county government act. An offer to accept bonds of a county may be withdrawn unless the bonds when issued comply with formalities and requirements of the act under which they are authorized. County of Merced v. Regents of U. of C., 66 Cal. 26.

The county of San Luis Obispo was authorized to issue court house bonds to the amount of $40,000 [Stats. 1870, p. 816, and 1871-2, p. 369], but in fact issued twenty bonds of $100 each in excess of the authorization. These additional bonds were sold for value, interest paid on them, and they were outstanding on January 1, 1880. Pursuant to subdivision 14, section 25, of county government act of 1883, the supervisors undertook to refund the county indebtedness, and did issue new bonds for the extra $2000 of over-issue. Held, the over issue and the refunding bonds issued in place thereof were void, into whosesoever hands they may have passed. Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 335.

The board of supervisors of a county may employ counsel, other than the district attorney, to transact the legal business of the county, if in the judgment of the board the public interest will be thereby subserved. So held with reference to services of attorney employed to collect from the state moneys due Lassen county for care of indigent persons. [Scolly v. County of Butte, 67 Cal. 249; Hornblower v. Duden, 35 Cal. 670; Smith v. Mayor of Sacramento, 13 Cal. 533.] Lassen County v. Shinn, 88 Cal. 510.

The mode here pointed out is the only one

to be pursued in making sale of county bonds. A contract by the supervisors to pay a third person for procuring a purchaser of such bonds is unauthorized and creates no legal charge against the county. Smith v. Los Angeles County, 99 Cal. 629.

The supervisors of a county have no power or authority to enter into a contract with a private individual to proceed and cause to be collected from owners what may be due on account of sales of real estate made to the state for delinquent taxes, and to pay him a percentage on such collections. The whole course of proceeding, from the levy of a tax to its collection, is confided to officers designated by the statute, whose duties and the time and manner of their discharge are specified by the law, and there is no power conferred upon the supervisors to collect them in any other manner. The mode prescribed is the measure of the power. House v. Los Angeles County, 104 Cal. 73.

The proviso of subdivision 13 of section 25 of the county government act that no tax shall be levied upon any district unless the proposition to levy the same has been submitted to the qualified electors of the district, applies only to taxes levied on property upon the ad valorem principle, as prescribed by the constitution, and has no application to assessments for local purposes where the charge is upon property benefited in proportion to benefits. Holley v. County of Orange, 106 Cal. 420.

SUBDIVISION 16: The supervisors may lawfully employ an attorney to collect a sum of

money due from the state to the county. And if the board had original power in the premises, it may cure informalities or irregularities in the procedure by a subsequent satisfaction and recognition of its liability. Power v. May, 114 Cal. 208.

Under the act of 1891, it was held that supervisors are the creatures of statute, and the authority for any act on their part must be sought in the statute. There is no authority given by statute for supervisors to employ special counsel to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases. An action may be maintained on behalf of the county to restrain payment of a warrant drawn by the supervisors in payment for such services. County of Modoc v. Spencer, 103 Cal. 499.

SUBDIVISION 18: The authorization to the supervisors to transfer moneys from one fund to another cannot be construed to authorize the transfer to a fund established by law and expressly limited in the amount of its receipts. All the money used for, road purposes must come from the road poll tax and property road tax. [Pol. Code, Secs. 2652, 2653.] Only a portion of the cost of constructing bridges can be paid from the general fund. An order transferring money temporarily from the county general fund to a particular road fund for payment to the road overseer for work, etc., aside from the construction of bridges, is without authority of law, and the treasurer will not be compelled by mandamus to obey such order. Potter v. Fowzer, 78 Cal. 494.

SUBDIVISION 19: Boards of supervisors do not "elect" to office; they appoint. An appointment is not made until certificate is issued, and an understanding or agreement or direction appointing may be revoked at any time before the certificate issues. As to elections by the people, the rule is different. Conger v. Gilmer, 32 Cal. 77.

The distinction between vacancies occurring by reason of some provision of law, and those existing in fact, is discussed in People v. Ward,

107 Cal. 241.

All of the appointing power of the board of supervisors is not necessarily included in section 25 of the county government act. Section 35 recognizes that fact by giving to the board power to do and perform all other acts and things required by law, not in this act enumerated, or which may be necessary to the full discharge of the duties of the legislative department of the county government. [Citing also Sec. 111 C. C. P.] People v. Sands, 102 Cal. 18.

By section 111, Code of Civil Procedure, the supervisors may appoint to vacancy in the office of justice of the peace; and under various acts, relating to irrigation, and reclamation districts, special authority is given to appoint to vacancies. With respect to sanitary districts [Stats. 1891, p. 223; 1893, p. 88; 1895, p. 86], such provision as to vacancy seems to be omitted, while in school districts the county. superintendent fills vacancies.

The power to appoint to vacancies raises a question that may not be considered as entirely settled in this state, although decisions upon various phases of the question are numerous. When does a vacancy exist?

In Rosborough v. Boardman, 67 Cal. 118, the court says: "The power of the supervisors to appoint the petitioner depended on there being a vacancy in the office; and an office becomes vacant on the happening of any of the events enumerated in section 996 of the Political Code, among which the event relied on in this case is not mentioned. The enume

ration in the code must be held to be exclusive. [People v. Tilton, 37 Cal. 621; Stratton v. Oulton, 28 Cal. 51; People v. Bissell, 49 Cal. 411.]" It is perhaps singular that neither of the cases cited sustains the language of the court, as to the exclusiveness of section 996, but an examination of the three cases cited certainly discloses that fact,

The decision in the Rosborough case was undoubtedly correct as to there being no vacancy in the case before the court, for there was no office at the time the appointment was made.

Justice Thornton concurs in the judgment, but points out that the court has gone further than was demanded by the facts before it, and says: "I am of opinion that an office is

vacant which has never had an incumbent legally elected or appointed."

In People v. Hammond, 66 Cal. 656, it had been argued that a vacancy in office did not