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void. Ex parte Mason, 102 Cal. 172; Merced County v. Helm, 102 Cal. 159.
Counties, cities, etc., derive their power to legislate from the same source that the legislature does, i. e., the constitution, and an ordinance within the power granted is to be construed with the same effect as an act of the legislature, and so far as ordinances upon the subjects of police regulation and control are concerned, the ordinances of a city supersede, within the city, any ordinances passed upon the same subject by the supervisors. While license taxes may be collected from the same persons under ordinances of both city and county, ordinances for regulation rest upon a different footing. Ex parte Roach, 104 Cal. 272.
That license taxes may be imposed in a city by both the city and the county authority, see the cases cited in Ex parte Roach, supra.
Distinction between "assessment” and “tax." Holley v. Orange County, 106 Cal. 426.
If in the exercise of the power to license, the supervisors pass an ordinance regulating and licensing the selling of liquors, which conflicts with the ordinances of an incorporated city in the same county, the city ordinance will have superior force within its municipal limits. Citing Ex parte-Roach, 104 Cal. 272; Ex parte Mansfield, 106 Cal. 403.
A.county ordinance is not invalid by reason of establishing a higher liquor license for saloons outside of an incorporated city than is required for saloons conducted inside the city. Ex parte Stephen, 114 Cal. 281.
The supervisors of a county have power to impose license taxes for purposes of revenue, and to provide for their collection by suit or otherwise; and though it has no power to appoint a license tax collector, it may authorize license taxes to be paid to the county tax collector. Ventura County v. Clay, 112 Cal. 66.
By the organization of a city within the boundaries of a county, the territory thus organized is withdrawn from the legislative control of the county upon the designated subjects, and is placed under the legislative control of its own council. Ordinances enacted by supervisors are not "general" laws in the sense that they will displace or repeal ordinances of a city within the same county. A city ordinance regulating licenses will supercede a former ordinance of the supervisors (as to the territory within the city) upon the same subject. Ex parte Roach, 104 Cai. 276.
SUBDIVISION 26: The power conferred by the county government act upon supervisors to provide for destruction of wild animals, etc., does not authorize an ordinance prescribing a penalty upon the owner or occupint of land for not exterminating ground squirrels on their respective lands, and thereafter to keep said lands free and clear therefrom, and declaring a violation of the ordinance a misdemeanor. Such an ordinance is declared void, as being unreasonable and burdensome. Ex parte Hodges, 87 Cal. 162.
SUBDIVISION 29: The authority conferred upon the rupervisors to "provide for the working of prisoners,” includes all that is required 'to prevent escapes, as well as the direction of their labor, and "under the direction of some responsible person," implies a contract with some person. The sheriff might be selected but could not be compelled to act, and it is held that the person contracted with by the supervisors is entitled to the custody of the prisoners for the purposes of this law, as against the sheriff. Hicks v. Folks, 97 Cal. 243.
SUBDIVISION 31: One or more of the features of a county ordinance may be void, and yet those parts which are independent of the invalid provisions may stand unaffected. An ordinance undertaking to punish precisely the same acts which are punishable under the general law of the state is to be deemed in conflict with the general law, and void; but a void penal clause which is independent of and severable from the part of the ordinance declaring the acts to be a misdemeanor, will not vitiate a judgment of conviction for such misdemeanor, where the judgment is in accordance with the general law. Ex parte Stephen, 114 Cal. 281.
Feeding swill to cows may be prohibited. Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal. 242.
A municipality has no authority to pass an ordinance to punish precisely the same acts which are punishable under the general laws of the state. In the matter of Sic, 73 Cal. 142. A county ordinance is void if in conflict with a valid law of the state, but the ordinance must prevail, notwithstanding it conflicts with a general statute, if such statute is. unconstitutional and the ordinance harmonizes with the constitution and all other general laws. County of San Luis Obispo v. Graves, 84 Cal. 74.
Wild animals. An ordinance requiring owners and occupants of land to destroy ground squirrels, and to thereafter keep the premises free from the same is unreasonable and burdenscme, and void. Ex parte Hodges, 87 Cal. 162.
Pool selling. Any practice or business, the tendency of which, as shown by experience, is to weaken or corrupt the morals, encourage idleness, etc., is a legitimate subject for regulation or prohibition. Ex parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589.
The presumption arising from the existence of an ordinance upon the record of ordinances is sufficient to entitle it to be received in evidence without further proof, in the absence of evidence showing its invalidity. County of San Diego v. Siefert, 97 Cal. 597.
Steam carpet cleaning. Section 11 of article XI of the constitution provides that any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. This grant of police power is direct, broad and far reaching, including the right to pass any ordinance not conflicting with the general laws of the state and not violative of the general principles of the constitution. Ex parté Lacey, 108 Cal. 326. Ex parte Cheney, 90 Cal. 617.
Unusual restrictions upon a lawful business may be an arbitrary exercise of police power, violative of general principles, and void. So held with reference to an ordinance of a board of supervisors requiring private insane asylums and home for inebriates to be fire proof and enclosed by wall, etc. Ex parte Whitwell, 98 Cal, 73.
A general law authorizing the formation of sanitary districts [Stats. 1891, p. 223] construed to apply in counties but not to include cities or towns. Woodward v. Fruitvale, S. Dist., 99 Cal. 554. Approving In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296.
SUBDIVISION 35: Subdivision 40 of section 25 of the county government act of 1893, does not repeal the statute approved on the preceeding day relative to the sale of franchises for telegraphs, telephones and railways. [Stats. 1893 p. 288.] Such franchises must be sold for money, and cannot be bartered away for commodities. Thompson v. Board of Supervisors, 111 Cal. 555.
SUBDIVISION 36: The right conferred by subdivision 41 of section 25 of the act of 1893, to grant franchises for toll roads is not in conflict with section 13, article XI of the constitution. [Blood v. Woods, 95 Cal. 78 distinguished.] Blood v. McCarty, 112 Cal. 564. See subdivision 4, ante.