on, or copied from, these strict entails. It is, however, the custom, owing to the Rule against Perpetuities, to re-settle the estates every generation or two, as family circumstances require. Such settlements depend entirely on custom and not on law; but custom and social habit are strong forces.

Into the technical provisions of a strict settlement it is impossible to enter here. It is a highly technical document, and it is only old family solicitors and members of the higher branch of the legal profession who practise as conveyancers that can find their way about them with ease. It is sufficient to say that the tenant for life, or in tail, in possession, is not the complete owner of the estate; he enjoys the greater part of the income, and has considerable powers of management and disposition, but these powers are limited and controlled by the terms of the settlement, the existence of trustees of the settlement, the Settled Land Acts, and the Chancery Division. If he sells, he cannot spend the proceeds. They constitute "capital money," and must be paid to the Trustees or into Court, and the rights of the various parties interested in the land after sale attach to the "capital money" in place of the land itself. Nor can we enter here into the vexed question of what used to be called "the evil effects of primogeniture and settlement" upon agriculture and industry. The various arguments for and against the system are excellently set out and considered in Professor C. S. Kenny's History of Primogeniture (Yorke Prize Essay, 1877).

The sting was taken out of this system of entails by the Settled Land Acts, 1881-2, the policy and objects of which were to promote the alienation and to cheapen the transfer of land by affording greater facilities of dealing with it to limited owners. Whether they went far enough in that direction is open to question. Lord Birkenhead and his coadjutors

apparently think that they did not. These Acts contain a code of rules regarding the rights and duties of limited owners and of all persons interested in settled estates.

2. The Trader's Settlement. Strict settlement, however, is not the only way in which land may be settled. There is also a form of settlement, known as "the trader's settlement," which is used by the wellto-do middle classes, when there is no desire to make an "eldest son" and perpetuate a family name, but there are investments in land or house property which it is not desirable to disturb. Such settlements are generally executed on the marriage of the parties (marriage being a valuable consideration), and the object of the settlement is to secure some provision for the wife and children of the intended marriage, which cannot be touched by creditors in the event of misfortune. In this case two deeds are employed: by the first, the property to be settled is conveyed to trustees to hold upon trust for sale, with certain powers of postponement, investment and management in the meantime: by the second deed, executed contemporaneously with the first, the trusts of the settlement are declared which are usually to allow the husband (and/or wife) to enjoy the income until sale, and afterwards the income of the invested proceeds of sale during his (and/or her) life, with a power of appointment in favour of the issue of the marriage, with various other powers, e.g. advancement, hotchpot, etc. This is a very convenient and useful form of settlement. A trust for sale is wider than a power of sale, and the power of appointment amongst issue is much more flexible than the limitations of a strict settlement. Such a settlement partakes of the nature both of a settlement of land and a settlement of personalty, and it is growing in use and popularity. There is also this great advantage about it. When the trust for sale is executed, i.e. when the real

property comprised in the settlement is sold, the purchaser has no right to see the second deed, and indeed he would be very unwise to seek to do so. The importance of this point will be more fully appreciated when we come to consider the equitable doctrine of notice and the "curtain clauses" of the new legislation.

3. The third form of settlement is one of pure personalty with which we are not concerned.

Referring again to the Conveyancing Acts and Settled Land Acts, excellent as was the policy of those Acts and beneficial as their operation has been in promoting the free alienation of land, in course of time they have become overgrown and over-loaded with decisions in particular cases, and owing to the custom of re-settling the estates every few years there has sprung up another development known as a compound settlement," which frequently causes considerable difficulty and cost in conveyancing. Add to this the facts that there has been for some time general dissatisfaction with our present system of landowning, and the present complexity and consequent cost of conveyancing, and that owing to increased taxation and the pressure of other burdens due to the war, there is a danger of the break-up of the old system of large estates, and it will be seen at once that reform is urgently needed.

Other elements which have contributed to the increased cost of conveyancing are the increase in the stamp duties in recent years rendered necessary for revenue purposes, and the increase in solicitors' costs. Before the Great War, owing to competition, few solicitors could venture to charge their clients full scale costs. Since the war most of them do so. There does not seem much hope of reduction in either of these directions so long as present conditions prevail. Another factor which adds to the difficulty and complexity of conveyancing is the equitable doctrine

of notice, which, in spite of certain provisions in the Conveyancing Acts, has been very much extended and developed. One has only to look at a standard text book on Equity, e.g. Snell, to see of what an elaborate code of rules this doctrine now consists. Stated in its most elementary form it is this: that a purchaser of land who has notice of any prior right, existing at the time of the purchase, will be postponed to the holder of that right. This is but common justice. On the other hand an innocent purchaser for value, without notice, is protected. But the doctrine has been pushed to extreme limits. We have now not only express notice, but implied or constructive notice, and the ingenuity of able lawyers has applied the doctrine to cases and circumstances to which it was probably never intended that it should be applied. This doctrine gives rise to innumerable complications, and conveyancers have to be constantly on their guard against it.

In these circumstances certain Acts of Parliament have recently been passed which make sweeping changes in the law of property and practice of conveyancing. They begin with the Law of Property Act, 1922, commonly alluded to as Lord Birkenhead's Act, as that distinguished lawyer was the prime mover in the passing of it, though it is well known that he had the assistance in the framing of it of several eminent Real Property lawyers, particularly Sir Arthur Underhill, one of the Conveyancing Counsel of the Chancery Division, who has published a masterly exposition of the principles underlying it, entitled An Explanation of Lord Birkenhead's Act, to which the writer desires to express his obligation.

The original Act has been to a large extent amended and repealed, and its operation postponed, by two Acts passed in 1924 and a new Act passed in 1925. The parts of it which remain are now to come into force on the 1st January, 1926, together with six

other Consolidation Acts into which the original Act of 1922 has been split up in order to make it more intelligible and workable. The result of the legislation is that it now consists of the following Acts:

I. The Law of Property Act, 1922 (parts only). 2. The Law of Property (Postponement) Act, 1924. 3. The Law of Property (Amendment) Act, 1924. The Law of Property Act, 1925.

4.

5. The Settled Land Act, 1925.

6. The Trustee Act, 1925.

7. The Administration of Estates Act, 1925. The Land Charges Act, 1925.

8.

9.

The Land Registration Act, 1925; and 10. The Universities and College Estates Act, 1925.

The last seven Acts received the Royal assent only on April 9th, 1925.

These Acts will constitute a revolution in our law of property, and considering the extent and variety of the changes made, and the numerous repeals and cross-repeals it will take the most industrious and capable student some time to master and digest all the details of this mass of legislation. The whole scheme of reform is so complicated and so far-reaching in its effects that it is doomed to failure and disaster unless it receives the goodwill and hearty co-operation of the legal profession. Yet it is a magnificent one, and it ought to have been attempted long ago. It marks the final stage (it is to be hoped) in the long struggle to shake off the shackles of feudalism and to assimilate the law of Real Property to that of Personal Property, so far as it is possible or desirable to do so.

It is of course impossible here to do more than briefly indicate some of the principal changes made by these Acts. They bristle with points and perhaps difficulties. The printed copies exceed 600 pages;