original act was a want of power in the municipality to issue its bonds payable in any specific kind of money, as had been held by the supreme court of Mississippi, this defect would not be obviated if the statute required them to be "payable in gold coin or lawful money of the United States." In the absence of any limitation upon the mode of payment, they would be payable in any lawful money of the United States, and, as a provision in the bonds giving to the municipality the alternative of paying them in gold coin or in lawful money of the United States would create no obligation upon it to make the payment in gold coin, it follows that the "lawful money" in which they would be paid would be that kind which the municipality would elect at their maturity, and, consequently, the kind which at that date would have the least value. It cannot be held that the words "shall be payable in gold coin or lawful money of the United States" were inserted in the statute merely for the purpose of declaring that the municipality should have the option at the maturity of the bonds to pay them in gold coin, or in lawful money, since it needed no legislative declaration to give it that option. The fact that they were payable in money would itself confer upon it that privilege; and, as such a construction of the statute would destroy any efficacy in the amendment, it ought not to be given unless required by its terms. It is not so indicated in specific language, and, as its language will permit a construction by which the municipality may determine in advance whether the bonds shall be payable specifically in gold coin, or generally in lawful money of the United States, a consideration of the purposes of the statute and the objects to be effected by it justifies us in giving it this construction.

The purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question was to enable the municipalities of the state "to acquire or construct certain municipal improvements which the public interest or necessity might demand, the cost of which would be too great to be paid out of the ordinary annual income." Unless the bonds that are to be issued under the proceedings thus authorized can be negotiated, the municipality will be unable to acquire or construct the improvements, and the very purpose of the legislature will be defeated. The legislature must be assumed to have been familiar with the laws of trade and finance

-to have known that bonds payable in fluctuating currency are less salable than if payable in gold coin. Guided by experience and the history of the last forty years, they were aware that obligations which were to run for forty years in the future would be subject to the contingencies of a depreciated currency, and that, in the light of this experience, capitalists and investors would decline to invest their money unless they could be assured that they would receive the value which they should give for the bonds. The bonds authorized by this act, when issued, become negotiable securities and the subject of daily traffic in the commercial world, and any provision in them that impedes their free negotiability destroys their value, and prevents the municipality from effecting a sale in accordance with the terms of the act. The requirement in the statute that the bonds shall be sold "at not less than their face value in gold coin of the United States" would prevent the sale of a single bond whose payment at maturity could be made at the option of the maker in such currency as it might then elect, and thus the very object of the statute would be destroyed. The recognized standard of value in this state is gold coin, and, as this is the only kind of money which the legislature has authorized to be received upon a sale of the bonds, and has required them to be sold for not less than their face value, it must be held that it was the intention of the legislature that they might be made payable in gold coin.

There is an additional consideration which lends weight to this construction of the intention of the legislature by this amendment. By an act passed March 15, 1883 (Stats. 1883, p. 370), certain incorporated cities were authorized to refund their indebtedness by issuing new bonds therefor. The form of the bond was prescribed by the statute and made payable in “dollars" without designating any kind of money. On the same day that the aforesaid amendment to the act of March 19, 1889, was passed, the legislature amended the act of March 15, 1883 (Stats. 1893, p. 59), by giving authority to those cities to refund their indebtedness and issue serial bonds therefor, to run for forty years, "principal and interest being payable in gold coin or lawful money of the United States"; and also providing that the bonds should be sold for not less than their face value "in

the same character of money in which they were payable." The provision of this statute that the bonds shall be payable in gold coin or in lawful money of the United States, as in the statute under consideration, and the further provision in that statute that they should be sold for their face value "in the same character of money in which they were payable," clearly indicates that the municipality should exercise its option for the mode of the payment, at the issuance of the bonds, and not at their maturity, and that the bonds themselves should be payable in the kind of money for which they were to be sold. The same provision in section 6 of the act under consideration, coupled with the provision that the bonds are to be sold for gold coin at not less than their face value, carries with it the same intention of the legislature that the bonds may be made payable in gold coin. (See Sutherland on Statutory Construction, secs. 284, 288.)

In the case of Skinner v. Santa Rosa, 107 Cal. 465, cited by appellant, the ordinance calling the election, as well as the notice of election, described the bonds as "payable in gold coin or lawful money of the United States," with interest payable "annually" at a place to be fixed by the city council, while the bonds which the council proposed to sell were made payable "in gold coin" with interest payable "semi-annually" in the city of New York, and it was held that the bonds in this form, not having been authorized by the voters of the city, would be invalid. Whether, if the ordinance had provided that the bonds should be issued "payable in gold coin," its approval by the voters would have authorized the issuance of such bonds, was not before the court for decision or discussed in its opinion. The only bonds which the voters had approved were to "be payable in gold coin or lawful money of the United States"; that is, as we have seen above, payable in such money as the city might elect at their maturity, and it was held that the city could not be made liable for bonds payable in gold coin, as that would impose upon it a burden which the voters had never authorized.

2. Section 2 of the act of March 19, 1889, provides that the ordinance calling a special election "shall fix the day on which such special election shall be held, the manner of holding such election, and the voting for or against incurring such indebted

such election shall be held as provided by law for holding

such elections in such city, town, or municipal corporation." The ordinance in the present case stated:

"Sec. 6. The manner of holding said election shall be as follows: 1. As provided by law for holding elections in said city; 2. As provided by the general election laws of this state, except where such general laws may conflict with the state law for elections of the kind hereby called, or with this or any ordinance; and 3. As provided for in this ordinance." It was further provided in this section of the ordinance: "Tickets must be of ordinary election ticket paper, 6x12 inches; the heading of such tickets must be 'Bond Election, City of San Luis Obispo.' Each proposition set forth in section 2 of this ordinance shall be voted on separately, and must be printed on such tickets as follows: 1. Bonding for city water works, $90,000.00. 2. Bonding for sewer improvements, $34,500.00. Each voter shall indicate his wish by writing, or causing to be written or printed, 'yes' or 'no' on the right-hand margin on his ticket, opposite the proposition on which he may desire to vote." At the election which was held under this notice more than two-thirds of the voters that voted indicated their wishes by voting a ticket in the following form:

MUNICIPAL TICKET.

BOND ELECTION.

City of San Luis Obispo.

To vote for or against a proposition, stamp a cross (X) in the square at

2

3

41

the right.

and indicated their wishes in no other way than by stamping a cross opposite the propositions on said ticket. Whether the proposition to issue the bonds was legally adopted depends upon whether the ballots thus cast should have counted in its favor.

The provisions of the Political Code which are applicable to elections of officers are not by any statute made applicable to elections of the character under consideration, and we have not been

cited to any special statute on the subject governing elections in the city of San Luis Obispo. It will be observed that by the terms of the ordinance the general election law of the state is not applicable where it is in conflict with the mode pointed out in the ordinance, and that the provisions of the ordinance control unless they are in conflict with some of the provisions of the general law. It follows that the statutory provisions requiring the city to fix by its ordinance the manner of holding the election, and the voting for and against it, is the rule by which the voters are to act in voting upon the question. This ordinance, having been passed by virtue of the statute authorizing it, has the force of a statute, and is to be construed with the same effect as if its terms had been prescribed by an act of the legislature.

It is urged by the appellant that the manner of voting which was prescribed in the ordinance calling the election was mandatory upon the voters, and that as this manner was not observed the election was invalid. Whether the forms prescribed for holding an election are mandatory or directory, and whether their observance is essential to the validity of the election, depends upon the character of the acts prescribed. In Tebbe v. Smith, 108 Cal. 101, Mr. Justice Henshaw stated the rule as follows: "It is the rule that mandatory provisions for the holding of an election must be followed, or the failure will vitiate it, while the departue from the terms of a directory provision will not render it void, in the absence of a further showing that the result of the election has been changed, or the rights of the voters injuriously affected thereby; but the rule as to directory provisions applies only to minor and unsubstantial departures therefrom. There may be such radical omissions and failures to comply with the essential terms of a directory provision as will lead to the conclusive presumption that the injury must have followed." In Kirk v. Rhoades, 46 Cal. 398, it was held that, if the requirements of the statute which it is within the power of the elector to control are willfully disregarded, his vote should be rejected; and in Lay v. Parsons, 104 Cal. 661, it was held that the specific directions to the voter as to the mode in which he shall mark his ballot are mandatory and cannot be disregarded. In the absence of any direction, the manner in which the voter is to indicate his wish