the sum of $2,000. The bill further avers | James S. Armiger to James P. Bannon, that on the same day, to wit, on February dated November 14, 1894, (2) the deed from 21, 1891, the complainant borrowed of John Thomas M. Bannon and James P. Bannon to W. Kaufman the sum of $1,000 to pay the Charles W. Green, dated July 16, 1901, and purchase money for said land, giving Kauf- (3) the deed from Charles W. Green and wife man at the same time a mortgage thereon to David G. McIntosh, Jr., James F. Thrift, to secure the payment of the sum borrowed, and Seth Hance Linthicum, dated December "which mortgage," it is alleged, "is still un- 11, 1906, were without legal consideration, released and unpaid." No copy of the mort- and were fraudulent and void. The prayer gage appears in the record, however, and its of the bill was that these several pretended terms and provisions are therefore not before and fraudulent deeds should be set aside us. The bill further avers that on the 20th and annulled, and that James A. Armiger day of March, 1891, the complainant, Thomas be decreed to make a conveyance of his M. Bannon, sold a one-half interest in this one-half interest in said tract of land to the farm to James S. Armiger, but that in the year complainant. Charles W. Green and wife 1894 Armiger sold the one-half interest back filed their answer to the bill of complaint again to Thomas M. Bannon, who instructed on January 27, 1908, but Messrs. McIntosh, his brother James P. Bannon, an attorney Thrift, and Linthicum demurred thereto. at law, to draw the deed for a reconvey- On December 5, 1908, the complainant filed ance of the property to the complainant, and a petition in the case, setting forth that the also gave his brother $500 with which to pay interest on the mortgage from Thomas M. Armiger for his interest therein, but that Bannon to John W. Kaufman, mentioned in James P. Bannon, against the instructions the bill of complaint, had been paid until and wishes of the complainant, and with- February 21, 1909, but the defendant James out his knowledge, had the said Armiger F. Thrift, cunningly conniving to defeat the to convey said land to himself; that the just rights of the plaintiff, and seeking to complainant, being employed by the United defraud him of his rights in the premises, States Geological Survey, was frequently and of his interest in said real estate, had called long distances from his home, for recently, on October 5, 1908. procured from long periods of time, and for that reason John W. Kaufman an assignment of said was induced by his brother to convey said mortgage, and had proceeded to advertise land to Charles W. Green, now one of the the mortgaged tract of land for sale. The defendants in this case, so that, in case a petition further alleged that the property sale of the property should be effected, a in question was already involved in this speedy conveyance thereof could be made to equity cause, and that James F. Thrift's the purchaser. A copy of the deed of con- rights could be adudicated herein. It was veyance to Green appears in the record as further alleged that the sale of the property an exhibit to the bill of complaint, and in the mortgage proceedings would be ruinshows the deed to have been dated July 16, ous to complainant's rights, and destroy his 1901, and to have been made and executed right to have the court pass upon the fraudboth by Thomas M. Bannon and James P. ulent conveyances, and that the property Bannon, the consideration named therein with this cloud upon its title would not sell being "the premises and one dollar," though for one-third its value. The prayers of the the premises recite nothing that could be petition were that James F. Thrift, assignee, construed a consideration beyond the $1 be made a party defendant to the cause, named therein. The bill then further avers and that an injunction might be issued rethat, since the said conveyance to Green, straining Thrift from making sale of the he (Green) had frequently acknowledged and real estate, as set forth in the advertiserecognized the complainant as the owner of ment. On the same day an order was passthe said tract of land, and that the com- ed making James F. Thrift, assignee, a plainant had instructed him not to convey party to the proceedings; and, although no said land to any one, as he was holding it in bond was filed, the writ of injunction was the hope of selling it to the state of Mary- granted as prayed. On January 22, 1909, land; that notwithstanding these instruc- James F. Thrift, assignee of the mortgage tions, Green and wife, on the 11th day of above mentioned, dated February 21, 1891, December, 1906, conveyed the property to without having been summoned to appear, the defendants David G. McIntosh, James F. voluntarily appeared and filed his answer Thrift, and Seth Hance Linthicum, in fee, to the aforementioned petition, denying that for the nominal consideration of $1; that the interest on the mortgage had been paid until within the last two months before the to February 21, 1909, but alleging that in filing of the bill the complainant had sup- fact such interest had been paid only to posed the title to the whole tract was in August 21, 1908, and that both principal and himself, since he purchased the half inter- interest were overdue. The answer to the est of Armiger, during all of which time he petition also denied that there was any had paid the interest upon the mortgage fraud in the acquisition of the mortgage, debt, and also all taxes on the land. The denied the appellant's rights under the bill then averred that all three of the deeds mortgage could be adjudicated in this above mentioned, to wit: (1) the deed from cause, or that a sale under the mort

gage would be ruinous to the complainant's required by section 18 is a condition precerights, averring that, as assignee of a mortgage made antecedently to the so-called "fraudulent conveyance," his rights could not be affected by these proceedings, and praying that the order of injunction theretofore passed might be rescinded. Without waiting for the action of the court on this answer the appellant on the same day, January 22, 1909, entered an appeal from the order of December 5, 1908, making him a party defendant, and granting the writ of injunction to restrain him from making sale of the real estate as advertised.

2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1051*)-HARMLESS
ERROR-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.
In an action against a steamboat company
for damages through failing to stop at a wharf
for a passenger holding a round-trip ticket, the
erroneous admission of blank forms of a print-
ed bill of lading usually issued by defendant,
and containing a list of landings at which de-
fendant's boat stopped, was harmless; it being
conceded in the argument that the boat on its
return trip stopped on notice or signal at the
wharf from which plaintiff desired to embark,
such wharf being among those listed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 4164; Dec. Dig. § 1051.*] 3. NEGLIGENCE (§ 138*)-DAMAGES-INSTRUC

TIONS.

Raymond S. Williams and Jacob S. New, for appellant. Edward A. O'Mara, for ap

pellee.

SCHMUCKER, J. The appellee sued the appellant steamboat company in the superior court of Baltimore city for damages alleged to have been caused by its negligence in failing to stop its boat for him at one of its landings. The declaration alleges, in substance, that the steamboat company, having sold to the appellee a round-trip ticket by its line from Baltimore to Rock Creek and return, carried him by one of its boats to Rock While the simple question whether damages have been sustained by a breach of duty or the Creek, but the boat failed to stop there for violation of a right and the extent of damages him on its return trip, although he was waitsustained are matters for the jury, the court ing on the wharf at that place, when it passmust direct the jury in respect to what ele-ed by without stopping, and that, in addiments and within what limits damages may tion thereto, he gave the officers of the boat be estimated in the particular action. notice from the wharf that he was there waiting to be taken back to Baltimore. The defendant pleaded that it did not commit the wrong alleged, and the plaintiff joined issue on the plea. On the trial of the case the plaintiff secured a judgment in his favor, from which the steamboat company took this appeal.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. § 356; Dec. Dig. § 138.*] 4. CARRIERS (§ 278*)-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS-FAILURE TO STOP FOR PASSENGERS-INSTRUCTIONS.

In an action against a steamboat company by a passenger holding a round-trip ticket for damages through failure of defendant to stop at a wharf for plaintiff, whereby plaintiff was compelled to walk to his home through a rain and became ill, the refusal of instructions that the proper damages are the cost of the ticket plus any reasonable charge for lodging, or, if plaintiff was compelled to return to his home that night, the reasonable cost of obtaining a conveyance, and that he could not recover for any sickness brought about through exposure from a walk voluntarily and unnecessarily taken by him, and that he could not recover on exposure to the elements, nor for any sickness in consequence thereof, nor for any time lost, after returning to his home in consequence of such exposure, and the substitution of a charge that the measure of damages was the amount necessarily expended by plaintiff as the result of defendant's negligence, together with the proportionate cost of the round-trip ticket purchased by plaintiff and not used by him, and that plaintiff was not entitled to any damages for expenses unnecessarily incurred by him, or for sickness or injury resulting from exposure or sickness unnecessarily undergone, was error. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1081; Dec. Dig. § 278.*]

5. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1068*)-HARMLESS ERROR-INSTRUCTIONS.

There is evidence in the record tending to show that the appellant company owns a steamboat called the "Petrel," which makes two round trips a day from Baltimore to Rock Creek, in Anne Arundel county, stopping at any one of about a dozen private wharfs in the creek when requested or signaled to do so, but not otherwise. On Saturday, December 14, 1907, the appellee purchased a round-trip ticket by the boat for Gray's wharf, one of the private landings on the creek. He went to Gray's by the afternoon boat intending to return that night, but the boat failed to stop for him when it passed the wharf on the return trip at about 6 o'clock in the evening. The evidence is conflicting as to his having requested or signaled the boat to stop for him, but that was a question for the jury.

There was a slight cover of snow on the ground at the time, and it was raining. SevIn an action against a steamboat company eral persons living near the wharf offered for damages resulting from defendant's failure to stop at a wharf for plaintiff, a passenger the appellee lodging for the night after the holding a round-trip ticket, error in instruc- boat failed to stop for him, but he declined tions did not require a reversal of the judgment the offers. Having procured some one to where the smallness of the verdict of $100 found by the jury satisfied the court that the row him across the creek to Osborne's wharf, jury were not seriously misled by the indefinite- he walked nearly 11 miles through the snow ness of the instructions. and rain until he reached the Curtis Bay trolley line, by which he returned to Balti

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §, 4225; Dec. Dig. § 1068.*1

more, arriving at his home about 11 o'clock Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore at night, exhausted by fatigue and drenched City; Henry Stockbridge, Judge. with rain. He was quite ill the next day, Action by Charles Boyd against the Rock | and, although he returned to his employment, Creek Steamboat Company. Judgment for of barkeeper at a rathskeller, on the followplaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, BURKE, WORTHINGTON, and THOMAS, JJ.

ing Monday he continued to be ill, and on December 27th was obliged to give up his employment, and remained in ill health during the remainder of the winter and the greater

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes

The record contains three bills of exceptions-two to the rulings on evidence and one to the court's action on the prayers.

As the appellant's counsel stated at the hearing before us that he did not press the first exception, it will receive no further notice from us.

part of the next summer, first with grippe only upon the rejection of its third and fifth and afterwards a "stomach trouble of some prayers and the giving by the court of his sort." The time lost from his employment own instruction. The defendant's third and attributed by him to the exposure on his fifth prayers were as follows: Third. “The walk home from Gray's wharf consisted of defendant prays the court to instruct the 10 days when he went home on December 27, jury that, if they find for the plaintiff, the 1907, and about six weeks during the follow-only proper damages are the cost of the ticking summer and two weeks in the fall of et, plus any reasonable charge for lodging, 1908. His salary was $15 a week. During or, if the plaintiff was compelled to return to the period referred to he from time to time the city that night, then as a damage the either called to see or was visited by Dr. reasonable cost of obtaining a conveyance to Muse, who saw him in all about 30 or 40 his destination; and the court further intimes during 1907 and 1908, and expressed structs the jury that the plaintiff cannot rethe opinion that his sickness was due to ex- cover any damages for any sickness or inposure and cold. He was also treated from jury brought about through exposure inciabout the middle of November, 1908. by Dr. dent to a walk voluntarily and unnecessarily W. A. Cox, who found him suffering from taken by him with recklessness and want of intestinal trouble, for which he was still care for his own personal safety and comtreating him at the time of the trial. Dr. fort." Fifth. "If the jury find for the plainCox expressed no opinion as to the probable tiff, they will, when estimating his damages, cause of the plaintiff's illness. There is no not allow him anything on account of the evidence of the payment of any money by fact that he was exposed to the elements, the plaintiff to his physicians for their serv- nor for any sickness he may have suffered in ices or of other expenses resulting from his consequence of such exposure and walk to illness. the cars at Curtis Bay, nor for any time lost as is claimed by him after his return to Baltimore in consequence of such walk and exposure." The instruction given by the court to the jury is as follows: "The court instructs the jury, in case they should find a verdict for the plaintiff under the foregoing instructions, that the measure of damages is the amount of money necessarily expended by the plaintiff as the result of the negli gence of the defendant, together with the proportionate cost of the round-trip ticket purchased by the plaintiff and not used by him, and that the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages for expenses unnecessarily incurred by him, or for sickness or injury resulting to him from exposure unnecessarily undergone." The contention of the appellant upon this branch of the case may be succinctly stated in two propositions. The first is that, as the plaintiff offered no prayer on the measure of damages and the defendant's third and fifth prayers stated in a substantial and concrete form the true criteria, deducible from the facts in evidence, for the guidance of the jury in estimating damages, the court erred in rejecting those two prayers and substituting for them his own instruction, which was in abstract terms, and did not direct the jury as to the precise elements or items of damage for which the plaintiff was entitled to recover in this case, but permitted them to, speculate without proper restraint in ascertaining the amount of damages. The second is that the statement in the last clause of the court's instruction that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for sickness or injury resulting to him from exposure unnecessarily undergone in effect charged the jury that he was entitled to recover for sickness or injury resulting to him from exposure necessarily undergone; and that such an instruction was erroneous

The second exception was taken to the admission in evidence over the defendant's objection of a blank form of the printed bill of lading usually issued by the steamboat company for freight received by it for transportation. At the head of the bill was a list of the Rock creek landings, among which was "Cooks," which was admitted to be Gray's wharf. The form was offered in evidence by the plaintiff upon the cross-examination of the manager of the steamboat company who had gone upon the stand in its behalf. As it did not relate to the matters in reference to which the witness had testified in his direct examination, it was not properly admissible upon his cross-examination. Duterra v. Babylon, 83 Md. 538, 35 Atl. 64; Griffith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 478. It would have been admissible for the plaintiff as part of his own evidence, accompanied by proof of its publication in some manner by the company, in order to show what were its stations on Rock creek. We do not, however, regard the admission of this evidence as reversible error because it was conceded in the argument that the Petrel on its afternoon return trip stopped at Gray's wharf upon notice or signal, and not otherwise. At the close of the evidence on the trial of the case the plaintiff offered no prayers, but the defendant offered seven. The learned judge below refused all of the defendant's prayers except the first and second, and gave an instruction of his own to the jury. The defendant excepted to the entire action of the

ITY OF AGENT TO EMPLOY SUBAGENT.

To entitle plaintiff to recover commissions on a sale made under an alleged agreement with defendant's agent, plaintiff must prove that the agent acted on defendant's expressed or implied authority, or that the agreement was subsequently adopted by defendant or the proceeds accepted with knowledge of the circumstances.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. § 35; Dec. Dig. § 17.*] 3. CORPORATIONS (§ 432*) - OFFICERS — AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY.

of a corporation has power either to appoint There is no presumption that the secretary agents or to ratify appointments previously made without authority.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1726; Dec. Dig. § 432.*] 4. ESTOPPEL (8 95*)-EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

easily escaped all of the exposure he suffer-2. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 17*)—AUTHORed in consequence of his walk home on an inclement night by simply accepting the lodging for the night which the undisputed evidence shows to have been offered him by several persons residing near by the wharf on which he was left by the defendant's passing boat. Upon a close examination of the court's instruction to the jury, it be comes apparent that the difference in principle between it and the rejected third and fifth prayers for which it was substituted is slight, but the application of the principle involved to the situation presented by the evidence is not made as exactly or completely by the instruction as by the prayers. We have held in a number of cases that, "while the simple question whether damages have been sustained by the breach of duty or the violation of right and the extent of damages sustained as the direct consequence thereof are matters within the province of the jury, the court must decide and direct the jury in respect to what elements and within what limits damages may be estimated in the particular action.'" B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Carr. 71 Md. 143, 17 Atl. 1052; Belt R. R. Co. v. Sattler, 102 Md. 605, 62 Atl. 1125, 64 Atl. 507; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Lehman, 105 Md. 318, 67 Atl. 241. In Westn. Md. R. R. Co. v. Martin, 73 Atl. 267, No. 12 on the docket of the present term of this court, we reviewed

SILENCE.

Plaintiff volunteered to assist defendant's agent in selling a steel safe, and claimed that the agent promised that, if the sale was made, asked was $18,000, but the buyer offered $13,plaintiff should receive compensation. The price 000, and defendant finally acceded to these terms. The agent on several occasions told plaintiff that, if defendant was compelled to cut the price to the lower figure, there would be no commission for either. Held, that plaintiff by remaining silent when such statements were made, thereby permitting the agent to conclude made, was estopped to claim commission. the sale on terms he might not otherwise have

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. § 285; Dec. Dig. § 95.*]

5. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 24*)-AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO EMPLOY SUBAGENT. Evidence held insufficient to carry to the

somewhat at length our previous rulings up- jury the question of an agent's authority to em

on this subject.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, especially the remoteness of some of the facts proven as elements of damage, we think the appellant as defendant below was entitled to have sent to the jury the instructions as to the elements and limits of damages set forth in its third and fifth prayers, and that it was error to reject them and substitute for them the less precise instructions of the court. We do not think, however, that the error is one calling for a reversal of the judgment, as the smallness of the verdict of $100 found by the jury satisfiles us that they were not seriously if at all misled by the indefiniteness of the court's instruction to them. We will therefore af

firm the judgment.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

(111 Md. 252)

ploy a subagent on commission.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Dec. Dig. § 24.*]

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Henry Stockbridge, Judge.

Action by John N. Carroll against the Manganese Steel Safe Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, BURKE, WORTHINGTON, and THOMAS, JJ.

R. E. Lee Marshall, for appellant. Alfred J. Shriver, for appellee.

SCHMUCKER, J. The appellant sued the appellee, a foreign corporation, in the superior court of Baltimore city for a commission on the sale of a steel bank vault. At the trial of the case in the court below the presiding judge granted the defendant's prayers, instructing the jury to find a ver

CARROLL v. MANGANESE STEEL SAFE dict in its favor for want of legally suffi

CO.

(Court of Appeals of Maryland. June 30, 1909.) 1. TRIAL (8 178*)-DIRECTION OF VERDICT EFFECT OF MOTION.

Where defendant requests a directed verdict for want of sufficient evidence to entitle plaintiff to recover, defendant's evidence can be looked to only so far as it supports plaintiff's case. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 402; Dec. Dig. § 178.*]

cient evidence to entitle the plaintiff to recover. Upon the verdict so rendered a judgment for the defendant for costs was entered, from which this appeal was taken.

The evidence in the record on the part of the plaintiff is substantially as follows: During the year 1904, there was an active competition between companies engaged in building safes and vaults to secure contracts

•For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes