 (3 Hearings 924) but not favorably received by Mitchell and Ehrlichman. (3 Hearings 925) After the initial luncheon meeting between Magruder and Caulfield, the plan was again put to Mitchell-this time for use by CRP-but he again rejected it. (4 Hearings 1605)

5. The Hiring of G. Gordon Liddy by the Campaign Committee. With Sandwedge rebuffed, Magruder and Gordon Strachan of Haldeman's staff asked Dean to find a lawyer to serve as CRP General Counsel who could also direct an intelligence-gathering program. (3 Hearings 927) Dean and Magruder had, on previous occasions, discussed the need for such a program with Attorney General Mitchell. (2 Hearings 786) ** The man Dean recruited was G. Gordon Liddy (3 Intertel is a private international detective agency.

** Mitchell, however, testified that the first time he recalled discussing an intelligence capacity for CRP was on November 24, 1971, in a meeting with Dean and Liddy. (4 Hearings 1608)

Hearings 927-8), who moved from the Special Investigations Unit in the White House to CRP. (2 Hearings 810; 3 Hearings 927-8) Magruder testified that, when Dean sent Liddy to the Committee to Re-elect the President in 1971, he (Magruder) was unaware of Liddy's activities for the Plumbers, particularly his participation in the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office. (2 Hearings 786).

Dean had first asked Krogh whether David Young would be available for the special CRP assignment. Krogh said no, but suggested Liddy (3 Hearings 927) with the caveat that Ehrlichman must approve of the transfer; subsequently, Krogh informed Dean that Ehrlichman did approve. Dean then called Mitchell to tell him that Krogh, with Ehrlichman's sanction, had recommended Liddy and to arrange for Mitchell to meet Liddy. (3 Hearings 927-28) Ehrlichman, however, denied in a Committee staff interview that he approved Liddy's assignment to the CRP and has stated that he first learned of Liddy's CRP employment after the Watergate break-in. (Ehrlichman Interview, May 4, 1973, p. 8) The record shows that Mitchell (still the Attorney General) interviewed Liddy on November 24, 1971 (3 Hearings 928; 4 Hearings 1608), and approved Liddy for his position with CRP. (5 Hearings 1924)

B. THE COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION
OF THE PRESIDENT AND ITS RELATION TO
THE WHITE HOUSE

Before relating the evidence as to the planning of CRP's political intelligence-gathering program that ultimately resulted in the Watergate break-in, it is important briefly to identify its close relationship with, if not domination by, the White House. The evidence accumulated by the Select Committee demonstrates that CRP was a White House product, answerable to top White House leadership. It appears that H. R. Haldeman, the President's Chief of Staff, was principally responsible for organizing CRP, and John Mitchell has stated that Haldeman was the moving force. (4 Hearing 16067)

In May 1971, Jeb Magruder, then a Haldeman staff assistant, was released from his White House position and assigned the task of building the re-election committee. (2 Hearings 784) With Magruder on this assignment were Harry S. Flemming, Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., Herbert Porter, Robert Odle and Dr. Robert Marik. All but Marik were former White House aides. (1 Hearings 10)

Magruder cleared all recruitment of White House personnel for the Committee with Haldeman. (3 Hearings 3023)

Though Attorney General Mitchell also passed on the appointment of persons to important re-election committee positions (1 Hearings 14; 4 Hearings 1606), in a meeting with the President on April 15, 1973, Kleindienst characterized Mitchell's role in the formulation of CRP as that of "a puppet." (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 741) The evidence, however, shows that Mitchell assumed a political managerial role with the re-election effort as early as the spring of 1971, a year before he left his position as Attorney General. (2 Hearings 785; 4 Hearings 1606) It was understood, even at that early time, that Mitchell would take full charge of the campaign when it went into high gear. (2 Hearings 785) Thus, Mitchell received memoranda for his information and approval from CRP as early as May, 1971. (1 Hearings 18, 40-41)

The campaign organization eventually evolved into two entities: (1) the Committee for the Re-election of the President, which had the responsibility for political activity, and (2) the Finance Committee for the Re-election of the President, the organ responsible for campaign fundraising and disbursement. (1 Hearings 12)* Approximately thirty-five White House aides left their positions to assume key or lower level positions at CRP or FCRP. (1 Hearings 10, 437-47) A comparison of the CRP organization chart (Exhibit 7, 1 Hearings 19) and the White House organization chart for the period 1971-1972 (Exhibit 9, 1 Hearings 77), shows that most important positions in the campaign organizations were held by former White House aides.

Magruder was the caretaker director of the campaign political arm from May 1971 until March 1972 when Mitchell took over the duties of Campaign Director. (1 Hearings 1213; 2 Hearings 784) To keep Haldeman informed daily of CRP operations, Gordon Strachan, a Haldeman staff assistant, was designated as the liaison between Haldeman and Magruder. (8 Hearings 3024) On a regular basis, Magruder provided Strachan with reports of CRP activities and decision memoranda requiring Haldeman's approval. (2 Hearings 785; 8 Hearings 3023)

Moreover, Robert Odle, CRP Administrative Assistant under Magruder, testified that CRP memoranda went to the White House in such significant numbers that there was a sample memorandum in the Staff Manual showing the prescribed form for a memorandum from a CRP staffer to Haldeman or other White House personnel. (1 Hearings 58; Ex

* Several days prior to April 7, 1972, the effective date of the new campaign fund reporting law, this entity was renamed the Finance Committee to Reelect the President.

hibit 4, 1 Hearings 454)* Magruder also sent a flow of memoranda to Mitchell for his reaction or approval. (1 Hearings 18, 40-1; 4 Hearings 1607) Examples of memoranda to Mitchell while he was still Attorney General are Exhibits 74 and 75. (4 Hearings 1810-11) Mitchell's campaign activity began as early as May 1971. (2 Hearings 785; 4 Hearings 1606, 1653-53) Prior to his appearance before the Select Committee, Mitchell testified in March 1972 before the Senate Judiciary Committee that he had "[n]o re-election campaign responsibilities" before his resignation as Attorney General. (Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on the Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst to be Attorney General, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, p. 633)

The two divisions of the campaign organization were ultimately headed by two Cabinet Members-Mitchell became Director of CRP (1 Hearings 12) and Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans retired to head FCRP. (1 Hearings 13) Mr. Stans testified before the Committee that, as FCRP Director, he raised approximately $60 million for the campaign. These funds were disbursed on the basis of decisions made by a budget committee consisting of key officials of CRP and FCRP. (1 Hearings 12) These decisions were at times reviewed by Haldeman.

After the November election, FCRP had a substantial surplus, much of which was apparently used to defend itself in lawsuits and to pay legal fees of former CRP and FCRP officials involved in various Watergate-related legal matters. (Washington Post, March 30, 1974, p. A6) As the Select Committee files its final report, approximately $3.5 million in FCRP surplus is still held by the Campaign Liquidation Trust.

On the basis of this evidence, the Committee finds that the Committee for the Re-election of the President and the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President were, in the main, White House-staffed and White House-controlled political organizations. It finds that they were initially conceived and created with the purpose of assuring White House control over the campaign funds raised by FCRP and the campaign strategies planned and implemented by CRP.

C. THE PLANNING OF "GEMSTONE”

From the time G. Gordon Liddy was appointed CRP General Counsel in December 1971 (2 Hearings 786), his prin

* Moreover, Haldeman testified that there were "twice weekly meetings in Mr. Ehrlichman's office with the campaign committee people and senior White House people." (8 Hearings 3023)

cipal efforts were devoted to developing, advocating and implementing a comprehensive political intelligence-gathering program for CRP under the code name "Gemstone." (1 Hearings 126-27; 2 Hearings 786-87; 9 Hearings 3751) The Select Committee's knowledge of Liddy's activities comes from sources other than Liddy, himself, since he refused to testify, although instructed to do so by the Committee upon the conference, pursuant to court order, of "use" immunity. (Liddy Executive Session, June 4, 1973) Liddy's role in the Gemstone plan was detailed to the Committee through the testimonies of James McCord, Jeb Stuart Magruder, John Dean, John Mitchell and E. Howard Hunt. Although it is not clear from the testimony who originated the Gemstone concept, there is no dispute that it was Liddy who, with the aid of Hunt and McCord, formulated the plan and presented it for approval to Dean and Magruder.

1. The Meeting of January 27, 1972. The first Gemstone plan was presented to Attorney General Mitchell by Liddy at a meeting in Mitchell's Justice Department office on January 27, 1972. Magruder and Dean were also in attendance. The plan was a Liddy, Hunt and McCord composite. McCord's input was the budget for the equipment needed to implement the electronic surveillance aspects of the plan. (1 Hearings 127-28) Hunt, still employed at the White House, aided Liddy in formulating the plans for other intelligence gathering operations. (9 Hearings 3663)

The testimony of Mitchell, Dean and Magruder as to this meeting is fairly consistent concerning the nature of Liddy's presentation and the general contents of the plan. Liddy illustrated his presentation with six large posters on an easel, each one portraying a specific coded component of the overall plan. The plan called for: (1) the use of mugging squads and kidnapping teams to deal with leaders of antiNixon demonstrations; (2) prostitutes stationed on a yacht, wired for sound, anchored offshore from Miami Beach during the Democratic Convention; (3) electronic surveillance and break-ins at various targets not yet identified at the time of the meeting. The budget for the plan was $1 million. (2 Hearings 787-788; 3 Hearings 929; 4 Hearings 1610)

Liddy's plan was not approved at the meeting. Dean testified that he was surprised at Liddy's plan and had not known of its contents prior to the meeting. (4 Hearings 1442) He testified that Mitchell was likewise amazed and told Liddy to revise the plan, focusing on the problem of demonstrations. (3 Hearings 930) Magruder and Dean also indicated to Liddy that the project must be redone. (2 Hearings 789)