a variety of issues thus appearing to come from a group of liberal Democrats. According to Khachigian, Pat Buchanan edited Khachigian's draft before it was printed in final form.378

Porter received the final draft from Khachigian and asked Tom Bell, a staff member of the Young Voters for the President, to have 1,000 copies printed up in 72 hours.379 All the negatives from the pamphlet were returned to Porter because of the secrecy Porter demanded.380 Following Magruder's direction, Porter had the pamphlet mailed to about four hundred "liberals" around the country.3 381 A plan for Roger Greaves, "Sedan Chair I", to distribute some of the pamphlets at a Muskie fund-raising dinner in Beverly Hills fell through when the dinner was cancelled.383

382

This bogus pamphlet also found its way to the New Hampshire primary. In February 1972, Porter instructed Roger Stone, a scheduler at CRP, to fly to New Hampshire with a copy of the pamphlet and to place it in the headquarters of Senator George McGovern. Stone left the pamphlet on a table in the McGovern headquarters in Manchester, New Hampshire, and then went to the Manchester Union Leader, where he produced another copy of the pamphlet for an editor there which he said he had found in McGovern headquarters. Stone said he expressed outrage to the editor that the McGovern campaign was capable of printing such trash.384 Berl Bernhard, Senator Muskie's campaign manager, testified that the pamphlet from the Citizens for a Liberal Alternative "appeared in a number of different places in New Hampshire." 385

Finally, Donald Segretti received 500 to 1000 copies of this same pamphlet sometime after the Florida primary, and sent them to some of his agents, who presumably distributed them.386

378. A copy of the pamphlet is at pp. 4055-58, Book 10, Select Committee Hearings (Exhibit 158). Patrick Buchanan's testimony on this incident is at 10 Hearings 3922.

379. Bart Porter interview, Sept. 6, 1973, p. 22. See also Bell interview, August 15, 1973. Bell recalls that only 500 copies of the pamphlet were ordered.

380. Bell interview, August 15, 1973.

381. Porter interview, Sept. 6, 1973, p. 22.

382. The plan was Magruder's or Khachigian's idea according to Porter. Porter interview, August 20, 1973, p. 13.

383. Roger Greaves interview, August 21, 1973.

384. Foger Stone interview, August 15, 1973.

385. 11 Hearings 4671; See also testimony of Frank Mankiewicz that he observed the pamphlet in New Hampshire. 12 Hearings 4611-4612.

386. 10 Hearings 3994. It should also be noted that Stewart Mott placed some advertisements from the "Committee for Honesty in Politics" in the 1972 campaign. However, Mott paid for these ads and personally signed every one of them. (Mott Executive Session, October 5, 1973.)

II. 1972 CAMPAIGN

A. Political Strategy

The poliical strategy of the Committee to Re-elect the President in early 1971 and 1972 was unambiguous: undercut Senator Muskie in the Democratic primaries, divide the Democratic Party so that it could not unite after the convention, and assist where possible in getting the weakest Democratic candidate nominated. The absence of a serious fight for re-nomination gave the CRP and the White House the luxury of focusing their political efforts during this period on potential Democratic opponents rather than serious primary contenders within their own party. In the meantime, the various Democratic contenders had to concentrate their own political efforts on obtaining their party's nomination.

The Nixon strategy was best embodied in a series of political memoranda written by speechwriter Patrick Buchanan and his assistant, Ken Khachigian.387 The early concern with Senator Muskie resulted from a series of public opinion polls in April, May and June of 1971, which showed Senator Muskie leading both President Nixon and Governor Wallace in a three-man race.388 Buchanan outlined a "Muskie" strategy in a lengthy memorandum to President Nixon on March 24, 1971. Buchanan proposed creating a "Muskie Watch," "an operation working perhaps within the Republican National Committee, which may even be a publicized operation, doing constant research on Ed [Muskie] and putting out materials to interest groups, and to the press. " 389

A few months later, Buchanan wrote:

Thus, Senator Muskie is Target A as of mid-summer for our operation. Our specific goals are (a) to produce political problems for him, right now, (b) to hopefully help defeat him in one or more of the primaries (Florida looks now to be the best early bet, California, the best later bet), and (c) finally, to visit upon him some political wounds that will not only reduce his chances for nomination-but damage him as a candidate, should he be nominated.390

The strategy Buchanan advocated was to force Muskie to

387. See Exhibits No. 164-194, Vol. 10, pp. 4114-4263 for a full exposition of these memoranda.

388. 11 Hearings 4637.

389. 10 Hearing 4146, 4153.

390. 10 Hearings 4186.

take more stands on controversial issues and to have President Nixon attack Muskie "on those issues that divide Democrats." 391 The anti-Muskie plan involved much "negative campaigning" against the Senator rather than positive campaigning on behalf of President Nixon. In addition, such a strategy would subject Muskie to the "pressures and harassments that go with being a front runner, pressures and harassments he is not getting today." 992

In addition, Buchanan advocated concentrating on dividing the Democrats so that they would be unable to unite for the general election. In a July 2, 1971 memo, Buchanan advised:

[We] maintain as guiding political principle that our great hope for 1972 lies in maintaining or exacerbating the deep Democratic rift between the elite, chic, New Left, intellectual avant garde, isolationist, bell-bottomed environmentalist, new priorities types on the one handand the hard hat, Dick Daley, Holy Name Society, ethnc, blue collar, Knights of Columbus, NYPD, Queens Democrats on the other.

The liberal Democrats should be pinioned to their hippie supporters. The Humphrey Democrats should be reminded of how they were the fellows who escalated and cheered the war from its inception.393

This "attack strategy" of dividing the opposition was a main tenet of political faith both at the White House and the CRP throughout the 1972 campaign.

By April 12, 1972, Buchanan observed, "Our primary objective, to prevent Senator Muskie from sweeping the early primaries, locking up the convention in April, and uniting the Democratic Party behind him for the fall, has been achieved." 394 Further on, in the same memorandum, Buchanan rhetorically raised the question of "whom [do] we want to run against.' ." 395 Buchanan's clear choice was Senator George McGovern. Later in April, Buchanan noted, "we must do as little as possible at this time to impede McGovern's rise." 396

The above strategy, while not improper in itself, was ultimately converted by others into the dirty tricks outlined below. The various operatives and agents of the White House and the CRP also had three major objectives in the 1972

391. 10 Hearings 4148.

392. 10 Hearings 4147. 393. 10 Hearings 4183.

394. 10 Hearings 4225. 395. Ibid.

396. 10 Hearings 4235.

campaign: to weaken Senator Muskie, to divide the Democrats, and to nominate the weakest Democratic candidate.

The absence of primary opponents for President Nixon allowed his political strategists to target their efforts on the Democrats. The abundance of money in the CRP allowed the political operatives to set up a concerted effort to infiltrate and interfere with the Democratic primaries. The result was a campaign to re-elect President Nixon that was filled with illegal, improper, and unethical activity, much of which is described below.

B. Implementation of White House

and CRP Strategy

1. DONALD SEGRETTI

A. Hiring. In early 1971, Gordon Strachan and Dwight Chapin, both staff aides in the White House working for H. R. Haldeman, discussed the need for a "non-Colson dirty tricks operation in the field" for the 1972 campaign.397 Strachan said that Chapin explained that he and Buchanan had been involved in some campaign pranks such as a false mailing sent out in the New Hampshire primary,3 398 but that it would be a good idea if the operation were moved from the White House in 1972,

As a result, a meeting was held in the early summer of 1971 among Chapin, Strachan, Buchanan, Khachigian and Ron Walker, head of White House advance operations, to discuss how to structure a political prankster operation in the field for the 1972 campaign. Buchanan testified that he advised the group that "it should be a small operation, and that because of 1971 . . . it ought to be under the Committee to Re-Elect the President." 399

Strachan and Chapin agreed that Donald Segretti, an old college friend of theirs from USC, would be a good candidate for the job of pulling pranks to disrupt the Democratic presidential primary campaigns. Segretti was first contacted by Dwight Chapin in the spring of 1971 about possible employment following his release from the Army.400 Se397. Strachan Interview, August 13, 1973.

398. Ibid., p. 1.

399. 10 Hearings 000.

400. In informal interviews, Segretti noted that Strachan first called him in January, 1971, on a purely social basis, and that Chapin contacted him in April, 1971, about possible White House employment. Strachan claims that Segretti first contacted him about finding a job. See also transcript of U.S. v. Chapin, p. 220.

gretti at that time expressed some interest in a possible job, since both his friends worked in the White House and since he thought that the job might include exciting work.

Segretti stayed in touch with Chapin and Strachan during the next few months, and flew to Washington, D. C. to meet with them in late June, 1971.401 Segretti met with Chapin and Strachan twice on this visit once at dinner at Chapin's house, and again the following day at lunch. At these meetings, Strachan and Chapin explained to Segretti that his job would be to perform political pranks that would aid in the re-election of President Nixon.40 402 Segretti was given $400 in cash from Gordon Strachan to cover his expenses for this trip. Strachan and Chapin also cautioned Segretti not to discuss this matter with anyone else if he were not interested. But Segretti expressed great interest in the job, since it seemed to involve exciting work, and after this meeting, he began to contact old friends about the possibility of doing some work for the Nixon campaign.

Meanwhile, Strachan and Chapin obtained Haldeman's approval for the project to insure that Segretti could be paid from left-over 1968 campaign funds. Mr. Haldeman specifically approved having a person in the field to disrupt the Democratic primary campaigns, and specifically approved the hiring of Mr. Segretti.403 In late August, 1971, Haldeman and Strachan met with Herbert Kalmbach. Strachan testified that Haldeman directed Kalmbach to pay the salary and expenses of Segretti.404

Strachan then told Segretti to contact Herbert Kalmbach in Newport Beach, California, for the purpose of finalizing his employment. Segretti met Kalmbach in late August, 1971, and was offered a salary of $16,000 a year plus expenses for his activities.405 Segretti said he was not sure if he was to be working for Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Chapin, or others.4 406

401. 10 Hearings 3985.

402. 10 Hearings 3980.

403. 7 Hearings 2877. "I agreed that if this man wanted to take on this activity, Herbert Kalmbach should arrange for his compensation and expenses from the 1968 campaign fund surplus.

"It was my clear understanding that Segretti would act independently and on his own initiative within the broad guidelines outlined above. It was also my clear understanding that he was to engage in no illegal acts. Mr. Strachan has told me that he was so advised and that he understood that. I had no specific knowledge of Segretti's activities or the details of how or with whom he worked. I do not believe that there was anything wrong with the Segretti activity as it was conceived. I have only limited knowledge, and that acquired only lately, as to how it was actually carried out." 404. 6 Hearings 2502.

405. 10 Hearings 3980. 406. Ibid.