tend to acts done by the servant not in the performance of the duty intrusted to him at all, but merely because it may not be unnatural or unreasonable that he should, being on the spot for the purpose of performing his duty, sometimes assist others in the performance of another duty relating to the same subjectmatter as his own. - Solicitors' Journal.

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT.* ALTERATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENT. The burden of proof of accounting for an erasure or alteration is not necessarily on the party producing the instrument. Each case must depend on its own circumstances, and the triers must be satisfied that the erasure or alteration was fairly made so as not to affect the validity of the instrument. Hayden v. Goodnow, 165.

COMMON CARRIER.

Goods were sent by a sealed railroad car to be delivered unbroken at the place of destination. The railroad company on the way opened the car and transferred the goods to another. The owner refused to receive them and brought trover. The judge charged the jury that "if a common carrier, when a car and contents are to be forwarded unopened, intentionally breaks the package and removes the goods, he is liable in trover to the owner for their value, less the charges upon them." Held to be erroneous. If the goods are removed for the convenience of the carrier, and are afterward delivered without loss of quantity and without injury, the carrier would not be liable in trover. Tucker v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 447.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

1. As a general rule the title to personal property perfected in one State, according to the laws of that State, is respected in all other States and countries into which the property may come. The validity of transfers of such property depends in general upon the place of the contract; sometimes the situs of the property is an important consideration. These general rules are, however, subject to the exception that every State must judge for itself how far it will give effect to the laws of other States. Ballard v. Winter, 179.

2. The rule of law in Connecticut which requires a change of possession to accompany sales and mortgages of personal property, in order to perfect the title as against creditors of the vendor or mortgagor, is not a mere rule of evidence, but of positive law. But this rule does not, as such, apply to property located without the jurisdiction of the State, and ought not to be applied to a contract made in good faith in another State, between citizens of that State, according to the laws of that State, in relation to property there situate, with no purpose of being executed in this State, or of evading its laws. Ib.

DAMAGES.

1. The doctrine that the circumstances attending a trespass may be given in evidence for the purpose of enhancing damages, though not alleged in the declaration, does not apply where the circumstances of themselves constitute an independent cause of action. Plumb v. Ives, 121..

*From John Hooker, Esq., State reporter, and to appear in 39 Conn.

2. Therefore where in trespass de bonis asportatis, the declaration contained no allegation of injury to the person of the plaintiff, and there was no claim that the taking of the property was malicious, it was holden that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for an assault made upon her by the defendant in connection with the taking of the property. Ib.

EASEMENT.

A lease of certain land granted to the lessees "the privilege of using the well when necessary on the lot next south, so long as they remain."

Held, that, as it did not appear that the use of these structures was indispensable to the convenient use of the letten premises, there was no covenant by necessary implication that they should remain; that the lessees had merely the right to their use while they remained, and the lessors had the right to determine how long they should remain, and might remove them at their pleasure. Basserman v. Society of Trinity Church, 137.

EMANCIPATION.

A father, acting in good faith, may make a valid gift to his minor son of his time and future earnings, although insolvent at the time. Atwood v. Holcomb, 270.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE.

The defendants, owners of a building occupied by the plaintiffs as their tenants, employed a mason to remove the earth from under a wall of the building and underlay it with stone. The mason undertook the work, but did it so negligently that the building fell and the plaintiffs were damaged. The work was done under a contract for a fixed price, and with no control over the means employed on the part of the defendants. The general principles applicable to such a case reviewed, and the defendants held not liable. Lawrence v. Shipman, 586.

FIXTURE.

1. A portable hot air furnace, placed in the cellar of a dwelling-house for the purpose of warming the house, and set in a pit prepared for it in the bottom of the cellar, where it is held in place simply by its own weight, is a part of the realty. Stockwell v. Campbell, 362.

2. So, also, is the smoke-pipe leading from the furnace to the chimney of the house. Ib.

GOOD WILL.

The plaintiff, a practicing physician in a country village, being about to remove to a neighboring town, proposed to the defendant, who was also a physician, to remove to the village and take his place, he agreeing to recommend him to his patrons and to use his influence in his favor, reserving the right to practice in the village when called on to do so; the defendant in consideration agreeing to pay the plaintiff $500. Held, that the business of the plaintiff was not such a personal trust and confidence that it could not be the subject of sale, and that the contract was not void as being contrary to public policy. Hoyt v. Holly, 326.

HIGHWAY.

1. To render a city lible for an injury caused by a defect in a public street, there must have been some neglect of duty in the matter on the part of the city authorities; and notice of the defect is essential to such neglect. This notice may be actual or may be in

ferred from the circumstances of the case. Bill v. City of Norwich, 222.

2. If the defect was, at the time of the injury, palpable, dangerous and in a public place, and had existed for a considerable period of time, knowledge on the part of the city authorities might be presumed. Ib.

3. Notice to a citizen is not, as matter of law, notice to the city, but may be considered by the triers as evidence tending to show such notice; and if many citizens had knowledge of the defect, so that it had become notorious, the evidence that the city authorities had notice would become very strong. Ib.

4. A city street was laid out wholly through the land of A, leaving a narrow strip of land between the new street and the land of B, which had no direct access to the street except through the land of A. Held, that the fact that the land of B was not benefited by the laying out of the street unless it could be united with the land of A by purchase or sale, did not make an assessment of benefits upon B's land illegal. Terry v. City of Hartford, 291.

5. Objects within the limits of a highway which in their nature are calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, may be nuisances, which make the highway defective within the meaning of the statute, and which it is the duty of a town to remove. Ayer v. City of Norwich, 376.

6. The character of the objects, however, should be such as to make the danger obvious and the duty of the town clear. Ib.

7. Whether such an object in any particular case amounts to such a nuisance, is a question for the jury to determine upon a consideration of its character, its situation, the amount of travel on the highway, and all the circumstances. Ib.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. Where a husband, having a life estate in land in his own right, conveyed the legal title to his wife by deed, it was holden that the intention of the parties in respect to the estate granted must be gathered from the record, and that, in the absence of any indication in the language used that the parties intended that the estate vesting in the wife should be to her sole use, the law would not supply such an intention, and that therefore the husband, after such conveyance, was entitled to the use, rents and profits of the land in right of his wife, during his life. Plumb v. Ives, 120.

2. Where after such conveyance a crop of tobacco was raised on the land, partly by the labor and means of the husband, and partly by the avails of the land, which was sold and delivered by the husband as his own, and in trespass by the wife against the purchaser the court charged the jury, that if they should find that the tobacco was raised with means and labor substantially furnished by the husband, they would be justified in finding that it was included, and intended to be included, in the transfer, and as to a subsequent purchaser in good faith the transfer would be void, but if raised in like manner by the wife, when severed it would be hers. Held, that the effect of the charge was to permit the wife to hold the avails of the husband's labor and other means to the exclusion of bona fide purchasers from the husband, and that in this respect the charge was erroneous. Held also, that the purchaser had constructive notice from the record of the existence of the deed to the wife, but that it was not his duty to inquire into circumstances de hors the record which might affect the title, although he knew

the husband to be a man of dissolute habits and want of credit. Ib.

3. As a general rule, if it is intended that a married woman shall hold real estate conveyed to her, to her sole and separate use, that intention must appear upon the face of the deed. Hayt v. Parks, 357.

4. Where under the common law the rents and profits of the wife's real estate go to the husband as his own, he can relinquish them to her, in which case they will vest in her free from any control by him. Ib. 5. And where the wife's right to receive certain rent from a lessee depended upon the question whether the husband had by his acts relinquished his right to her, a charge was held erroneous that did not submit this question to the jury as a vital one in the case. Ib. 6. Whether the husband, under our statutes, takes the rents and profits of the real estate of the wife as her trustee quere. Ib.

ISLAND.

1. An island emerging from navigable waters vests in the State. Tracy v. Norwich & Worcester R. R. Co., 382.

2. A grant from the State may be presumed from long-continued exclusive and adverse possession. Ib.

LESSOR AND LESSEE.

1. A lessee for a term of years covenanted to keep the premises insured for a certain sum during the term in companies approved by the lessor, the lease to be forfeited on his neglect. Held, that the lessee might take out the insurance on the property for the benefit of both lessor and lessee according to their respective interests, and was not bound to renew a policy previously taken out by the lessor on his own interest merely. Sherwood v. Harral, 333.

2. Where, therefore, upon the expiration of such policy, the lessor, without notice to the lessee, renewed it, and several days after demanded of the lessee the amount of the premium paid by him, which the lessee, supposing that the policy had not yet expired, refused to pay, upon which the lessor made entry and claimed a forfeiture, immediately after which the lessee paid the renewal premium to the insurance company, it was held that, whatever might have been the effect of the lessee's neglect to procure some proper insurance on the expiration of the policy, if an entry had been made and a forfeiture claimed on that ground, yet the refusal to pay the premium demanded was not itself a breach of the covenant, working a forfeiture of the lease. Ib.

LIBEL.

1. In a prosecution for libel, evidence of other libelous publications of the defendant against the same person are admissible to show malice in the publication charged. State v. Riggs, 498.

2. But such evidence is not admissible for the purpose of proving the fact of the publication charged. Ib. 3. Where the judge instructed the jury that such evidence, introduced for the purpose of proving malice, might yet be considered by them in determining whether the defendant was guilty of the publication charged, it was held to be error, and a new trial was granted. Ib.

LIFE INSURANCE.

The defendants, through R., their local agent, issued a policy of insurance for $10,000 on the life of L., a brother of the plaintiff, for the benefit of and payable to the plaintiff. By a secret arrangement between R. and the plaintiff, R. advanced $525 toward the pay

ment of premiums, and agreed to advance the subsequent premiums, the amounts so advanced to be refunded by the plaintiff; and it was further agreed that R. should assume the policy if requested by the plaintiff within three years, and refund to him the amount of premiums paid by him with interest, and should receive $1,000 of the sum insured, if paid by the defendants, in case L. should die within three years. L. did not know of the existence of the policy, and was not examined by a physician as the rules of the defendants required, and the plaintiff had no interest in his life except such as arose from the relationship between them. The defendants were ignorant of all these facts. In the application for insurance the plaintiff stated that he had an interest in the life of L. to the full amount of insurance applied for. The defendants having canceled the policy, in an action to recover the amount of premiums paid it was holden: 1. That the transaction between the plaintiff and R. constituted a fraud upon the defendants, to which the plaintiff was a party in contemplation of law, and that the defendants could take advantage of the fraud as well against | him as against R., although the plaintiff did not actually participate in the fraudulent intent. 2. That the mere relationship between the plaintiff and L. was not such an interest as would support the policy, but that the policy was prima facie valid, and could only be avoided by showing by parol evidence such want of interest, and that the plaintiff was now estopped from averring such want of interest against the defendants. 3. That the responsibility assumed by the defendants, and the risk and inconvenience to which they were exposed by the acts of the plaintiff, constituted a consideration for the premiums paid. Lewis v. Phanix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 100.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

1. Whenever a municipal corporation is authorized to make by-laws relative to a given subject, and to require of those who desire to do any act or transact any business pertaining thereto to obtain a license therefor, the reasonable cost of granting such licenses may be properly charged to the persons procuring them, although the power to do so is not expressly given in the charter. Welch v. Hotchkiss, 140.

2. Therefore, where the charter of the city of New Haven empowered said city to make and enforce bylaws to protect the city from fire, to establish districts within which it should not be lawful to erect, enlarge or elevate any wooden building except by license of the city, and to enact ordinances relating to the subject, and prescribe penalties for their violation; and ordinances of said city provided that no person should build or enlarge any building within the fire limits, without a license first issued by the fire marshal, for which license a fee of fifty cents was required to be paid. Held, that the license fee required was not a revenue tax in any proper sense, but rather a reasonable sum collected of the party interested for the purpose of defraying in part the expense of issuing and recording the license, and that the power to require such a fee was conferred by the charter by intendment, as convenient, if not essential, to the full enjoyment of the powers expressly granted. Ib.

3. The charter of a city authorized the common council to pass ordinances upon certain subjects pertaining to the police, good order and welfare of the city, and provided that a violation of certain of such ordinances should be a misdemeanor, and might be

prosecuted before the police court of the city like other offenses, which court might inflict the penalty named in such ordinance, provided that no penalty should exceed the sum of fifty dollars for a single offense. Held, that the charter did not attempt to confer upon the common council the power to define and determine crime, and was not therefore unconstitutional. State v. Tryon, 183.

PAROL EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL
AGREEMENTS.

Wherever the hard and fast rule excluding parol evidence to control or vary a written document can be relaxed with advantage, there cannot be two opinions concerning the advisability of such relaxation. We have recently had two important illustrations of the view which courts having equitable jurisdiction will adopt in construing agreements which do not fully carry out the declared intentions of the parties. In Erskine v. Adeane (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 234), Lord Justice Mellish said, "The common law of England is distinguished from the law of almost all other countries by the fact that it does not imply contracts and agreements to any thing like the same extent, but generally obliges those who make contracts to insert in those contracts all the stipulations by which they intend to be bound." "No doubt then," his lordship added, "there are cases in which obligations may be implied, but, as a general rule, the man who wishes to have a particular stipulation for his benefit, must take care to have that stipulation inserted in the contract."

Such stipulations being omitted from an agreement, the point to be considered is whether the stipulation cannot be substantiated as a collateral agreement. The case of Erskine v. Adeane and that of The Llanelly Railway and Dock Company v. London and Northwestern Railway (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 357), furnish some useful information upon this subject. In the former case two questions were raised, the one relating to the keeping fences in repair, and the other to keeping down the game. It was held that a covenant by the lessor to keep up the fences could not be imported into the lease, and on the second point that there was sufficient evidence of a collateral promise by the lessor to keep down the game to entitle the lessee to compensation for damage done by game upon the land. This case is the more important because it must frequently happen that the execution of an agricultural lease is induced by a promise such as we have referred to; and indeed the same question arose in Morgan v. Griffith (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 783). There the lessee urged the insertion in the lease of a clause providing that the rabbits on the land should be destroyed. The lessor refused to insert such a covenant, but the promise of the lessor that they should be destroyed was proved by the lessee to the satisfaction of the County Court judge and the Court of Exchequer, to which the appeal was carried. The point of law was whether the parol evidence was admissible, and it was argued that the alleged promise imposed upon the landlord an onerous obligation, and was inconsistent with the full enjoyment of the right of shooting for pleasure contained in the lease. That, it was said, distinguished the case from Lindley v. Lacey (17 C. B. N. S. 578; 11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 273), where an undertaking to stay an action against the plaintiff was part of the consideration which induced the plaintiff to sell the defendant certain fixtures and furniture. The first agreement containing this term was verbal, and the subsequent

written agreement did not contain it. The action was not stayed and the plaintiff brought his action to recover damages against the defendant, and the jury found that his undertaking was a distinct collateral agreement, and the court held that it was admissible in evidence.

In the case of The Llanelly Railway and Dock Company v. The London and North-western Railway Company, collateral matter was referred to to show the nature of the consideration for an agreement in the result held to be indeterminable. The agreement between the two companies was, as Lord Justice Mellish stated, so onerous upon one, making their line liable to carry the trains of the other, and there being no reciprocal clauses, that it would have been held to be determinable upon due notice. But on the letters which passed before the execution of the agreement being looked at, it was found that a large sum of money was advanced by the defendant company to the plaintiff company to enable them to complete their railway-a sum which the plaintiff company could not have borrowed in the market at all when it was so advanced. "You may treat it," said Lord Justice James, "as a collateral bargain which should not be revoked, just as we let in evidence the other day, in the case of a lease, of a collateral bargain by a landlord to keep down the game; and just as in the case of mutual wills, you cannot read the one will for the purpose of construing the other; but you can give evidence that there were two wills made, for the purpose of showing that there was a mutual agreement between the testators that the will should not be revoked." To this his Lordship added: "You can give evidence of any thing to rebut an implication of a resulting trust, or to rebut an implication of an advancement for a child, or a person to whom the donor or the purchaser is in loco parentis."

In short, the learning of the courts plainly is to give effect to all evidence adding terms to agreements if those terms can be made to appear an essential part of the consideration; and the cases we have cited are very good illustrations of the class of contract which may be affected by collateral agreements. Parties, however, must be prepared with the most satisfactory proof of collateral agreements. Lord Justice Mellish said he should not be contented with evidence only of one of the immediate parties as to what took place when no one else was present.-Law Times.

SHERIFFS, CLERKS AND CRIERS OF COURTS AND THEIR DUTIES.

The incompetency and heedlessness of some of our sheriffs, clerks and criers of courts is remarked at Circuits and Courts of Oyer and Terminer. Very few of them are elected or appointed for their dignity of person, or gentlemanly bearing, or qualifications; and they seldom thoroughly inform themselves for a correct discharge of the duties of their offices before they enter upon them; and some of them never learn how they ought to perform such duties.

There should be a seat for the sheriff and one for the crier in front of the judge's desk in every court room. Where no fast seats are made, suitable chairs should be provided for such officers.

It is the duty of the sheriff to be in his seat, or have his under sheriff or a deputy in it, each day from the opening to the adjournment of every Circuit and Court of Oyer and Terminer; and the sheriff should see that

the atmosphere in the court room is kept at the proper temperature, and that idle lawyers and spectators are orderly and behave themselves as they ought to; and he should do all this without having his attention called to the matter by the presiding judge of the court.

How humiliating it is to the judge, and every intelligent spectator, that any necessity should occur for the judge to call the attention of a sleepy or thick-headed, incompetent sheriff to the fact, that it is too warm or too cold in the court room; or that the court room must be ventilated by opening a window; or to tell him when to close it again; or to say to him that there is too much conversation or noise in the court room. And when the judge is compelled to do this, to see the sheriff and three or four constables jump to their feet and pound their staffs of office upon the floor, and yell out, "There is too much conversation and too much noise in the court room, and it must cease." And then, too, see the sheriff and his deputies and constables relapse into a state of indifference, or actually go to sleep; and in ten or fifteen minutes thereafter to hear the judge cry out again for order, or respecting the temperature or impurity of the air in the court room, and then see the above-described scene acted over again.

Such scenes are repeated day after day in court rooms, provided the sheriff, his deputies and constables have not gone out door to play ball, or stroll about the county seat, tell stories and talk politics.

How often we see a stupid old crier, or a dull young one, opening court, or calling defendants when an inquest is moved against them, or making the different necessary and proper proclamations in court proceedings, in words or tones of voice that cannot be understood by the court or lawyers or spectators, and hesitating and looking round to the judge to be prompted and told what to say. This often occurs in our court rooms.

But look at the average crier when a witness is sworn. He will occasionally rise and hold the Testament to a witness (it is always his duty to do so if the witness swears by the book) while he is being sworn, and after the oath is administered, sit down without saying a word.

If the crier is informed by the judge that it is his duty to ascertain the name of the witness, as he is sworn, and then to stand with his face toward the jury and announce the name of the witness so that the judge, each juror and every spectator can distinctly hear it and understand it, he will mumble over the name of the witness sworn, so that very few can understand him, and perhaps be looking upon the floor and turning his back toward the jury during the ceremony as though he were ashamed of what he is doing.

The truth is, that the criers we have (county judges appoint them) seldom ever learn their duties or properly discharge them. And they are frequently out of doors when they are most wanted in the court room.

It would require but a little time for an intelligent crier to learn his duties if he would merely study the "Clerk's Assistant."

The ignorance or negligence of the clerk in swearing witnesses in such a hasty, indistinct and mumbling way, that they do not feel that they are under oath when they testify, is a very serious matter.

Witnesses should be sworn in such a manner that they will feel that they are under an obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

They cannot be so sworn unless the clerk repeats the oath to them in a careful and solemn manner and in a tone of voice that indicates earnestness, and is so loud that all persons in the court room can easily hear the oath and understand it.

How few clerks know the legal form of administering an oath to a witness, or even learn that the form of administering oaths to witnesses is prescribed by statute.

It is seldom, when the grand jury come into court, that the clerk, after calling their names, rises and says: "Gentlemen of the grand jury: Have you any thing to present to the court?"

How few clerks ever learn the forms and ceremonies to be observed in receiving verdicts of juries in either civil or criminal cases? And most of them make very awkward work in discharging their duties on trials for murder. How often a clerk is absent when a witness is to be sworn, and the judge is obliged to administer the oath to the witness or send for the clerk and wait until he returns to his place.

A clerk is hardly to be found who thinks it necessary to learn the Code or rules of court prescribing their duties in court. How few comply with rule 11 of the Supreme Court? How often the clerk is seen asking the judge the form of orders under sections 264 and 265 of the Code?

We ought to have civil service reform in this State, and also rules requiring the education of our sheriffs, eriers and clerks touching their duties, and they should be obliged to study diligently respecting the duties of their offices at least one month, with a competent teacher, before doing any thing in their offices, and then they would exhibit enough ignorance and stupidity in their offices.

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OBSERVER.

P. S. It would be well for lawyers to know where they should stand when they address the court, and to learn that they should keep out of the seats of the sheriff, crier and clerk; and not talk to each other in undertones or sit with their feet on chairs or tables in

court rooms.

OBITUARY.

SAMUEL NELSON.

Samuel Nelson, late Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, died of apoplexy on Saturday last, at his residence in Cooperstown, N. Y.

Judge Nelson was born November 10, 1792, at Hebron, Washington county, N. Y. He graduated from Middlebury College, in 1813, and directly entered upon the study of the law in Salem, N. Y., in the office of Savage & Woods. Of his early preceptors, Savage afterward became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Woods Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Madison county. In 1815, Mr. Woods removed to Madison county and Mr. Nelson accompanied him. The latter was admitted to the Bar in January, 1817, and began practice in the village of Cortland. His success at the Bar was moderately good. In 1820, he was elected presidential elector, and was appointed shortly after Postmaster of his village. In 1821 he was a delegate from Cortland county to the Constitutional Convention which framed the Constitution of that year. In 1823, Gov. Yates appointed him Circuit Judge of the Sixth Circuit, at the same time that his former preceptor, John Savage, was made Chief Justice. Judge Nelson held this office for eight years, discharging its

duties in such a manner as to win for him a sterling reputation as a lawyer and a judge. In February, 1831, he was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of this State, vice Wm. Marcy resigned. In August, 1837, he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to succeed his old preceptor, John Savage. For eight years he filled this office, and in 1844, was appointed to succeed Smith Thompson on the Supreme Bench of the United States. The sketch of his subsequent years we copy from a contemporary: He took his first seat in the Circuit Court in this city, and soon dispelled by his acuteness, earnestness, sound judgment, and erudition, any doubts that might have been entertained of his fitness for this position. His decisions were rarely appealed from, and came to be leading authorities on questions of admiralty and maritime law. In the Supreme Court, his decisions did more than command the respect of bar and bench; they were conclusive and unanswerable. In the famous Dred Scott case, however, Judge Nelson concurred in the decision of Chief Justice Taney, urging that if Congress possessed power under the Constitution to abolish slavery, "it must necessarily possess the like power to establish it." During the war, his conservatism, as well as his life-long political affinities, led him to regret many encroachments of the military on the civil power, but his relations with the administration were as harmonious as his loyalty was undoubted. It is a proof of his judicial evenness that his relations with administrations of such varied politics were so cordial, and that his counsels were often sought on abstruse questions. Of the four justices whose position on the legal tender question was overruled by the novel expedient of appointing additional justices, only two, Clifford and Field, now remain alive, Chase and Nelson having passed away. In 1871, Justice Nelson was appointed by President Grant to serve as a member of the Joint High Commission to arbitrate the Alabama claims on the part of the United States. His special proficiency in international jurisprudence dictated this appointment, and it is but moderate praise to say that in this, as in every other respect, he far overtopped every other member of that Commission, whether Englishman or American. The delicate and responsible duties here imposed upon him compelled a temporary cessation of his attendance on the bench, and enfeebled as he was by age, it was evident that his strength was undergoing heavier drafts than it could safely endure. Exposure to cold during the final sessions of the Commission, the fires having been allowed to go out, it is said, brought on a serious attack of lumbago. He returned to Cooperstown, still suffering from its effects, and spent a quiet summer, but at the end of that time found himself unable to return to the seat which he never occupied again.

Some weeks after the opening of the October term of the court, his resignation was offered to the president. Had it been delayed a few months longer, he would have completed his fiftieth year upon the bench, a length of judicial service almost without a parallel, but he preferred to resign an office he could no longer administer, and deprived the future historian of the opportunity of rounding some striking periods. By his retirement, Justice Nathan Clifford became senior Associate Justice, Ward Hunt being nominated to fill the vacancy. Kindly remembrances from his former associates, from the lawyers of New York city, and lawyers and judges everywhere, found their way to