the publication did not injure,' or that it benefitted the plaintiff; or that others had previously published the same words; a declaration of the plaintiff that the publi cation did him no injury; or that he believed the defendant was not the author but only the repeater of the slander; that plaintiff was an enemy of his (defendant's);" that plaintiff is a quarrelsome person; or a malicious person; that plaintiff had boasted of committing offenses of 8 community in regard to the facts stated in the publication. (Sheckell v. Jackson, 10 Cush. [Mass.] 25.) And see Bond v. Kendall (36 Vt. 741), where it was held that defendant could not show the libel was a letter to B. containing the result of inquiries made concerning plaintiff at request of B. Where the action was for publishing the proceedings of a meeting, held that defendant might prove in mitigation that many severe expressions were used towards plaintiff which he did not include in his report. (Creighton v. Finlay, Arm. Mac. & Og, 385; and see Creevy v. Carr, 7 Car. & P. 64.) 1 Titus v. Sumner, 44 N. Y. 266. On the trial of an action for slander it is not error to exclude a general offer by defendant to prove that plaintiff's reputation was not affected by the publication. The evidence would be a mere opinion of the witness, and is not directed to plaintiff's want of previous good character as affecting the amount of the recovery. (Id.) Calhoun v. M'Means, I Nott & McC. 422; Rex v. Woodfall, Lofft, 776. No man shall set up his own iniquity as a defense any more than as a cause of action. (Mansfield, Ch. J., Montefiori v. Montefiori, 1 W. Black. R. 363; see Stewart v. Wilkinson, 7 Law Times, 81; Fry v. Bennett, 28 N. Y. 328; note 7. p. 520, ante. 3 Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 355; Willower v. Hill, 72 N. Y. 36; see Hewett v. Pioneer Press Co. 25 Minn. 198; Tracy v. Luke, 2 Vict. Law Rep. L. 64. Defendant may show in mitigation that in reproducing the article Porter v. Henderson, 11 Mich. 20; Richardson v. Barker, 7 Ind. 567. In Quingley v. Phila. &c. R. R. Co. (2 How. U. S. Rep. 209), the defendants gave evidence of declarations by plaintiff that the matters out of which the libel arose had improved his business. In an action for libel, the answer denied malice and injury to plaintiff, and set up a justification. On the trial defendant offered to prove a conversation with plaintiff in which he stated he had sustained no damage, was ready to withdraw the suit, as he had not been injured at all, and that he would have withdrawn it, were it not for his lawyers, who had taken the case for what they could get out of it. which was excluded, held that it ought to have been received. (Samuels v. Even'g Mail Asso. 6 Hun, 5; see this case, 9 Hun, 288, and 75 N. Y. 604.) A witness was allowed to testify that when subpoenaed by plaintiff, he, witness, asked plaintiff, if he thought what defendant had said had been of any injury to him, to which plaintiff answered that he did not know that it had, but it had occasioned some of his creditors to crowd him. (Ostrom v. Calkins, 5 Wend. 264: see ante, note 7, p. 520; and note 2, p. 686) 8 a like character with that charged; that plaintiff was in the habit of abusing the defendant;' that plaintiff was a common libeler; that plaintiff has sometimes published slander of other persons not the defendant; or has threatened so to do; a former recovery; that defendant declared he could prove the truth of the words; or in an action for slander of husband and wife, that they lived unhappily together; or kept a disorderly house." INJUNCTION. 417a. The courts will, in some cases, interpose by injunction to prevent the perpetration of a wrong, but as a general rule the publication of an alleged libel will not be stayed by injunction.10 The court of Star Chambers was in the habit of restraining the publication of libels,11 and 1 Pallett v. Sargent, 36 N. Hamp. 496. 2 Goodbread v. Ledbitter, 1 Dev. & Bat. 12; Wakley v. Johnson, 1 Ry. & M. 422: May v. Brown, 3 B. & Cr. 113; M'Alexander v. Harris, 6 Munf. 465; contra, see Botelar v. Bell, 1 Md. 173. In a suit for slander, for charging plaintiff with perjury, defendant cannot show that, upon a wholly different occasion, the plaintiff called him a liar and a perjured wretch. (Porter v. Henderson, 11 Mich. 20.) 3 Maynard v. Beardsley, 7 Wend. 560; 4 Id. 336; Gould v. Weed, 12 Id. 12; see Sullivan v. O'Leary, 15 No. East. Rep. 775 (Mass.). 4 Forshee v. Abrams, 2 Clarke (Iowa), 571. Cochran v. Butterfield, 18 N. Hamp. 115. The defendant is not allowed to give in evidence, in mitigation of damages, a former recovery of damages, against him, in favor of the same plaintiff, in another action for a libel, which formed one of a series of numbers published in the same gazette, and containing the libelous words charged in the declaration in the sec ond suit. (Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56.) The damages are not to be lessened by the fact that plaintiff has an action against other persons for publishing the same language. (Harrison v. Pearce, 1 Fost. & Fin. 567: Frescoe v. May, 2 Id. 123; and see Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill, 467.) James v. Clarke, 1 Iredell, 397. 8 Anon. I Hill (S. Car.), 251. Watson v. Moore, 2 Cush. 133. 10 See, Restraining libel by injunction, 17 Irish Law Times, 40; Restraint of libellous publications, 53 Law Times, 112; Injunction to restrain slander in respect to business. by Robert P. Clapp, 23 Amer. Law Register, N. S. 701; Oral slander of one's business, Injunction against; 20 Central Law Jour. 13; Injunction to restrain defamation, 18 Irish Law Times, 627; Injunction to restrain libel and slander, 2 Manitoba Law Jour. 49; Enjoining publication of libels, 4 Cent. Law Jour. 170. The law and practice of Injunctions, by W. W. Kerr, with notes by Franklin I. Dickson, Chapter XIII. Injunction against the publication of a libel and against slander of Title. 11 Hudson's Star Chamber. after the abolition of that court, Chief Justice Scroggs, and the other Judges of the Court of Kings Bench, prohibited the publication of a periodical entitled "The Weekly Packet of Advice from Rome or the History of Popery." For this Scroggs was impeached. Lord Ellenborough said obiter that the exhibition of a libelous painting might be restrained by injunction. This dictum is said to have excited much astonishment in the minds of all the practitioners in the Court of Equity in England. Lord Chancellor Parker granted an injunction to restrain the publication of a translation of a book from Latin into Eng. lish, on the ground that the book in English might have a hurtful public tendency. The Chancellor of New York, on demurrer to a bill praying an injunction to restrain the publication of a libelous pamphlet, dismissed the bill. The House of Lords reversed a decree of the Scotch courts, enjoining the publication of a register of the names of persons whose notes had been protested. Where plaintiff, a physician, applied for an injunction to restrain defendant from, among other things, publishing an advertisement, so expressed as to raise the inference that certain pills sold by defendant, were sold by him on behalf of plaintiff. The court held the advertisement amounted to a libel on plaintiff and dismissed the bill, because to grant the injunction "would imply that the court has jurisdiction to stay the publication of a libel, and I cannot think it 1 8 Howell's St. Trials, 189. 2 DuBost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. Rep. 511. 3 Horne's Case, 20 Howell's St. Trials, 799, note; 10 Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, ch. ccxiii. Rev. G. W. Lemon was master of Norwich Grammar School and author of "English Etymology," A. D. 1783. It is related of him that one Beasely, an alderman of Norwich, offended him, and in revenge he gave in his book as the derivation of obesity "The exclamation of people who see a certain Norwich alderman, Oh Beasely! Oh beastly!! obesity !!! Beasely got an injunction to restrain the publication, and the sheet containing the obnoxious passage was cancelled. See Notes and Queries, 6th series, 111, April 2, 1881, page 271. Burnett v. Chetwood, 2 Merivale Rep. 441, note. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige, 24; and see Hoyt v. McKenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 320. Fleming v. Newton, 1 Ho. of L'ds Cas. 363. has.1 But where a jury has found matter to be libelous, there the courts in England will restrain its further publication.2 It has been said that the constitution of the State of New York, by providing that every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, deprives a court of equity of jurisdiction to restrain the publication of libelous matter. An association incorporated to protect dealers from giving credit to delinquent debtors to members thereof, cannot be restrained by injunction from publishing, to its members, plaintiff 's name as such delinquent, if he be in fact a delinquent.* S4176. For a time there was in England a decided 1 Clark v. Freeman, II Beavan, 112; 12 Jur. 149; 17 Law Jour. Rep. Ch. 142. This case is questioned in supplement to Drewry on Injunctions, 34; but not on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel. The case is questioned also, in Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 551; Dixon v. Holden, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 488; Maxwell v. Hogg, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 310. An injunction to restrain publication of an alleged libel was denied. (Mulkern v. Ward, Law Rep. 13 Eq. 619.) And an application by Mr. Weldon to restrain a publication in London edition of New York Herald was denied by Lord Denman, September, 1889. Injunction will not be granted to restrain publication of libelous notices, unless no damages can be collected of defendant. (Burnett v. Tak, 45 Law Times Rep. 743.) 2 Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339; see 30 English Reports (Moak's Notes), 209. 3 N. Y. Juvenile Guard. So. v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly, 188. In Louisiana it was held that a Court of Equity could not enjoin the publication of a libel. (The State v. Civ. Dist. Court, 34 La. Ann. 741.) And in Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. Rep. 773; 34 Alb. L. J. 371, Bradley, J., held that the English cases which favored an injunction were based upon the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, and the Judicature Act of 1873; "but neither the statute law of this country nor any well considered judgment of the courts has introduced this new branch of equity into our jurisprudence." The Codes of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code in Texas provide for restraining the publication of a libel and the distribution of libels, and for putting under bonds not to publish a libel. In Life Asso. of Amer. v. Boogher (3 Mo. App. 173; 4 Cent. Law. Jour. 40), it was held that a court of equity has no power to enjoin the threatened publication of a libel, though its publisher is insolvent and the damage will be irreparable. In Francis v. Flinn (6 Supreme Court Reporter, 1148), the Supreme Court of the United States sustained a demurrer to a bill seeking to restrain the publication of a libel, saying plaintiff had his remedy at law. 4 Greene v. U. S. Dealers' and Protective Ass'n, 16 Abb. N. C. 419; 39 Hun, 300. An injunction will not be granted to restrain a mercantile agency from publishing representations as to the standing and character of a person, or as to his property, even though false, if there is no breach of trust or of contract involved. (Raymond v. Russell, 143 Mass. 295.) leaning towards extending the jurisdiction in the matter of injunctions to restrain libelous publication. An injunction was granted against the publication of a notice stating that plaintiff, a merchant, was a partner in a bankrupt firm. Malins, V. C., in granting the injunction, said: "I go further, and say if it (the publication sought to be restrained) had only injured his (plaintiff's) reputation, it is within the jurisdiction of this court to stop the publication of a libel of this description, which goes to destroy his (plaintiff's) property, or his reputation, which is his property, and, if possible, more valuable than any other property. In this case, I go on general principle, and I am fortified by authority. General principle is in its favor, but authority is not wanting. . . In the decision I arrived at, I beg to be understood as laying down that this court has jurisdiction to prevent the publication of any letter, advertisement, or other 'document, which, if permitted to go on, would have the effect of destroying the property of another person, whether that consists of tangible or intangible property, whether it consists of money or reputation. Professional reputation is the means of acquiring wealth, and is the same as wealth itself."1 An injuction was refused to restrain defendants, the committee of an association called "The Underwriters' Registry," from publishing to their subscribers, against a report of a survey of plaintiff's ship, "class suspended;" it was not libelous. The courts in Massachusetts refused 1 Dixon v. Holden, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 488; see, also, Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 551. In Reg. v. L'd Mayor of London (L. R. 16 Q. B. 774), it is said that Dixon v. Holden was overruled in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Knott, Law Rep. 10 Ch. 142. Any way the dictum of Malins, V. C., has not been followed nor received as authority. (See Poulet v. Chatto, Week. Notes, 1887, pp. 192, 230. Statement in Peerage as to legitimacy.) 2 Clover v. Royden, Law Rep. 17 Eq. 190. The fact that plaintiff's reputation might suffer by his dismissal from defendant's service is not a ground for equitable interference to prevent his dismissal. (Johnson v. Shrewsbury R. R. Co. 3 De G. M. & G. 926.) In Shore v. Jones & Co. (London Times, Apl. 13, 1889), an injunction was granted by Mr. Justice Kay, restraining defendants "from publishing libelous and slanderous statements to the members of the |