51 However, earlier in his memorandum, on page two, Caulfield discussed a former FBI agent who was known as a "black bag" specialist while at the FBI. Caulfield acknowledged that the term "black bag specialist,” means an individual who specialized in breaking and entering for the purpose of placing electronic surveillance.50 In addition, Caulfield noted that the term "bag job" in the intelligence community meant a burglary for the placement of electronic surveillance.5 Thus it appears that the capability to which Caulfield was referring in his "Sandwedge Proposal" was one of surreptitious breaking and entering for the purpose of placing electronic surveillance, quite similar in nature to the Gemstone Operation which ultimately evolved. This interpretation is further buttressed by the budgetary request for $15,000 for electronic surveillance equipment, noted on the attachment to the plan that was submitted to John Dean.52 In August or early September, 1971, Caulfield brought Dean a copy of the Sandwedge memorandum. Dean testified that Caulfield wanted to discuss the matter with John Ehrlichman and Attorney General Mitchell.53 Dean recalled that the memo provided for "bag men" to carry money and engage in electronic surveillance.54 On September 17, 1971, Caulfield wrote a follow-up memorandum to John W. Dean in which he explained how the new security corporation could handle the security needs for the 1972 campaign and the Republican National Committee.55 In addition, Caulfield had lunch in September, 1971, with Dean and Magruder to discuss "project Sandwedge.' "56 Dean discussed the Sandwedge Proposal with Attorney General Mitchell.57 Mitchell said he was not interested in the proposal since he felt that the principal problems of the re-election campaign related to security against potential demonstrators. In addition, Dean testified that Mitchell wanted a lawyer to handle any kind of covert operation.58 In his own testimony, Mitchell admitted to being aware of the concept that Caulfield was proposing, but he also claimed that he had never seen a copy of the Sandwedge memorandum.59 Mitchell did, however, talk to H. R. Haldeman about the Sandwedge operation, but said that Haldeman also 50. Ibid., p. 109. 51. Ibid., p. 109. 52. See Exhibit 34-9, p. 1121 of the Hearings. 53. Vol. 3, p. 924. 54. Vol. 3, p. 925. 55. See Exhibit 34-9, p. 1124 of the Hearings. 56. See Vol. 2, p. 786. 57. Vol. 3, p. 925. 58. Ibid. 59. Vol. 4, p. 1605. disapproved of the operation because of "the lack of experience" of the individuals involved.60 Mitchell did not, however, wish to discuss the proposal with Caulfield, and so Dean kept putting Caulfield off whenever Caulfield raised the subject. However, Caulfield also took the Sandwedge Proposal to John Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman testified that Caulfield brought him a three or four page double-spaced typewritten prospectus concerning the establishment of a private security entity.81 Ehrlichman said he told Caulfield that he could not help him on the proposal. However, Ehrlichman mentioned Operation Sandwedge to Dean, and according to Dean, said that he would like to keep Tony Ulasewicz around during the campaign even though he did not think much of Caulfield's grand proposal. Dean testified that Ehrlichman also informed him that Mitchell and Caulfield should meet to discuss Ulasewicz's future.62 Because of Attorney General Mitchell's lack of enthusiasm for Caulfield's project, Dean let the matter ride and did not give Caulfield a specific "yes" or "no". However, in the fall of 1971, it was decided to switch the payments from Kalmback to Ulasewicz to a cash basis. Therefore, Kalmbach gave Caulfield and Ulasewicz $50,000 in cash in the fall of 1971, which was meant to fund Ulasewicz's activities at least through the campaign of 1972.63 By November, 1971, Caulfield knew that his proposal was going nowhere. However, he wanted to work as a scheduling aide to Attorney General Mitchell in the upcoming campaign, and therefore asked Dean to get him an appointment with Mitchell. Caulfield met with Attorney General Mitchell on November 24, 1971, just prior to the Attorney General's meeting with G. Gordon Liddy.64 Prior to the meeting between Caulfield and Mitchell, Caulfield directed Ulasewicz to go to New Hampshire and investigate the primary campaign of Congressman Pete McCloskey. This effort was designed in part to gather valuable political information for the potential New Hampshire primary, as well as to show Attorney General Mitchell the capabilities of Caulfield and Ulasewicz. Ulasewicz investigated the McCloskey campaign in New Hampshire from November 18 through November 21, 1971. While in New Hampshire, he interviewed a number of campaign workers and volunteers in the organization under his usual pretext 60. Notes of 6/27/73 interview of John Mitchell. 61. Vol. 6, p. 2537. 62. Vol. 3, p. 925. 63. See Ulasewicz interview, April 30, 1974. 64. Vol. 3, p. 925. of being a newspaper reporter.65 Ulasewicz's report on the New Hampshire campaign was forwarded over to the Attorney General along with some follow-up reports that were written after a subsequent visit to the McCloskey campaign headquarters two weeks later.66 Mitchell discussed possible employment in the campaign with Caulfield at their meeting on November 24, 1971. However, Operation Sandwedge may not have been turned off at this meeting because Caulfield continued to refer to his intelligence-gathering capabilities as "Operation Sandwedge.' ."67 For example, in a memorandum dated December 11-12, 1971, Caulfield described "a Sandwedge-engineered penetration of McCloskey's volunteer headquarters in Washington, D.C." 68 This refers to a visit by Ulasewicz to the McCloskey headquarters to obtain information. The memo also refers to future arrangements to infiltrate the New Hampshire McCloskey campaign.69 In late December, 1971, Mitchell asked Dean for a summary of Caulfield's and his agent's activities. Dean wrote Mitchell on January 12, 1972, that Caulfield had prepared a list of the activities so that Mitchell could review them in order to decide whether or not further funding would be made available for Mr. Ulasewicz." Mitchell stated that this memorandum was the last discussion of Sandwedge and that the proposal was finally killed then."1 Ulasewicz continued to be funded through cash payments after this time, but his political investigations dropped off considerably until after the break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters on June 17, 1972. "Operation Sandwedge" as envisioned by Jack Caulfield was a significantly similar precursor to the Gemstone plan which was later implemented in the campaign of 1972. The plans calling for the creation of an offensive intelligencegathering capability were basically what the Gemstone Plan was designed to do. The placement of infiltrators in campaigns, surveillance of the Democratic convention and meetings, the creation of a "derogatory information investigative capability," and the creation of a "black bag" capability were the very measures that the Gemstone Plan in fact carried out. Discussions of the Sandwedge proposal appear to have con 65. See Exhibit 43-11, p. 1134 of Hearings. 66. See Exhibits at 3 Hearings, pp. 1142-1144. 67. Vol. 3, p. 926. tinued until at least January 12, 1972, a mere two weeks prior to the initial meeting in Attorney General Mitchell's office when the Gemstone plan was first revealed. The relationship between the Sandwedge proposal and the Gemstone plan is suggested by Jeb Magruder's statement: "In November 1971, it was indicated to me that the project [Sandwedge] was not going to get off the ground and consequently G. Gordon Liddy came into the picture after that." 2דיי OTHER SURVEILLANCE SENATOR Following his investigation of the accident at Chappaquidick, Ulasewicz kept Senator Kennedy under physical surveillance on a selected basis. In the fall of 1971, John Dean testified that he received a call from Larry Higby, who said that Haldeman wanted twenty-four hour surveillance placed on Senator Kennedy and regular reports of his activities forwarded to the White House.73 Dean passed the request to Jack Caulfield, who emphatically stated that he thought twenty-four hour surveillance was a silly idea. Caulfield contended that it would require several men and might result in Senator Kennedy discovering he was under surveillance. In addition, the twenty-four hour surveillance could be easily misinterpreted as a threat on his life, and the police or FBI could be called in to investigate.74 Dean agreed with Caulfields assessment of the idea and convinced Higby that the plan was unwise.75 As an alternative, Caulfield was directed to keep track of Senator Kennedy's activity and to pursue specific investigations that could turn up valuable political intelligence. As a result, many of the investigations listed above, conducted by Anthony Ulasewicz, were a result of this original directive from Haldeman. Other Investigations of Senator Edward Kennedy. There were other instances of White House initiated investigations designed to discredit a potential Presidential bid by Kennedy. In the summer of 1969, John Dean, then at the Justice Department, testified that he was instructed by Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to contact Cartha DeLoach, Deputy Director of the FBI, and “obtain from him infor 72. See Vol. 2, p. 786. 73. Vol. 3, p. 922. 74. Caulfield Ex. Session, March 16, 1974, p. 85. 75. Vol. 3, p. 923. mation regarding the foreign travels of Mary Jo Kopechne." 76 (Kopechne was the woman who died in the Chappaquiddick auto accident.) Kleindienst told Dean that the White House wanted this "very important information."" Dean obtained the information and passed it on to Caulfield at the White House.78 Dean was not sure why he was asked to be the courier of the FBI information, but he speculated before the Select Committee that he was chosen "so that others could deny they had done so should the matter become known." 79 In another incident in about July 1971, E. Howard Hunt, who was working part-time for the White House, discussed investigating Senator Kennedy with his employer, Robert Bennett of Mullen and Company, a Washington, D.C. public relations firm. Hunt had been asked by Colson or Bennett to investigate Senator Kennedy's activities.80 Hunt had asked Bennett if he knew people with information on the Kennedys, and Bennett mentioned Clifton DeMotte, a General Services Administration employee in Rhode Island who had worked in John Kennedy's 1960 campaign and was, Bennett believed, antagonistic toward the Kennedy family.81 Although Bennett testified that he warned Hunt that DeMotte might not know anything politically useful,82 Hunt says he also told Colson that he had been given “credible information" "83 that DeMotte was worth contacting. Hunt says Colson asked him to interview DeMotte without disclosing Hunt's White House connection. Hunt said he would need an alias, false documents, or perhaps a physical disguise for the interview. Hunt testified that Colson was wary of approaching the FBI or the Secret Service with such a request, and so he agreed to "look into" obtaining the material from the CIA. General Robert Cushman, formerly Deputy Director of the CIA, testified that on July 7, 1971, he received a telephone call from Ehrlichman in which Ehrlichman said, "Howard Hunt had been hired as a consultant to the White House on security matters that he would be coming to pay me a visit and could I lend him a hand."84 Alleged notes taken by Cushman's secretary during the telephone conversation show 76. Dean testimony, Hearings 3, p. 922, June 25, 1973. 77. Dean Testimony, Hearings 3, p. 922, June 25, 1973. 78. Dean interview, July 26, 1973, p. 4. 79. Ibid. 80. 9 Hearings 3677. See also Bennett interview, July 27, 1973. 81. Robert Bennett interview, July 27, 1973. 82. Ibid. 83. Hunt testimony, Sel. Com. Hearings, 9, p. 3677, Sept. 24, 1973. Unless otherwise indicated details that follow are from Hunt's public testimony at pp. 3677-78. Hearings 9. 84. 8 Hearings 3290. |