the hearings may well result in a request for additional action by the Department of Justice. We can't afford bitterness at Justice nor can we risk a new Attorney General being able to handle some of the potential problems.

"Kleindienst should be asked to follow the hearings closely and keep us apprised of any potential problems from a Department of Justice standpoint.

"Kleindienst should be given the feeling that he is an important member of the team and it is not merely because of these hearings that he is being asked to stay on." (Exhibit 34-36; 3 Hearings 12471248)

Kleindienst confirmed that he met with President Nixon in late February and that the President requested him to stay at his post until the investigation was over. (9 Hear- ings 3568-3569)

Several days later, on February 28, the President personally expressed to Dean his concern over the upcoming Select Committee hearings. The President stated his hope that the Committee would have one "big slambang thing for a whole week," after which "interest in the whole thing will fall off." (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 79) Dean warned the President that:

"I think this is going to be very different. It will be hot, I think they are going to be tough. I think they are going to be gory in some regards, but I am also convinced that if everyone pulls their own oar in this thing, in all those we've got with various concerns, we can make it through these things and minimal people will be hurt. And they may even paint themselves as being such partisans. " (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 93)

The President said he hoped the Committee would “be partisan rather than for them to have a facade of fairness and all the rest." (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 93) The February 28 meeting concluded with President Nixon telling Dean that he expected Mitchell "won't allow himself to be ruined [by Watergate]. He will put on his big stone face [before the Committee]. But I hope he does and he will." (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 110.) (emphasis added) Dean expressed concern that the Select Committee was out to get him, a notion the President discounted. The President, however, did express a belief that the Select Committee was "after" Haldeman,

Colson or Ehrlichman. (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 110)

5. Henry Petersen's Communications to the President. The edited transcripts of presidential conversations show that Henry Petersen, Chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, served as a conduit for a constant flow of information from the Grand Jury and the prosecutors first to Dean and then to the President. The transcripts also demonstrate that the President kept Haldeman and Ehrlichman informed of what he learned from Petersen. Petersen's conduct raises a serious question as to whether high Department of Justice officials can effectively administer criminal justice where White House personnel, or the President himself, are the subejcts of the investigation. The conflict of interests is apparent and a Committee recommendation deals directly with this issue. (See Recommendation I)

Early in the Watergate investigation (in 1972) Petersen had kept Dean informed. Dean told Petersen during their morning March 21 meeting that Petersen had made him "totally aware" of relevant information with respect to the prosecutorial effort.

"There is no doubt that I was totally aware of what the Bureau [FBI] was doing at all times. I was totally aware of what the Grand Jury was doing. I knew what witnesses were going to be called. I knew what they were asked, and I had to." (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 185: Meeting of March 21, 1973) (emphasis added)

The President asked Dean: "Why did Petersen play the game so straight with us?" Dean replied:

"Because Petersen is a soldier. He kept me informed. He told me when we had problems, where we had problems and the like. He believed in you and he believes in this Administration. This Administration made him. I don't think he had done anything improper, but he did make sure that the investigation was narrowed down to the very, very fine criminal thing which was a break for us. There is no doubt about it." (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 185) (emphasis added)

Dean assured the President during this meeting that Petersen is "the only man I know . . . that really could tell us how this could be put together so that it did the max

imum to carve it away with a minimum damage to individuals involved." (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 205)

Later, in April 1972, Petersen and the President met on several occasions to discuss the progress of the Watergate investigation. At one session, Petersen assured the President that the investigation would not reach him because the Department of Justice had no jurisdiction to investigate the President:

"I've said to [U.S. Attorney Harold H.] Titus 'We have to draw the line. We have no mandate to investigate the President. We investigate Watergate.'(Edited Presidential Conversation, p. 1259: Meeting of April 27, 1973)

He continued:

"My understanding of law is-my understanding of our responsibilities, is that if it came to that I would have to come to you and say, 'We can't do that.' The only people who have jurisdiction to do that is the House of Representatives, as far as I'm concerned.”. (Edited Presidential Conversations, pp. 1259-1260)

Petersen, however, at an April 17 meeting told the President that:

"Mr. President, if I thought you were trying to protect somebody, I would have walked out" (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 1086)

Petersen's role as a conduit of secret grand jury information is illustrated by his telephone conversation of April 16, 1973, with the President (from 8:58 to 9:14 p.m.). The conversation began:

P I just want to know if there are any developments I should know about and, second, that of course, as you know, anything you tell me, as I think I told you earlier, will not be passed on.

HP I understand, Mr. President.

P Because I know the rules of the Grand Jury. (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 966) (emphasis added)

Petersen then began to relate to the President secret information before the Grand Jury. He relayed to the President the factual details of the investigation, even indicating where there were gaps. Thus he told the President that Dean "got in touch with Kalmbach to arrange for

money, the details of which we really don't know as yet." (id., at 969) *

The next morning, April 17, from 9:47 to 9:59 a.m., the President met with Haldeman and discussed strategy for dealing with the Watergate Affair. In the course of that conversation, the President, who had been informed that the Justice Department did not know the details of Kalmbach's arrangement for money, said to Haldeman:

"Another thing, if you could get John [Ehrlichman] and yourself to sit down and do some hard thinking about what kind of strategy you are going to have with the money. You know what I mean." (Edited Presidential Conversations 983) (emphasis added)

The President also told Haldeman:

"Well, be sure that Kalmbach is at least aware of this, that LaRue has talked very freely. He is a broken man. . . .” (Id. at 983)

Petersen had informed the President on April 16, 1973, that Dean had said that Liddy "confessed to Dean" on June 19, 1972, and that Dean then told Ehrlichman what Liddy had said. (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 974). The next morning the President told Haldeman:

P Dean met with Liddy on June 19th, must have been when he did it. He was in California in January but that is irrelevant. But they keep banging around and banging around. The prosecution gets out the damn stuff. Did John talk with you about it?

H Yeh, he mentioned it. Dean did tell us that story in Ehrlichman's office last week or two weeks

ago.

P

But not to go all through this.

H I don't think so. (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 982)

The transcript of the President-Petersen meeting of April 17 provides another example of Petersen's briefing the President on information received by the prosecutors and Grand Jury. (Edited Presidential Conversations, at p. 1060, et seq.) This conversation also shows that Petersen was giving the President tactical advice as to the posture the White House should strike during the investigation. During this conversation, the President told Petersen not to tell

Earlier in the day, the President had informed Ehrlichman and Ziegler that "I've got Petersen on a short leash". (Edited Presidential Conversations 941)

him "anything out of the Grand Jury unless you think I need to know it. If it corroborates something or anybody here I need to know it-otherwise I don't want to know about it." (Id. at 1060) The President then asked: "I guess it would be legal for me to know?" and Petersen responded: "Well yes, I think it is legal for you to know.” (Id. at 1061) Peterson left, Handeman and Ehrlichman appeared and the President proceeded then to relay to them the information obtained from Petersen. (Edited Presidential Conversations 1115 et seq.)

At least by April 27, Petersen's constant contact with the White House created suspicions among the Department of Justice Watergate investigators. Petersen admitted to the President on April 27:

"We had a kind of crisis of confidence night before last . . . And in effect it concerned me—whether or not they were at east with my reporting to you, and I pointed out to them that I had very specific instructions, discussed that with them before on that subject... As a consequent-I kind of laid into [Harold] Titus yesterday and it cleared the air a little bit, but there is a very suspicious atmosphere. They are concerned and scared . (Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 1258)

N. THE BEGINNING OF THE UNRAVELING OF

THE COVERUP

The coverup began publicly to unravel when McCord broke his silence on March 21, 1972 with his letter to Judge Sirica which was read in open court on March 23. It was soon learned that McCord had accused Magruder of perjury and Mitchell, Magruder and Dean of participating in planning the Watergate break-in. Even before McCord broke his silence, Magruder and Dean were concerned about the viability of the coverup. Magruder, according to his testimony, expressed his concerns to Haldeman as early as January 1973, and to Mitchell and Dean in March; Dean voiced his fears to the President on several occasions.

1. The February 28 Meeting. According to Dean, he met with the President on February 28, 1973, and, after discussion of a number of matters, informed him that he (Dean) was involved in the post-June 17 activities regarding Watergate. "I briefly described to him why I thought I had legal problems, and that I had been a con