CHAPTER III

USE OF THE INCUMBENCY-RESPONSIVENESS

PROGRAM

1. Introduction and Overview

A significant aspect of the Select Committee's investigation was its inquiry into the Administration's programs to use the powers of incumbency to re-elect the President. Documents obtained by the Committee indicate that this effort-which had as its main vehicle a White House devised plan known as the Responsiveness Program-was an organized endeavor "to politicize" the executive branch to ensure that the Administration remained in power.

The scope of this effort was broad and its potential impact considerable. It included, for example, plans to redirect federal monies to specific Administration supporters and to target groups and geographic areas to benefit the campaign. It entailed instructions to shape legal and regulatory action to enhance campaign goals. It comprised plans to utilize government employment procedures for election benefit.

Not only were such plans laid, they were, in part, consummated, although Departmental and Agency resistance to campaign pressures limited the success of these endeavors. Particularly in regard to the expenditure of federal monies concerning certain minority and constituent groups were there flagrant abuses of proper governmental procedures. Some of these abuses appear to stem from the improper involvement of campaign officials in governmental decision making.

Several federal civil and criminal laws appear applicable to the conduct described in this Chapter. In fact, a question exists whether the planning and implementation of the Responsiveness plan rises to the level of a conspiracy to interfere with the lawful functioning of government, conduct prosecutable under 18 U.S.C. $371 as a conspiracy to defraud the United States, as that term has been interpreted by the Supreme Court.*

The evidence presented below is not exhaustive. While the staff has interviewed over 150 witnesses and reviewed thousands of documents respecting these matters, it has not been able, because of time and staffing limitations, comprehensively to cover all possible areas of investigation. This is

See Section VIII below.

particularly the case since the Responsiveness Program was intended to pervade the entire executive branch-including regional offices.

The Select Committee believes, however, that the account presented below is a fair and accurate statement of the parameters of the Responsiveness Program, certain actions taken under its aegis, and other related conduct. It makes this assertion with confidence because much of the evidence obtained respecting these matters is documentary. The account below consists largely of excerpts from the plethora of documents uncovered by staff investigators. The principal documents are appended to this report as are certain relevant executive session transcripts.

The Committee's report on these activities concludes with certain legislative recommendations designed to restrain future misuse of federal resources for political purposes.

II. Early Manifestations of Administration's Interest in Using the Incumbency to Affect the Re-Election Effort

Throughout 1971, members of the Administration and the campaign team (which began to form in May, 1971) displayed a studied interest in using the resources of the federal government to enhance the President's re-election chances. John Dean, testifying in Executive Session before the Committee on June 16, 1973 (p. 38), expressed the concern relayed to him by H. R. Haldeman as to the activities of the White House staff.

It was probably in summer of 1971, to the best of my recollection, that Mr. Haldeman began discussion with me what my office should and could be doing during the campaign. He told me that all the officers in the White House were having discussions and were being told the President's wish was to take maximum advantage of the incumbency; and the White House would reshift itself from the current duties to focus very much on the re-election of the President.

The testimonies of Messrs. Haldeman and Ehrlichman during Committee interviews on January 31, 1974, and February 8, 1974, respectively, also indicate that the President was interested in using the resources of the federal government to best advantage in the re-election campaign. (Haldeman, 4; Ehrlichman 76-7, 79-82). The testimony of Patrick Buchanan, discussed in Chapter II of this Report, pro

vides another account of the Administration's early interest in utilizing the incumbency for campaign purposes (e.g., Hearings 3940-41).

This early interest is revealed not only by testimony of witnesses before the Committee, but also in numerous documents prepared in 1971. A sampling of such documents follows.

1. On January 12, 1971, Jeb Magruder, then a White House staffer, submitted a "Confidential/Eyes Only" memorandum to Attorney General Mitchell regarding political activities in the White House in 1970 (Ex. 1). The memorandum concluded with the following paragraph under the heading "Resource Development":

Our Administration has not made effective political use of the resources of the Federal Government, the RNC, the White House, and outside groups and corporations. In developing the structure for the campaign, proper use of these resources should be of primary concern at the outset of the planning.

2. Magruder, apparently at the Attorney General's request, began an examination of the utilization of federal resources by others in presidential campaigns. On April 14, 1971, he wrote a "Confidential" memorandum to Dean (Ex. 2), which began:

It has been requested that we determine what use Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson and Vice President Humphrey made of resources available in the Federal Government for campaign purposes.

Dean's assistance in this project was requested.

Less than a month later, on May 6, Magruder reported his interim findings to Mitchell in a "Confidential" memorandum entitled "Utilization of Government Resources by General Eisenhower, President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey" (Ex. 3). His conclusion as to President Eisenhower's campaign was:

"During the actual campaign no use was made of the White House or the Federal Government to specifically work on the campaign other than the normal support activities given General Eisenhower through his position as President."

Magruder, however, concluded that employment of federal resources by President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey was more extensive.

"Under Johnson it has been indicated that he made considerable use of the White House staff and individuals in the departments to work on the campaign. At the present time, I have not been able to get any specific information but, hopefully, will have more concise in⚫ formation in the near future.

"Before the convention, Humphrey used many people on his Vice Presidential staff, as well as individuals who were employed by the Cabinet Committees he was in charge of, to work specifically on the campaign. Many individuals remained on the government payroll after the convention and continued to work exclusively on the campaign. As an example, the individual who headed up his veterans activity was employed by the Veterans Administration and remained with the VA throughout the campaign. Some use was also made of the research facilities at the Census Bureau."

Because this Committee's mandate is limited to an examination of the 1972 campaign, no effort has been made to substantiate or refute Magruder's allegations.

Magruder ended his memorandum to Mitchell on a cautionary note:

"One reason why both Johnson and Humphrey had an easier time than we would have in this situation is that the control of Congress was under the Democrats and my information is that it was difficult for the Republicans to make much of this issue on the Hill. On the other hand, if we used these resources in the same way Johnson and Humphrey did, with the control of the Congress in the hands of the Democrats, they could make this an issue.

From a public relations standpoint, it would seem best to restrict the use of government employees to:

1. direct assistance for the President, and

2. to help develop strategy.

They should not get involved in the day-to-day campaign functions."

3. Magruder, however, on May 17, 1971, sent Gordon Strachan, a White House staffer working for Haldeman, a "Confidential" memorandum on "political" use of the "White House computer" (Ex. 4). And, on June 14, 1971, he forwarded to William Horton* a June 3, 1971, "Confidential

* Horton worked for Frederick V. Malek at the White House. Malek, a former Special Assistant to the President, was responsible for the creation of the Responsiveness Program, as subsequently discussed.

Eyes Only" memorandum to Magruder from William Timmons of the White House staff which read:

"As you know, Preston Martin is head of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. He is a California-Nixon Republican and is a little put out that nobody has sought his political advice.

"Apparently, he has given a great deal of thought to, and designed, a sound economical plan to use federal resources (projects, contracts, etc.) for advantage in 1972. He has graphs, maps, flow charts, etc., to show how available money can be directed into the areas where it would do the most good. Very scientific, I'm told.

"While I have not talked to Preston, I think it would be valuable for you to chat with him about his plan." (See Ex. 5).

The memorandum to Horton, which was also designated "Confidential/Eyes Only," suggested that Horton see Martin and "plug this into your project." The nature of Mr. Horton's "project" is discussed in detail below (item 6, this section). Mr. Martin has stated to the Committee that he never devised a plan to use federal resources for political advantage and the Committee has not uncovered additional evidence that establishes the contrary.

4. The concern respecting use of federal resources to affect the election is reflected in communications among other White House and campaign staffers. Two "Confidential/Eyes Only" memoranda from Peter Millspaugh, a White House political aide to Harry Dent, to Harry Flemming of the campaign staff, dated May 12 and June 23, 1971, are instructive (Ex. 6 and 7). The memoranda indicate that certain White House and departmental personnel were meeting to consider the use of government "resources"-particularly government "patronage" in the campaign. The May 12 memorandum states:

66

.. A consensus emerged that the range of federal resources must be inventoried and analyzed with perhaps the federal grants area broken out for priority treatment because of the immediate benefits and some budget cycle timing considerations. Additionally, the matter of a delivery system which would put these resources at our disposal on a timely basis was considered to be imperative."

Attached to the June 23, 1971 memorandum is a document listing the "Basic Types of Patronage" that could be