cept became known as The Responsiveness Program. Mr. Malek's testimony as to this document are found at Malek 33.

Mr. Malek has described the Responsiveness Program as more benign than these documents suggest. According to Malek, its main thrust was to insure that the Departments and Agencies, taking all factors into account, serviced deserving groups and then properly communicated their good works to the voting public. (e.g., Malek, 41, 104-5, 149-50) His account, however, should be compared with the description of the program in public testimony of William Marumoto, a White House aide connected with the Responsiveness Program: *

SENATOR TALMADGE What was the responsiveness group?

MR. MARUMOTO As I explained this morning, this was a group of four or five gentlemen who initially were under the leadership of Mr. Malek and later under the leadership of Dan Kingsley, who were responsible to and working with various special interest groups under Mr. Colson's operation as well as our personnel operation to make sure that the various departments and agencies were responsive to requests that went to them from the White House on personnel matters, publicity, public relations, and grants and contracts.

T Simplified, it was a group to take maximum political advantage of public dollars that were awarded in the form of public grants and contracts, was it not? MAR A system to facilitate some of our requests. T "Facilitate"-what do you mean by that?

MAR Try to get through the bureaucratic red tape. T In other words, my statement is correct. It was to maximize the advantage of the American taxpayers' dollars in a political effort, was it not?

MAR Yes. (13 Hearings, 5318-19)

2. THE PLAN AS CONCEIVED WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO MINORITY GROUPS

As discussed in Section V, there was much activity of the Responsiveness ilk in connection with minority-oriented federal programs. Because of this-and because of the considerable detail in which they were set out in written form -it is useful to discuss separately the specific plans to use the incumbency that were formulated to appeal to Spanishspeaking and Black constituents.

See Section 1 below.

A. Spanish-Speaking Plans. The basic strategy for using federal resources for campaign purposes regarding Spanishspeaking voters was outlined in a "Confidential" document entitled "The Campaign To Re-Elect The President. The Plan To Capture The Spanish Speaking Vote", (Ex. 10) prepared in early 1972 by Alex Armendariz, head of the Spanish-speaking Voters Division at CRP. Under the heading "Implementation Tools", Armendariz wrote:

"Use the incumbency to the greatest extent possible to stroke this community over the next several months through appointments, grants, program development, accelerated program implementation, and publicity of the President's record, through the departments and agencies." (emphasis in original)

And on p. 13 he noted:

"The purpose of the White House Spanish Speaking Constituent Group Task Force is to mobilize the resources of the Executive Branch in support of the campaign effort. This task force is responsible ... for obtaining Spanish-speaking personnel appointments, grants and other program initiatives.

99

Tab G of this document, entitled "Capitalizing On The Incumbency", is particularly important and is set forth in full text:

"Substantial assistance to the Spanish speaking campaign can be provided through use of the control of the Executive Branch. Through this control, we can fill in any gaps in the President's record and generate favorable publicity for the campaign persuasion [sic] effort. In addition, a number of Spanish speaking programs are sources of political information.

"Bill Marumoto is responsible for submitting a plan to capitalize on the incumbency by May 1. The elements of this plan will be directed to achieving the following end results.

(1) To develop specific ideas for using grants, personnel appointments and programs to fill out any gaps in the President's record, e.g., appoint a Mexican American to a regulatory commission.

(2) To set up organizational procedures and contacts with the appropriate White House Staff members and the Executive Branch for accomplishing the above steps.

(3) To provide the campaign team with up to date

information on all programs directed at the Spanish speaking community.

(4) To use the Departments and Agencies public information offices to publicize favorable Administration activities in behalf of the Spanish speaking.

(5) To ensure that those Federally subsidized programs which serve as havens for opposition political operatives are closely supervised so that they are devoting all their energies toward solving the problems of the Spanish speaking poor (particularly in September and October)." (See Ex. 262-1, 13 Hearings 5532)

Mr. Marumoto has testified that he prepared and submitted the plan referred to in the above document. (13 Hearings 5279) The Select Committee, however, has not obtained a copy of this plan. However, the detailed account in Section V.1. of this Chapter of the actual conduct that occurred regarding the Spanish-speaking community presents a comprehensive view of the type of activities encompassed by the above outline.

B. Black Plans. The overall plans to use the incumbency to achieve Black support in the 1972 campaign appear in several documents. The earliest is a "Confidential," "Final" document, dated March 15, 1972, and entitled “Campaign PlanA Strategy For the Development of The Black Vote in 1972." (Ex. 11) Significant for present purposes is a paragraph that appears at pp. 23-4, under the heading "Use of Administration Resources":

To augment organizational efforts it is proposed to make use of Administration resources to provide visible support of deserving projects. With team members working closely to monitor economic and social programs a selective funding approach will furnish encouragement incentives for Black individuals, firms and organizations whose support will have a multiplier effect on Black vote support for the President. This will call for working with OMBE, SBA, Department of Labor, OEO, HUD, HEW and the Justice Department. What we do economically will be a vital key politically.

The "team" referenced in this paragraph is identified at p. 21 of this exhibit:

In order to assure maximum coordination from the out-set a team approach to implementation of strategy and execution of the plan of action will be used. The

team coordinating efforts will include Robert Brown, Special Assistant to the President; Stan Scott, White House Communications Staff Member; Ed Sexton, RNC; Samuel Jackson, Assistant Secretary of HUD (representing the Council of Black appointees); and Paul R. Jones, Black Vote Division Executive Director. It is anticipated that this group will meet regularly on a weekly basis and inter-act daily as needed.

This memorandum concludes (at p. 24):

In support of staff efforts it is proposed that emphasis be placed on closer control of grants, loans, contracts and appointments-especially from socially-oriented Departments and agencies. What the Administration does economically is key. The major issues of concern to the rank and file Black voter are those which have an economic base. They are concerned about those things that affect day to day livelihood and well-being.

Testimony taken by the Select Committee establishes that this document was probably the composite product of several contributors, among whom were Paul Jones of CRP and Robert Brown of the White House. (Jones 132-134)

The use of Administration resources in the Black area was spelled out in greater detail in a “Confidential” June 15, 1972, memorandum from John Clarke to Malek entitled "Black Vote Field Plan”. (Malek Ex. 23) At pp. 5-6 of this document, the following passage appears:

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

Grants and Government Resources

At the present time, Bob Brown and his staff are handling the grants activity. To date, they have identified all Blacks who are receiving, or have received, money from this Administration. These recipients are being utilized as a source of campaign contributions and volunteers and as a vehicle for getting our appointees invited to various Black events as speakers and participants. They also form an excellent group of visible Blacks and they are being used to reach the voters in their areas of influence. [*]

In addition to the above results, Bob and his staff are actively seeking out other projects that could be funded to the benefit of the campaign. They are specifically looking for projects that will impact heavily on * Mr. Brown in executive session denied that he utilized Black recipients of federal funding as a source of campaign contributions. (Brown, pp. 46-9)

Blacks due to voter appeal and Black involvement. To date, they have been very successful. In this area, a local Black building contractor (Jack Crawford) has developed a program for identifying potential projects, getting them funded through Bob's office and, in return, obtaining a strong vote commitment for the President from the recipient. This plan is being actively pursued at present. Another specific project that is underway is the identification of all remaining grant and loan monies with a view to carefully allocating those funds to projects which will impact most heavily on black voters. [*]

Finally, Bob and his staff are working closely with Dan Kingsley to identify various advisory boards and commissions and job openings which can be filled by visible Blacks.

Even with the accomplishments so far, more work needs to be done in this area and plans are currently being drawn to more effectively develop and coordinate this activity.

The "Crawford Plan" mentioned above is attached as Ex. 12. The plan, at p. 2, states:

In order to obtain endorsements from . . . local Black leaders who will in all probability be at least nominal Democrats, some inducements will need to be offered. The inducements could be federal financial from the normal grant-in-aid programs administered by HEW, HUD, OEO, DOL, SBA, EDA, OMBE, and USDA. “The [recommended] locally based national representative (assisted by Black representatives of the various federal agencies) will be able to offer federal aid grant assistance to those leaders who are willing to endorse the President or at least make positive statements concerning the higher level of assistance currently being enjoyed by his institution under this administration.

In addition, Crawford recommended (pp. 3-4) that:

There should be a White House representative who can facilitate assure [sic] the delivery of federal grantin-aid funds to leaders who endorse the President and the Administration's efforts to improve the lot of Blacks. This liaison man is charged with coordination of the * Brown also denied seeking out projects that could be funded for the benefit of the campaign. (Brown 47). Mr. Crawford, in executive session, testified that, while he had developed the program referred to above, he was not "actively pursuing" it at the time of this memorandum. (Crawford 40-2)