5. CONDITIONS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS MONDAY, MARCH 23, 1936 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C. The subcommittee met at 3:20 p. m., Hon. Arthur D. Healey presiding. Mr. HEALEY. The committee will come to order to resume hearings on H. R. 11554. Is Mrs. Weed here? Mrs. WEED. Yes. STATEMENT OF MRS. HELENA HILL WEED, MEMBER, LEGISLATIVE Mr.HEALEY. What is your full name? Mr. HEALEY. Whom do you represent? Mrs. WEED. I am from Norwalk, Conn., and I am the Connecticut member of the legislative committee of the National Woman's Party, and in that capacity I am charged with watching industrial legislation which affects women, not only on behalf of our own organization, but on behalf of some 20 national organizations of women throughout the United States interested in the same subject who work with us. Mr. HEALEY. And you desire to address the committee on this bill? Mrs. WEED. Yes, sir. Mr. HEALEY. Will you proceed? Mrs. WEED. Mr. Chairman, I do not appear either to oppose or to support the bill in question as a representative of the National Woman's Party. Personally I am very much in favor of anything that can be done to humanize industry and to meet the economic situation which faces the country at the present time. Mr. HEALEY. You are personally in favor of the objectives of this bill? Mrs. WEED. Yes, sir; I hope the objectives can be attained. Mr. HEALEY. How about your organization, the National Woman's Party? Mrs. WEED. As an organization we work solely in the interest of women, and at the present time are working for equality before the law. Our first work was to seek political equality. Now we are working for complete civil and economic equality before the law in all forms. 493 Mr. HEALEY. And, of course, your organization would be interested in legislation that would tend toward the elimination of sweatshops? Mrs. WEED. Oh, certainly; and our point of view is that we want it done on a basis of fairness to all of the workers. In other words, we oppose restricting women, and not restricting our competitors, because the result of that is that women are placed at a disadvantage in earning their living. We believe that the same restrictions necessary in the case of women are equally necessary in the case of men. We do not know of any restriction that has been placed upon women which should not be placed upon men. We believe that industry itself should be regulated, and we believe that the regulation should be based upon the nature of the work itself and not upon the sex of the worker, but that there should be equal protection of law for both sexes; and we believe in a limited workday and a minimum wage if it is possible. All of those humanizing regulations in industry, we believe, are just as necessary for men as they are for women, and we feel that men and women should compete on a standpoint of equality, that these regulations should be based on the conditions that prevail in each industry, so that men and women can have a fair chance to compete on equal terms in earning a living. If we go out to buy a coat or a house or some food, nobody asks you whether you are a man or a woman; you pay the same price. No one says that because women receive lower wages than men for the same work they shall pay less for supplies. Every objective of gainful occupation costs the same for men or women, and so our organization works so that men and women may compete on a fair basis. We do not oppose minimum-wage legislation, if it can be accomplished, or the regulation of hours. I think that every woman in our organization would be in favor of it if we took a poll. What I am here for is to oppose section 8 of this bill, which gives the Secretary of Labor the authority to make exceptions respecting minimum rates of pay and maximum hours of labor "in specific cases or otherwise", which is pretty broad. The following proviso, that such action may be taken "whenever it has been recommended by an agency of the United States, and when justice or public interest is served thereby", is so broad that we contend that anything, any exception, can be made under that clause. Industrial laws applying to women only could be established under that authority. As to the provision that— upon the joint recommendation of the governmental agency and the contractor, the Secretary may modify the terms of an existing contract respecting minimum rates of pay and maximum hours of labor, as may be found necessary and proper in the public interest or to prevent injustice or undue hardship and that "the Secretary may provide reasonable limitations," and so on, that section might be all right from our point of view. It is, of course, for the committee to decide. We do not take any stand on whether the Secretary alone shall make these regulations, or whether it shall be done by a commission. I think that we would favor a commission, though, as being the more democratic form of making these arrangements, if they can be made properly—and I, personally, hope that they can. We ask that in section 9, some such clause as this shall be added: "Provided, further" and this is just a suggestion, something to shoot at, as it were, but I think you will get the idea-"that all regulations as to hours, wages, and conditions of work shall be based upon the nature of the work, and not the sex of the worker," perhaps, that "no regulations based on sex shall be permitted", or that "all regulations based on sex shall be prohibited." I am simply offering that proviso as a suggestion which you in your wisdom could work out. Now, when the Black 30-hour bill was up, before the adoption of the N. I. R. A., we appeared before that committee. When the same permission was asked-to give the Secretary of Labor or the authorities the right to make special regulations applying to women onlyand it was refused. It was discussed very thoroughly before the Black committee, and it was refused. The same thing occurred in connection with the N. I. R. A. When that bill was undergoing hearing, that same permission was sought and it was refused, and the National Industrial Recovery Act was written in terms of sex equality, that is to say, the regulations applied to all persons. If you will recall, it became necessary later, when restrictions based on sex were put in the codes, for General Johnson, the Director of the N. R. A. to introduce the clause into all of the codes, providing that there shall be no discrimination based on sex. Now, that is all that we want, and all that we ask for, but we are very much afraid of that broad power given to the Secretary of Labor, because in the papers-when the Berry committee was holding its meetings, and I understand that this bill was evolved from the bill of the Berry committee-we read that the American Federation of Labor was about to have introduced in this general legislation minimum wages standards for women and minors, and elimination of night work for women. We do not want women to work at night, but we do not think that men, either, ought to work at night. When the codes were being written, the Administrator of the Textile Code-which was supposed to be the model code-asked the representatives of those organizations which heretofore have favored special legislation for women whether they wished to have any special regulations regarding night work, and Miss Lucy Mason, secretary of the Consumers' League, said, "No, Mr. Administrator, provided that no one works in the graveyard shift; provided that there are only two shifts, we do not wish any differences between men and women." Now, we know that the American Federation of Labor has made as a part of its program minimum wages for women only. They seem to have forgotten the decision of the Supreme Court in 1923, and I would like, because it is so much clearer than I can state it, to read a particular clause from this decision. In this aspect of the matter they were referring to work that by its very nature was so physically hard as to possibly endanger the reproductive functions of women and was therefore a danger to the race In this aspect of the matter, while the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases, and legislation on fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take them into account, we cannot accept the doctrine that women of mature age sui juris require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances. To do so would be to ignore all of the implications to be drawn from the present-day trend of legislation as well as that the common thought and usage by which woman is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine that she must be given special protection, or be subjected to special restraint in her contractual and civil relationships. I think that that language, in the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital (261 U. S. 525), sums up the whole case. I could cite to you an infinite number of decisions since that time which have been based on the decision in that case, showing that since the enfranchisement of women, their civil and contractual rights have been recognized as well, and the Supreme Court has said that no legislation which restricts women and which does not restrict men under similar circumstances can be recognized as valid by that court. Of course, you are familiar with the fact that 10 years after this decision there was an effort made to reestablish a minimum wage for women only, and it was done in several States, but that new law has now been declared unconstitutional in the State of New York, and there is a similar minimum wage case in Illinois as well as in Ohio, and they are all on their way up to the Supreme Court. We feel that it would be a very unfair thing to permit to be written into the law now, language which would make it possible for those who have that attitude to again establish regulations based on sex. We know that the Secretary of Labor has that attitude, that she is, we believe very mistakenly, a firm believer in restrictive legislation applying to women only, and we know that a short time before she became Secretary of Labor, she said in New York that the married woman who could not earn $3,500 a year was an economic failure and ought to go back home. The married women whose husbands need their help cannot accept that. We know her theories on this point, and we are very much afraid, for we know that, despite the Supreme Court decision, she has spoken and worked for the continued minimum wage for women only, and we are afraid that if clause 8 gets into that bill, and she is made the absolute authority in the matter, we will have more court fights on our hands, and more injustice. Now, the men and women together should face this situation, and we have got to work hand in hand. We cannot accept a position where either the men can undercut the women, or the women can undecut the men. We have to have fair, human regulations in industry, to let all of us who have to earn our living have a fair chance, and work together, on equal terms, under rules of fair competition. So we ask that this clause 8 be revised, 8 and 9. I simply offer the objective that we want, that something may be put into this bill which will absolutely prohibit any restrictions based on sex, and that all regulations as to hours and conditions of work shall be based on the nature of the work, and not the sex of the worker. Thank you. Mr. HEALEY. We thank you very much. 1 Reference to New York Times Index for March 1930 for report of this speech and editorial comment thereon. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. GALLAGHER, REPRESENTING BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS, DECORATORS, AND PAPERHANGERS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Mr. HEALEY. Whom do you represent? Mr. GALLAGHER. I represent the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paperhangers International Organization. I am here to voice my opinion favorably on H. R. 11554. I believe that my experience with contracts awarded by the various departmental heads of the Government is ample justification for favoring this legislation, and believe it is about time legislation of this description would meet with favorable consideration by both branches of the Congress. Under the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended, the law provides that contracts below $2,000 are exempt from the provisions of that act. This means that hundreds of jobs of painting and decorating on Federal buildings throughout the United States have been done by contractors at such ridiculously low prices that it is simply out of the question for them to perform the work as outlined in the specifications at the prices quoted. As an illustration, let me cite a contract that I took off at the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department just the other day-the Archives Building here in Washington. While the award for this job has not yet been made, it is very evident from the decision of the Comptroller General that the lowest bidder must be awarded the contract. May I say that the low bid on this particular job for the painting of the walls and ceilings of the Archives Building is $3,947, while the high bidder is $14,684, a difference of almost $11,000 or nearly five times lower than that of the highest bidder. It seems ridiculous to conceive as to how this particular firm would be able to complete this job, in accordance with the specifications, and pay the prevailing rate of wages as prescribed under the BaconDavis amendment. This same firm that is low on this Archives job has about finished a post-office job in Cincinnati, Ohio, where a dispute arose as to what the prevailing rate of wages was, and, under the amended Davis-Bacon Act, wherein the Secretary of Labor is called upon to hold a meeting to determine the prevailing rates of wages, a meeting was held in Cincinnati for that purpose. Everyone interested, including the employer, the local men, and myself were notified regarding the time and place of this hearing. All were present, with the exception of the employer, who stated to the custodian, before the hearing, that he did not feel it was necessary to be at the hearing as he had everything fixed in Washington. This statement is a matter of record taken down during the hearing held in Cincinnati. On this particular job, many violations occurred and were substantiated by the custodian and by the Government inspector and by dozens of sworn affidavits furnished me outlining the conditions existing on the job. I finally had the Procurement Division turn the matter over to the Department of Justice. After some time had passed, I visited the Department of Justice to find out what disposition had been 58539-ser. 12, pt. 2-36- -25 |