any county may organize whenever a majority of the qualified electors of such county, voting at a general election, shall so determine; and whenever a county shall adopt township organization, the assessment and collection of the revenue shall be made, and the business of such county and the local affairs of the several townships therein, shall be managed and transacted in the manner prescribed by such general laws.

SEC. 5. The legislature, by general and uniform laws, shall provide for the election or appointment, in the several counties, of boards of supervisors, sheriffs, county clerks, district attorneys, and such other county, township, and municipal officers as public convenience may require, and shall prescribe their duties, and fix their terms of office. It shall regulate the compensation of all such officers, in proportion to duties, and for this purpose may classify the counties by population; and it shall provide for the strict accountability of county and township officers for all fees which may be collected by them, and for all public and municipal moneys which may be paid to them, or officially come into their possession.

SEC. 11. Any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.

SEC. 12. The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns, or other public or municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes." And

Article I, section 22:

SEC. 22. The provisions of this constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.

The twenty-seventh paragraph of section 25,

article IV, prohibits the legislature from passing any local act "providing for the management of public schools," and among the earliest cases considered by the supreme court with reference to this subiect of "general" and "local" laws under this constitution was Earl v. The Board of Education, 55 Cal. 489, and involving what was commonly known as "The Traylor Act," for the fixing of salaries of school teachers in cities having 100,000 inhabitants or more. At page 491, the court uses the following language: "It is said that the question whether a general law can be made applicable is one for the discretion of the legislature and not for the courts. It is true that it has been so decided, but under constitutions not containing a declaration that its provisions are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise."

The decisions have since become numerous in which the courts have held attempts at local and special legislation to be contrary to the present constitution, and in support of the theory that it was intended by the constitution to vest local county and municipal governments with such power. As was said in Ex parte Chin Yan, 60 Cal. 78: "It is not the purpose of the constitution to prohibit municipalities from enacting or enforcing special or local laws, but to prohibit the legislature from doing so."

The Political Code as originally adopted contained a general county government law

Secs. 4000 to 4344, inclusive-and its general frame work has been used in the several subsequent county government acts.

The first effort of the legislature, after the new constitution, to conform to the constitutional requirement of a general and uniform law for county and township government was at the session of 1880. This effort was confined to amendment of a number of the code sections above alluded to, but unfortunately the act purported to amend "sections" without stating to what code or law the designated sections belonged; it was clearly not in compliance with section 24, article IV, of the new constitution which requires that shall embrace but one subject, every act which subject shall be expressed in its title, and that no law shall be revised or amended by a reference to its title; but in such case the act revised or section amended shall be re-enacted and published at length as revised or amended. The validity of this statute was tested in the case of Leonard v. January, 56 Cal. 1, and it was decided unconstitutional, apparently because of the defect in its title, though there were several objections to it urged.

The next enactment on the subject related only to those provisions [Pol. Code Secs. 4109, 4024, 4027, 4111] governing elections and terms of office of county officers. [Statutes 1881, p. 74.] This act was generally referred to as the "Hartson Act." It changed the former provisions so as to make them conform

to the elections for other officers provided for in the constitution, and this act was held to be constitutional in Staade v. Election Commissioners, 61 Cal. 313, citing other decisions bearing upon elections sub-equent to the adoption of the new constitution, particularly the case of Barton v. Kalloch, 56 Cal. 95. There are dissenting opinions in most of the cases on this subject immediately following and resulting from the adoption of the constitution of 1879; and the subject of election of county officers, since 1880, has been prolific of litigation and adverse views. For instance, in the case of Barton v. Kalloch, while the chief point involved related only to elections in the city and county of San Francisco, the syllabus of the case exhibits the diverse views entertained substantially as follows:

1. The constitution did not change the time for electing city and county officers in San Francisco; but such elections are still governed by the act of April 2, 1866, as amended by the act of March 30, 1872 [Stats. 1866, p. 718, 1872, p. 729], and take place in the odd numbered years.

2. The provisions of section 10, article XXII, of the constitution, refer only to the officers mentioned in section 10 of article XX, "as provided for by this constitution;" that is to say, only to those officers who derive their right to hold office; immediately from the constitution, and whose offices are created by the constitution itself, and do not refer to municipal or county officers.

3. Justice McKee, concurring, was of the opinion that the sections of the constitution referred to apply to all offices-whether state or county-except municipal.

4. Justice Myrick, dissenting, was of opinion that the constitutional provisions in question apply to all offices, state, county, and municipal.

5. Justice Ross, and Chief Justice Morrison, concurring, were of opinion that it may have been and probably was contemplated by the framers of the constitution, that, when the legislature should provide for the election of county, township and municipal officers, it would require such elections to be held upon the even numbered years; but whether the legislature, when it shall act, must do so, is a question not involved in the present case.

6. In the leading opinion it is held that the legislature is authorized by section 5, article XI, of the constitution to provide for the election or appointment of all county officers -that they may all be appointed instead of elected, and that their terms may be fixed at one, two, three or four years.

7. Justice McKinstry, concurring, dissents from the proposition that the people might be deprived of electing their local officers, but assents that possibly certain officers, as supervisors, might be elected, and that the appointment of the other officers might be left to them. On the subject of elections it is sufficient at present to say that by the county government act of 1893, section 60 [Stats. p. 367], it was