Page images
PDF
EPUB

Mitchell also testified that, in their March 27 meeting, Magruder requested further assurance from someone still in the White House and Mitchell suggested a meeting with Haldeman. (4 Hearings 1634) Magruder testified that in January, when he became concerned he might be made a scapegoat, he went to Haldeman and said, "I just want you to know that this whole Watergate situation and other activities was a concerted effort by a number of people, and so I went through a literal monologue on what had occurred." (2 Hearings 806) However, Haldeman testified, "At no meeting with Magruder did he raise with me a monologue as he has described." (7 Hearings 2887) Dean testified that on March 28, Haldeman called him at Camp David and asked him to return to Washington to meet with Mitchell and Magruder. Although Dean resisted, Haldeman persuaded him to participate. (3 Hearings 1005) Dean said his meeting with Haldeman, Mitchell and Magruder concerned how Dean planned to testify, if called before an appropriate body, regarding the January 27 and February 4, 1972 meetings in Mitchell's office. Dean said he would not agree to help support the perjured testimony already given by Magruder in this regard. (3 Hearings 1006) Mitchell testified that, at the meeting, Haldeman offered to help Magruder as a friend, but made no other commitments. (4 Hearings 1634) Magruder recalled that Haldeman was careful to articulate that he "could make no commitments for the President." (2 Hearings 807) Because of Dean's stand and the advice of CRP lawyers, Magruder decided to retain personal counsel. (2 Hearings 808)

The transcript of an April 14, 1973 meeting among the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman indicates the President's view as to how an inference of Executive clemency could be given to Magruder in return for his claiming ultimate responsibility (along with Mitchell) for the Watergate affair:

P I would also, though I'd put a couple of things in and say, Jeb, let me just start here by telling you the President holds great affection for you and your family. I was just thinking last night, this poor kid

H

Yeah, beautiful kids.

P Lovely wife and all the rest, it just breaks your heart. And say this, this is a very painful message for me to bring—I've been asked to give you, but I must do it and it is that: Put it right out that way. Also I would put that in so he knows I have personal affection. That's the way the so-called clemency's got to

be handled. Do you see John?

E I understand.

H Do the same thing with Mitchell. (Edited Presidential Conversation 502-503) (emphasis added)*

4. Representations to G. Gordon Liddy. The edited Presidential transcript contains a reference to a purported promise by Mitchell of a pardon or clemency to Liddy. The following passage is from the April 14, 1972 meeting among the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman:

P He's not talking because he thinks the President doesn't want him to talk? Is that the point?

E He's according to them, Mitchell's given him a promise of a pardon.

P Bittman?

E According to Colson and Shapiro.

P I don't know where they get that. Mitchell has promised Liddy a pardon?

E Yes, sir. (p. 412)

On pages 485-487, the following colloquy from the same meeting appears:

P Colson to Bittman. I guess that's the only thing we have on that-except Mitchell, apparently had said something about clemency to people.

H To Liddy.

P And Mitchell has never, never-Has he ever discussed clemency with you?

E No.

P Has he ever discussed it with you?

H No.

P (unintelligible) We were all here the room.

H Well, may have said, "Look we've got to take care of this."

P But's he's never said, "Look you're going to get a pardon from these people when this is over." Never used any such language around here, has he, John?

[blocks in formation]

E Well I don't know. That's a question I can't

answer.

P Well, but Dean's never raised it. In fact, Dean

See also id. at 439, 442, 451, 459, 501, where the need to have Magruder and Mitchell present a congruent, false story is discussed.

told me when he talked about Hunt. I said, John, "where does it all lead?" I said, what's it going to cost. You can't just continue this way. He said, "About a million dollars." (Unintelligible) I said, John, that's the point. (Unintelligible) Unless I could get them up and say look fellows, it's too bad and I give you executive clemency like tomorrow, what the hell do you think, Dean.

P I mean, you think, the point is, Hunt and the Cubans are not going to sit in jail for four years and they are not being taken care of?

H That's the point. Now where are you going to get the money for that?

P

That's the reason this whole thing falls apart. It's that-It's that that astonishes me about Mitchell and the rest.

E Big problem.

(Material unrelated to Presidential actions deleted)

P The word never came up, but I said, “I appreciate what you're doing." I knew it was for the purpose of helping the poor bastards through the trial, but you can't offer that John. You can't-or could you? I guess you could. Attorney's fees? Could you go a support program for these people for four years.

E I haven't any idea. I have no idea. (See also, 3 Hearings 975; 7 Hearings 2801)

5. Consideration of Clemency for Dean and Mitchell. Comments by the President, at an April 14 meeting with Ehrlichman, indicated he considered Executive clemency for Dean and Mitchell in return for Dean's and Mitchell's cooperation in the Watergate affair:

P... one point, you are going to talk to Dean?

E I am.

P

What are you going to say to him?

E Well to get off this passing the buck business.
P John, that's-

E It is a little touchy and I don't know how far I can go.

P John, that is not going to help you. Look he [Dean] has to look down the road to one point there is only one man who could restore him to the ability to practice law in case things go wrong. He's got to have that in the back of his mind.

E

P

Uh, huh.

He's got to know that will happen. You don't

tell him, but you know and I know that with him and Mitchell there isn't going to be any damn question, because they got a bad rap. (Edited Presidential Conversations, pp. 668-669)

M. ACTIVITIES RELATING TO OTHER

INVESTIGATIONS AND COURT PROCEEDINGS White House and CRP officials were also concerned that other investigations besides the grand jury proceeding might uncover the true facts relating to the Watergate breakin.

1. The Patman Hearings. On August 19, 1972, Representative Wright Patman, Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, ordered his committee staff to investigate the President's campaign finances, including the checks deposited in Barker's account. By early September, White House concern over the Patman Committee's investigation had mounted. Dean testified that, from the beginning of this probe, the White House had two major fears: "First, the hearings would have resulted in more adverse pre-election publicity regarding Watergate and, second, they just might stumble into something that would start unraveling the coverup." (3 Hearings 953-9) See also, Edited Presidential Conversations, p. 67-69, which concern the meeting of September 15, 1972, among the President, Haldeman and Dean and show substantial conversation between the President and Dean as to how to deal with the problems posed by these hearings.

According to Dean, CRP Counsel Parkinson was put in touch with Congressman Garry Brown, a Committee member, to persuade Brown to help limit the scope of the Committee's hearings. On September 8, Brown sent a letter to Attorney General Kleindienst which according to Dean, Parkinson had drafted. (3 Hearings 959) The letter inquired as to the propriety of Stans' testimony before the Committee, scheduled for September 14, in view of pending civil and criminal suits. Congressman Brown has filed a sworn statement with the Committee denying that Parkinson drafted this letter, and Dean's knowledge, admittedly based on hearsay, has not been corroborated. (Exhibit 69, 4 Hearings 1791) The Committee has found no evidence that Congressman Brown committed any improprieties.

The Justice Department, according to Dean, declined at this time to recommend that Stans not be required to testify, being of the view such a suggestion would appear part of a

concerted effort to block the hearings. Nonetheless, Parkinson informed the Committee that Stans would not appear in order to avoid prejudicing pending criminal investigations. (3 Hearings 959-960)

In the last week of September, Dean took an active role in White House efforts to hinder the work of the Patman investigation. After Patman announced, on September 25, that he would hold a vote on October 3 on issuing subpenas to witnesses, Haldeman suggested that Dean talk to John Connally about blocking the Committee's hearings. Connally, Dean said, responded that Patman's only "soft spot" was a rumor that he had not reported large contributions from lobbyists. Dean then asked Parkinson to investigate the reports filed by members of the Committee with the Clerk of the House concerning campaign contributions. Parkinson furnished such a report on September 26, which Dean said he did not use.

Dean next presuaded Henry Petersen, Chief of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, to write Committee members to dissuade them from issuing subpenas. (3 Hearings 960-962) Petersen, in an October 2 letter to the members, asked that they delay their investigation because it might jeopardize fair criminal trials. (3 Hearings 1194) On October 3, the Committee voted not to hold hearings. (3 Hearings 962)

On October 10, Patman announced that his Committee would convene in two days in another attempt to investigate the Watergate affair. Patman requested Dean, Mitchell, MacGregor and Stans to appear. (3 Hearings 962) Dean declined to appear, claiming Executive Privilege. The others declined on advice of counsel and Patman did not reconvene the Committee.

2. The Civil Suits. A counter-offensive was likewise mounted regarding the civil suit brought by the Democratic National Committee against CRP. Dean testified that, around September 9 or 10, both Haldeman and Colson relayed to him a request from the President that a counter-action be filed against the Democrats "as quickly as humanly possible." (3 Hearings 956) On September 13, CRP filed a $2,500,000 counter-suit against the DNC for abuse of process and, on September 14, Stans brought a $5 million libel suit against Lawrence O'Brien, DNC Chairman.

Dean testified that, when he met with the President on September 15, the various civil cases were discussed. Dean stated he told the President that CRP lawyers were handling both the DNC suit and one filed by Common Cause. He

« PreviousContinue »