CHAPTER I

THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN

AND COVERUP

The Watergate drama is still unfolding.* Because all the facts are not yet in, because all the Watergate criminal trials and the impeachment proceeding are not concluded, and because the President has refused to produce to the Select Committee many crucial tape recordings and other evidence, this report-although it is the Committee's final report—is limited by these factors. And this report is limited in another way. Because of the massive amount of evidence now available as to Watergate developed in the Committee's hearings and elsewhere, it is impossible in a document of reasonable length to deal with every fact or every version of the facts. The Committee, therefore, in preparing this report, has exercised its judgment as to what facts are important and which versions of disputed facts should be included. Others may disagree with our account, but it is the Committee's mandate under Sen. Res. 60 to present the Watergate affair to the public as it sees it.

1. The Watergate Break-in and Its Prelude

In the early morning hours of June 17, 1972, James McCord, Bernard L. Barker, Frank Sturgis, Eugenio Martinez and Virgilio Gonzales illegally entered the sixth floor headquarters of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate Office Building. (1 Hearings 128) Nearby, in a room in the Watergate Hotel, Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, the supervisors of this burglary operation, stood by keeping in walkie-talkie communication with Alfred Baldwin who served as a lookout across the street from the Watergate complex in the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge. (1 Hearings 158, 402; 9 Hearings 3688; Hunt Executive Session, Sept. 10, 1973, pp. 37-8) The mission was ill-fated. Within a short time after the break-in, a Washington Metropolitan Police Department plainclothes unit in an unmarked car responded to a call to assist a guard at the Watergate Office Building. (1 Hearings 96) The guard, Frank Wills, had become suspicious when, for the second time that night, he found masking tape on the edge of a door in the garage leading to the office building. (Wills Interview, May 22, 1973, pp. 2-3) * This report was prepared prior to the public release of any evidence or materials by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives.

The tape had been placed to hold back the locking mechanism, permitting the door to be opened without a key. (1 Hearings 98) Earlier that night, Wills had removed tape from the same door thinking it had been inadvertantly left by a building engineer. (Wills Interview, May 22, 1973, pp. 1-2) The plainclothes unit, under the direction of Sergeant Paul Leeper (1 Hearings 95), entered the Watergate Office Building stairwell through the garage door and ascended to the eighth floor. The policemen worked their way down to the sixth floor level and entered that floor through the stairwell door which they found unlocked by the same masking tape technique employed on the garage door. (1 Hearings 103-104)

Alfred Baldwin, across the street at the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge, at first took no interest in the unmarked car which parked in front of the Watergate Office Building and in the casually dressed individuals who entered the building. (1 Hearings 403) That a plainclothes police squad in an unmarked car answered the police dispatcher's call was fortuitous. The call initially went out to a marked police car but that vehicle was on its way to a gasoline station. The dispatcher thus repeated the call for any tactical unit in the vicinity of the Watergate. (1 Hearings 96) Had the marked police car answered the call and had uniformed policemen entered the office building, Baldwin would have immediately taken notice and alerted the burglars who might have escaped. The true nature of the break-in might not have been discovered and there might have been no need for the massive coverup that followed which, when exposed, became the most serious political scandal in the nation's history.

Baldwin did not become alarmed until he noticed lights go on in the building-first on the eighth floor, then on the sixth-and saw two casually dressed individuals emerge on the sixth floor terrace of the DNC headquarters, one holding a pistol. Then he radioed Hunt and Liddy and asked "are our people in suits or are they dressed casually?" When the answer came back, “Our people are dressed in suits. Why?” Baldwin replied "You have some trouble because there are some individuals around here who are dressed casually and have got their gun out." Within minutes, Sergeant Leeper and his unit discovered the five burglars and arrested them. (1 Hearings 404) Hunt and Liddy, however, escaped unnoticed from the Watergate Hotel. Baldwin was told by Hunt to leave the Motor Lodge, which he promptly did. (1 Hearings 405)

Subsequently Hunt and Liddy were indicted with the five

men apprehended in the DNC headquarters (United States v. Liddy, et al., Indictment of September 15, 1972) and Baldwin became a principal government witness against his former co-conspirators. All defendants initially pleaded not guilty. But, as the trial opened in early January, 1973, Hunt, Barker, Sturgis, Martinez, and Gonzales changed their pleas to guilty. (Watergate Trial Transcript, pp. 106-129 and 357423; January 11, 15, 1973) The remaining defendants-McCord and Liddy-were found guilty (Watergate Trial Transcript, p. 2247) after a trial that left a number of questions which disturbed the Trial Judge, Congress and the American people. The crimes of wiretapping, burglary and conspiracy had been proved. But, why had these crimes been committed? Who sponsored them? What were the motivations? Was the break-in, as the White House immediately claimed, merely a "third-rate burglary"?

This report attempts to put this crime in focus. We discuss below the background and planning that led to the break-in as well as other activities by the burglary team now uncovered. We then deal with the extensive coverup that followed the apprehension of the burglars.

A. THE BACKGROUND OF WATERGATE

The Watergate break-in cannot be understood unless viewed in the context of similar White House activities. The evidence presented below shows that, from the early days of the present Administration, the power of the President was viewed by some in the White House as almost without limit. Especially if national or internal security was invoked, even criminal laws were considered subordinate to presidential decision or strategy. The manifestations of this philosophy that preceded the Watergate break-in are now discussed.

1. The Huston Plan. The earliest evidence that this concept of Presidential power existed is found in a 1970 top secret document entitled Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection (Exhibit 35, 3 Hearings 1062, 1319) and the various memoranda from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman which were first revealed by John Dean. (Exhibits 36-40, 42, 3 Hearings 1062, 1324-33, 1338) In preparation for his testimony before the Select Committee, Dean placed these papers, some of which bore the highest security classification, in the custody of Chief Judge John Sirica of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. This step was taken by Dean, on the advice of counsel, to avoid violation of any presidential directive or federal laws prohibiting release of government documents

affecting national security. After due consideration, Judge Sirica released one copy of these papers to the Department of Justice and one copy to the Select Committee, pursuant to its motion (United States v. John Doe, et al., Misc. No. 77-73, May 14, 1973)

The Committee, with the aid of various intelligence agencies, reviewed these documents. While the Committee sealed a few items therein which could involve national security considerations, it concluded that these papers, for the most part, dealt primarily with domestic affairs and were unrelated to national security matters. (3 Hearings 1060, 1062) The papers, as sanitized by the Committee, were entered into the Committee's record during Dean's testimony. (Exhibits 35-41, 3 Hearings 1062, 1319-1337)

These papers and the President's own statement of May 22, 1973, disclose that the President approved the use of illegal wiretapping, illegal break-ins and illegal mail covers for domestic intelligence purposes. The President was fully advised of the illegality of these intelligence-gathering techniques prior to approving them. In the top secret document entitled Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection, the recommendation for surreptitious entries (break-ins) contained the following statement under the heading "Rationale":

"Use of this technique is clearly illegal. It amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion.” (Exhibit 35, 3 Hearings 1321)

On July 14, 1970, Haldeman sent a top secret memorandum to Huston, notifying him of the President's approval of the use of burglaries, illegal wiretaps and illegal mail covers for domestic intelligence. In the memorandum, Haldeman stated:

"The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review, have been approved by the President. He does not, however, want to follow the procedure you outlined on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. He would prefer that the thing simply be put into motion on the basis of this approval. The formal official memorandum should, of course, be prepared and that should be the device by which to carry it out . . ." (Exhibit 36, 3 Hearings 1324) (emphasis added)

It appears that the next day, July 15, 1970, Huston prepared a decision memorandum, based on the President's approval, for distribution to the federal intelligence agencies involved in the plan—the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. (New York Times, June 7, 1973, p. 36) In his May 22, 1973, public statement, the President reported that the decision memorandum was circulated to the agencies involved on July 23, 1970. However, the decision memorandum is dated July 15, 1970, indicating that it was forwarded to the agencies on that day or shortly thereafter. (New York Times, June 7, 1973)

Huston's recommendations were opposed by J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI. (3 Hearings 916) Hoover had served as the chairman of a group comprised of the heads of the Federal Intelligence agencies formed to study the problems of intelligence-gathering and cooperation among the various intelligence agencies. (Presidential Press Statement May 22, 1973) In his public statement of May 22, 1973, President Nixon stated:

"After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposition of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified five days later, on July 28, that the approval had been rescinded."

Haldeman's testimony is to the same effect (7 Hearings 2874). Dean, however, testified that he was not aware of any recision of approval for the plan (3 Hearings 1066) and there apparently is no written record of a recision of July 28 or any other date. There is, however, clear evidence that, after receipt of the decision memorandum of July 15, 1970, Mr. Hoover did present strong objections concerning the plan to Attorney General Mitchell. (3 Hearings 916; 4 Hearings 1603)

Huston was concerned that Hoover's objections would interfere with the plan's implementation. On August 5, 1970, eight days after the President states he ordered recision, Huston sent Haldeman a lengthy top secret memorandum on the subject, "Domestic Intelligence," which strongly attacked Hoover's objections and made a number of recommendations concerning a forthcoming meeting regarding the plan among Haldeman, the Attorney General and Hoover. (Exhibit 37, 3 Hearings 1325-1329) Illustrative of the fact that the plan was still quite alive, but imperiled by Hoover, is the following language in this memorandum:

"At some point, Hoover has to be told who is President. He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is