sation of county officers is limited by section 5 of article XI of the constitution, which section requires such classification to be made according to the population of the various counties. It is apparent that the legislature has no power to arbitrarily place any particular county in any particular class. Classes of counties are arranged according to a graduated scale of population, and when the population of a county is determined by the legislature its classification is arrived at without trouble." It was also said that the legislature could not, by the act providing for the organization of Glenn county, so declare the class to which the new county, if organized, would belong after its organization, and it is held that the action of the legislature in that respect should be regarded only as determining its population. The county was not finally organized until May 11, 1892. By section 235 of the county government act of 1891, it was provided "that in all newly created counties for the purpose of fixing salaries and fees * * the board of commissioners appointed to organize said new county, and if no commissioners be appointed, then the supervisors of said new county, shall classify said new county according to the population classification of this act," and it was held that the declaration of the commissioners for the organization of Glenn county, on May 11, 1892, determined said county as of the forty-first class, notwithstanding the previous declaration of the legislature designating it as of the thirty-seventh

*

class. It had a population of more than 6500 and less than 6600, which would cause it to be properly classed at that time as a county of forty-first class.

By section 60 of the county government act of 1893, it was provided that all elective, county and township officers, except otherwise provided for in this act, shall be elected at the general election to be held in November, 1894, and every four years thereafter. By subdivision 26 of section 170 of the same act, it appeared to be provided that in counties of the eighth class, alone, such officers should be elected every two years. This was held to be void as destroying the "uniformity" required by the constitution. Hale v. McGettigan, 114 Cal. 116.

By subdivision 15, section 204 (applying to counties of the forty-second class), of the act of 1893, it was provided that supervisors should receive seven dollars per diem and twenty-five cent sper mile, etc., all of which compensation in the aggregate shall not exceed four hundred dollars per annum, each. The concluding clause is held to prevent any larger sum being charged or received by supervisors in that class for any services. Chapin v. Wilcox, 114 Cal. 499. There are numerous clauses in the present act to which this decision will probably be held applicable.

See notes under section 215, post.

OFFICIAL SALARIES AND FEES.

First-class-San Francisco.

SEC. 158. In counties of the first class the officers shall receive, as compensation for the services required of them by law, or by virtue of their office, the salaries and fees fixed by law as compensation; provided, that this shall not be construed as adding any additional compensation to any officer; provided, however, that the sheriff shall also be allowed mileage for the service of any paper required by law to be served, at the rate of fifteen cents per mile for one way only, to be paid by the person requiring such service.

The consolidation act [Stats. 1856, p. 145], declares: "Section 1. The corporation or body politic and corporate, now existing and known as the city of San Francisco, shall remain and continue to be a body politic and corporate in name and in fact, by the name of the city and county of San Francisco, and by that name shall have perpetual succession," etc. The boundaries are then defined, and it is then provided that "all rights and liabilities of the corporation heretofore and now known as the city of San Francisco, shall survive to, and continue against, the corporations continued by this act."

Section 2 of the act declares: "The public buildings, lands and property, all rights of property and rights of action, and all moneys, revenues and income belonging or appertaining either to the corporation of the city of San Francisco, or to the county of San Francisco, are hereby declared to be vested in and to appertain to the said city and county of San Francisco."

By that act the city of San Francisco, a body corporate and politic, and the county of San Francisco, a body corporate and politic, went out of existence and a new body corporate and politic, by the name of the city and county of San Francisco, was created.

The several county government acts have contained in their classification of counties, a clause referring to counties of the first class. Section 162 of the act of 1883, declares: "All counties containing a population of one hundred thousand inhabitants or over, shall belong to and be known as counties of the first class." And by section 163 it is provided that "in counties of the first class, the officers shall receive as compensation for the services required of them by law, or by virtue of their office, the salaries fixed by law." The succeeding county government acts have contained substantially the same provisions, and it has been uniformly understood that the corporate body known as the city and county of San Francisco, alone, was included in said provisions.

There are numerous acts which have been declared to enter into and form the "consolidation act," or the law governing and applicable to this consolidated government, but the following may be more particularly mentioned as directly forming the organic act and its amendments: Stats. 1856, p. 145; 1857, p. 345; 1861, p. 214; 1861, p. 291; 1862, p. 475; 1865-6, p. 718; 1871-2, p. 729. And as to elections therein, section 4109, Political Code, as

amended in 1881 [Stats. 1881, p. 74], may be mentioned.

Prior to the amendment of section 4109, of Political Code, it was held that the election of officers in San Francisco was not controlled by the constitution of 1879, but by the act above referred to of 1865-6. Barton v. Kalloch, 56 Cal. 96. It was next held that the amendment of section 4109 of Political Code, being "general" in its character did not repeal the "special" act of 1865-6, and did not effect election of officers in San Francisco; that the city and county was a continuation of the former municipal government. Wood v. Elestion Commissioners, 58 Cal. 562, As to the subject of street improvements in San Francisco, it was held that section 19 of article XI of the constitution of 1879, as originally adopted, requiring the cost of improvement to be collected before the work was done, repealed the street law of 1872, above referred to, in McDonald v. Patterson, 54 Cal. 245, and that decision was approved in the subsequent case of Ewing v. Oroville M. Co., 56 Cal. 649, and more or less directly approved in others. That said municipal corporation was not affected by the new constitution was held in a number of cases such as Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal. 245; People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612; People ex rel Dougherty v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2 W. C. Rep. 366; Wood v. Election Commissioners, 58 Cal. 561; People v. Hammond, 66 Cal. 655; Staude v. Election Commissioners, 61 Cal. 313; Heinlen v. Sul