point Bacon is silent, and it will be observed that he has nothing even to say about the moral sense. Two reasons (though I do not profess that they are exhaustive) may be given for this. In the first place it would not have escaped Bacon's acute mind that any prospect of a heavenly condition, or even of the realisation of the higher states of mind in this life, is confined, under the doctrine of the Nous, to philosophers or their hearers, and, apart from his quarrel with Aristotle, Bacon disliked philosophers, if only because he detected in them "vanity" and "ostentation." 1 The doctrine even excluded poets, whom Plato, to all intents and purposes, banished from his republic. Therefore Bacon would not, if he could avoid it, say anything which might have the appearance of countenancing their view. I know it is said that Bacon did not understand Aristotle; no doubt he did him less than justice as the foremost among the Greeks who were the creators of the instruments of exact thought; but I should be afraid to assert that he did not understand him, at least in essentials. The second reason is to be sought in Bacon's temperament and in his passion for scientific research. As in the consideration of the place of deity in relation to the universe and to human life, so in the inquiry concerning the nature and functions of the soul, his object would be to rescue all he could from the region of the unexplainable and forbidden, while at the same time leaving a causa causans which would preclude vain speculation, and give completion and finality in the region of whatever the senses, aided by instruments, were found ultimately incapable of explaining by physical causes. On this subject the reader is referred to what has been already said in the

1 Cf. "Socrates, Aristotle, Galen, were men full of ostentation " ("Of Vain Glory")—and similarly passim. Bacon also regarded himself as protagonist in the battle against the schools, which were still dominated by Aristotle. Moreover, the scholars of the day were, as a class, poor and depressed, and for the most part narrow and quarrelsome, whereas Bacon had been brought up about the English and French courts, and had a larger human outlook. He was more ambitious to shine as a man of the world than to pass for a man of learning, an ambition for which most of his countrymen are perhaps hardly in a position to throw stones at him.

section on the rational soul. My general conclusion is that in spite of what may appear, at first sight, to be the gross" materialism of Bacon's theory, he did, in his own mind, regard the divine soul as participating in the higher forms of judgment, and probably, so far as he thought about it, as being the source, by virtue of its heavenly origin, of the highest feelings in man. It is evident also that he believed in its immortality, and that it was not resolved, like the "spirits," or sensible soul, into the physical elements; but on the question of its relation to the individual experience after the death of the body he is silent, regarding that as a question which must be relegated to the province of revelation.

These ideas belong to Bacon's scheme for the "interpretation of Nature," which he adumbrated in a paper (in Latin), the purpose of which was (in the words of Spedding) "to explain the method of arriving by degrees at axioms, or general principles in nature; thence by the light of those axioms proceeding to new experiments; and so finally to the discovery of all the secrets of nature's operation— which would include the command over her forces." 1 The interpretation of nature was referred to by Bacon as the "kingdom of man." The paper is entitled "De Interpretatione Naturae Prooemium," and it is attributed by Spedding to the year 1603. It was never published, but the general material of it was incorporated in the Novum Organum, which appeared in its final shape in 1620, that portion of it which is autobiographical being replaced, as Spedding observes, "by a simple De nobis ipsis silemus." In the course of it Bacon explains why he deferred philosophic inquiry, which had attracted him as a youth, and for which he found he had a natural aptitude ("a kind of familiarity and relationship with truth"), and applied himself to "the arts of civil life." "When I found however that my zeal was mistaken for ambition, and my life had already reached the turning

1 See Spedding's account and translation of this paper in Life, iii. 82 sq., and cf. his preface to the Latin original in Works, iii. 507 sq.

point, and my breaking health reminded me how ill I could afford to be so slow . . I put all those thoughts aside, and (in pursuance of my old determination) betook myself wholly to this work."1 Bacon was born in January 1561, and was therefore over forty when this was probably written. His life, to all appearances, had been a desultory one, owing to lack of preferment, and it was not till June 1607, when James I. made him his Solicitor-General, that he obtained any regular appointment under the Crown. His greatest literary activity was, in my belief, between the ages of sixteen and forty; thereafter I think he devoted his leisure more, but not not wholly, to his philosophic writings. At some time between the date of this paper and the publication of the Organum, The Tempest of Shakespeare (which, it has been suggested, was first acted at the Court in 1611 or 1613) was probably composed. I do not myself agree that it was the last of Shakespeare's plays, and I consider that it was placed, with intention, by the author himself, at the beginning of the collected edition, known as the "First folio," which appeared in 1623. This play reflects, in my opinion, the philosophic ideas which I have endeavoured to summarise, and is only properly intelligible with reference to them.

The Tempest is clearly, to some extent, an allegory, which invites inquiry as to its meaning. On the surface it is, no doubt, a beautiful entertainment, but read, not merely seen as a spectacle, the impression it produces on the mind is very different. Here, however, I wish to say that I am no advocate of far-fetched interpretations. Those who seek for them in Shakespeare are, in my belief, certain to go wrong, as he not only keeps in view the audience, the generality of mankind, for which he is writing, but his mind is naturally opposed to

1 Spedding's translation. This, of course, was not what actually occurred. It is necessary to read what Bacon writes with caution, owing to his tendency to represent himself in the part which dominated his mind, or as he would like to be, or as he wished posterity to think of him.

vagueness and subtlety. The reader, however, who has followed what has been said above as to Bacon's theory of "spirits," will, I think, see that there is nothing far-fetched or fanciful in the suggestion that in the relations between Prospero and Ariel there is an allusion to that theory. That, at any rate, is my view, as I will proceed to explain.

It is a natural conclusion from the play that in Ariel" the poet is representing his own genius, and before I had read Bacon's philosophic works I took this for granted. After reading them I formed the opinion that Ariel was intended for the "sensible" or produced" soul (spiritus vitalis), under the theory which we have been considering. As under that theory the imagination is regarded as a faculty of the "sensible" soul, I still thought that the conception in the play had reference mainly to the creative genius of the author, with some reference incidentally to his scientific speculations and to the relations of the human soul with unseen conditions. But the more I considered Bacon's attitude towards questions relating to the soul, the less likely it seemed to me to be that he would make them the subject of popular allegory. In the first place I think he would have regarded it as little short of profanity to bring such a subject on the stage. In the second place a writer would only choose for such a serious presentment of his views as is obviously intended in The Tempest the subject in which, above all others, he was actively interested. In the case of Bacon (as we have seen) this was certainly not the nature or destiny of the soul, a question which involved the inquirer in metaphysics, which he regarded as vain, or in religious doctrine, which was, in his opinion, not a matter for discussion at all. Similarly in the case of Shakespeare, regarded solely as the author of the plays: there is nothing in them to show that his attitude towards such questions was different from that of Bacon; on the contrary, in my opinion the evidence from the plays all points to the conclusion that their habit of

thought was in all respects identical. Hence I came to the conclusion which I now hold, that in The Tempest Bacon (whom I believe to be the author) has represented under the figures of "Prospero" and "Ariel" the cherished dream of his life, namely, the power which man is to obtain over the forces of nature through scientific experiment and discovery. In "Prospero" the author sees an idealised presentment of himself. In "Ariel" is represented "spirit," ie. the "spirit in all tangible bodies," which, in Bacon's peculiar theory, has been "captured' by gross natter, and whose desire is to escape. The witch "Sycorax" represents gross matter. The liberation of this "spirit" and its temporary arrest and employment by Prospero is a poetical allegory of what we now term the "harnessing of the forces of nature." Once used, the force escapes, and, like Ariel, is rendered back, in a free state, to the elements. "Ariel and all his quality" are the "spirits" generally. I do not deny that there may be incidental allusions to the poet's genius; it is of the nature of poetry to give rise, through the presentation of ideas by concrete. images, to varied trains of thought. But the main purpose of the writer, in my opinion, was to leave behind him a parable (like the concealed knowledge of ancient times) of his scientific theory, and of the results to the human race which he expected from it when it had been applied in practice.1

1 The following passage from the Preface to The Wisdom of the Ancients should be read with particular attention in this connection :

"Men have proposed to answer two different and contrary ends by the use of parable; for parables serve as well to instruct or illustrate as to wrap up and envelop, so that though, for the present, we drop the concealed use, and suppose the ancient fables to be vague, undeterminate things, formed for amusement, still the other use must remain, and can never be given up. And every man of any learning, must readily allow that this method of instructing is grave, sober, or exceedingly useful, and sometimes necessary in the sciences, as it opens an easy and familiar passage to the human understanding, in all new discoveries that are abstruse and out of the road of vulgar opinions. Hence, in the first ages, when such inventions and conclusions of the human reason as are now trite and common were new and little known, all things abounded with fables, parables, similes, comparisons, and allusions, which were not intended to conceal, but to inform and teach, whilst the minds of men continued rude