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721. 6s. ;" and they further ordered
that "the arbitrators' charges and ex-
penses attending the reference, amount-
ing to 627. 14s. 10d., should be borne
in equal proportions by A. and B.;
and that the said sums of 721. 68.

and 627. 14s. 10d., making together
1357. Os. 10d., should be paid, within
ten days from the execution of the
award, to C.: "-The court refused to
make a rule, under the 1 & 2 Vict.
c. 110, s. 18, ordering A. to pay the
721. 68. to B.,-there being nothing on
the face of the award to shew how the
payment to C. was to enure as a pay-
ment for the benefit of B.; although
there was an affidavit stating that C.
was agent for B.'s vessel, and acted as
his agent in the matter of the arbitra-
tion, and that the money was directed
to be paid to him as such agent. Ib.

V. Order under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110,
s. 18.

The court will not make an order
under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, for pay-
ment of money directed to be paid by
an award, except in a case where an
attachment would have been granted.
In re Laing and Todd, 276.

ARTIFICER.

See TRUCK-ACT.

ASSAULT.

What amounts to.

The plaintiff being in the defendant's
workshop, and refusing to quit when
desired, the defendant and his servants
surrounded him, and, tucking up their
sleeves and aprons, threatened to break
his neck if he did not go out; where-
upon the plaintiff, apprehensive of vio-
lence, departed:-Held, an assault.
Read v. Coker, 850.

ASSURANCE.
See INSURANCE.

ATTACHMENT.

I. For Non-payment of Money,-See
ATTORNEY, II.

II. For Non-performance of an Award,

See ARBITRAMENT, V.

ATTORNEY.

I. Privilege.

1. Production of Deeds of Client.]—
An attorney is not bound to produce,
or to answer any questions concerning
the nature or contents of, a deed or
other document intrusted to him pro-
fessionally by his client: and the judge
has no right to look at the instrument,
to see if the objection to produce it or
disclose its contents be well founded or
not. Volant v. Soyer, 231.

2. Secondary Evidence of Contents.]
A paper which the attorney admits
to have been delivered out of his office
as a copy of the deed, but which he
states he is unable of his own know-
ledge to vouch to be a copy,-is not
admissible as secondary evidence, upon
the attorney's refusal to produce the
original. Ib.

II. Non-Payment of Money pursuant
to a Rule.

The mere non-payment of money by
an attorney, pursuant to an order and
rule of court, is no ground for striking
him off the roll. Guilford v. Sims, 370.
And see CONTRACT, II.

AVERAGE.
See INSURANCE.

AWARD.

See ARBITRAMENT.

BANKRUPT.

I. Rights and Liabilities of Assignees.
Mortgagor and mortgagee of an un-
divided moiety of certain premises,
jointly with the owner of the other
moiety, demised the whole for twenty-
one years to one Green, the latter co-
venanting with the three lessors jointly
and severally to pay the rent reserved,
but not saying to whom. Green en-
tered upon the premises, and after-
wards became bankrupt. His assignees
having accepted the lease,-Held,--
deferring to the authority of Wakefield

v. Brown, 9 Q. B. 209,-that the de-
fendants were liable in covenant at the
suit of the three lessors, for rent accru-
ing while they were possessed of the
premises. Magnay v. Edwards, 479.

II. Fraudulent Preference.

1. A. obtained certain goods by pur-
chase from the sheriff under a writ of
fi. fa. at his own suit, founded on a
warrant of attorney for 6001. given to
him by one S. The writ was put into
the sheriff's hands on the 25th of May,
1839, and a bill of sale given to the
plaintiff by the sheriff on the 21st of
June, for 600l. On the 29th of May,
another writ against S. was put into the
sheriff's hands, at the suit of one M.,
for 627. A. paid M.'s debt; and the
assignment to him was under both
writs.

A. took possession of the goods; and,
on the 5th of October, 1849, B. seized
and sold them as a distress for rent due
to him from S.

founded on that act of bankruptcy,
under which fiat assignees were ap-
pointed.

In an action by A. against B. for an
irregular and excessive distress of the
goods so obtained by him, the defence
set up by B. was, that A. had procured
the goods by way of fraudulent prefer-
ence, and that S. caused them to be
taken in execution with intent to de-
feat or delay his creditors, being then
indebted to some in a sum sufficient to
constitute a good petitioning creditor's
debt: and it was proved, that, on the
14th of June, 1851 (which was after
the commencement of this action), the
assignees under the fiat gave notice to
A. that they meant to treat the warrant
of attorney, judgment, and execution,
as void, and should claim the goods
against B., as being wrongfully taken
under a distress; and that they also
gave notice to B. that they had brought
an action against A. to try the vali-
dity of the warrant of attorney, and
had recovered 2301., the value of the
goods seized under A.'s writ; and re-
quiring B. to pay to A. the value of
the goods distrained, and claiming from
B. the damages for the illegal distress,
the subject of this action :-

Held, upon a bill of exceptions, that,
as the adjudication of bankruptcy pro-
ceeded on the bankrupt's own applica-
tion, the assignees could not treat the
alleged fraudulent preference, or taking
in execution, as an act of bankruptcy;
but that they were entitled to treat it as
a fraudulent preference, or an execution
procured by the bankrupt in contempla-
tion of bankruptcy, under the old law,
prior to the 6 G. 4, c. 16,—and conse-
quently voidable, upon the established
principle, that fraud only gives a right
to avoid a contract or purchase, that

S., on the 5th of October, 1849,
filed a declaration of insolvency, and
thereby committed an act of bank-
ruptcy; and, on the 8th,-the statute
7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, being then in force,
-a fiat was awarded against him,

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III. Order under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106,
8. 125, for Sale of Goods in the Pos-
session, Order, and Disposition of the
Bankrupt.

1. An order by a commissioner in
bankruptcy "that all goods and chattels
which at the time the said A. B. became
bankrupt, were, by the consent and
permission of the true owner thereof,
in the possession, order, or disposition
of the said A. B., whereof the said A. B.
was reputed owner, or whereof he had
taken upon himself the sale, alteration,
or disposition as owner," should be sold
for the benefit of the creditors,-is not
a compliance with the 125th section of
the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106; it must spe-
cify the particular goods which are to
be so sold. Quartermaine v. Bittleston,
133.

2. Such an order is properly made
upon an ex parte application. Ib.

3. Quare, whether the order should
recite the circumstances which gave
the commissioner jurisdiction to act. Ib.

BARON AND FEME.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.

I. Notice of Dishonour.
1. Time for.]—A bill indorsed by A.

to B., and by B. to C., became due on
Saturday, the 15th of November, and
was presented, and dishonoured. C.
gave notice of dishonour to B., on
Monday, the 17th, and to A. on the
following day,-B. having given no
notice.

In an action by C. against A.,-
Held, upon an issue on a plea travers-
ing the notice of dishonour, that the
notice was too late. Rowe v. Tipper,
249.

2. By an Agent.]-The bill was
placed in the hands of D. for the pur-
pose of receiving payment:-Held,
that D. was sufficiently authorised to
give a notice of dishonour on behalf of
the holder. Ib.

II. Accommodation Bill.
In assumpsit by indorsee against ac-
ceptor, the defendant pleaded that he
accepted the bill for the accommoda-
tion of the drawer, who negotiated it
for his own use, and paid it at matu-
rity; and that the bill was delivered
by the holder to the drawer, who,
without the consent of the defendant,
and without having it re-stamped, in-
dorsed and delivered it to the plaintiff.
It appeared, on production of the bill,
that the defendant's name was written
on the back, and that there was a
memorandum on the face of it denoting
the time of its maturity; and it was
proved that the bill was delivered by the
drawer to the plaintiff after that date:
-Held, no evidence to shew that the
bill had been negotiated by the drawer,
and paid by him at maturity. Jewell
v. Parr, 909.

III. Bill obtained by Fraud.
In an action by the indorsee against
the acceptor of a bill of exchange, in
order to raise a presumption that the

plaintiff had received the bill fraudu-
lently and without value, evidence was
offered to shew that the defendant had
been defrauded of it, that one H., the
person from whom the plaintiff received
it, had, in the year 1847, stood in the
dock at the Old Bailey, that he retired
thence, and was seen no more at large
for eighteen months, and that the
plaintiff had admitted that he "had
known H. for a considerable time :
Held, no evidence to go to the jury,
that the plaintiff was aware of H.'s
conviction or disreputable character.
Berry v. Alderman, 674.

-

[Upon a second trial, the defendant
obtained a verdict upon both issues,
and retained it. Ed.]

BOTTOMRY.
See SHIPPING, II.

CASE.

I. For Negligence.

In driving Carriages.]—1. A master
is responsible for an injury resulting
from the negligence of his servant
whilst driving his cart or carriage, pro-
vided the servant is at the time engaged
in his master's business, even though
the accident happens in a place to
which his master's business did not call
him: but, if the journey upon which
the servant starts be solely for his own
purposes, and undertaken without the
knowledge or consent of his master,
the latter is not responsible. Mitchell
v. Crassweller, 237.

2. The defendants' carman, having
finished the business of the day, re-
turned to their shop in Welbeck
Street, with their horse and cart, and
obtained the key of the stable, which
was close at hand; but, instead of going

there at once, and putting up the horse,
as it was his duty to do, he, without
his masters' knowledge or consent,
drove a fellow-workman to Euston
Square; and, in his way back, ran
over and injured the plaintiff and his
wife :-Held, that, inasmuch as the
carman was not at the time of the acci-
dent engaged in the business of his
masters, they were not responsible for
the consequences of his unauthorised
act. Ib.

3. The declaration alleged that "the
defendants were possessed of a certain
cart and horse, which was being driven
by and under the care and direction of
their servant,"-not saying, at the time
of the grievance complained of; and
that, "whilst the plaintiff was crossing
a certain street, &c., the defendants,
by their servant, so negligently and
improperly drove and directed the said
cart and horse along the said street,
that the plaintiff was knocked down
and injured: "-Held, that the first
allegation was immaterial, and not tra-
versable; and that, under "not guilty,"
the defendants might shew that the
driver was not at the time of the acci-
dent acting as their servant. Ib.

In Navigation.]-4. By the 26th sec-
tion of the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 79, the
commissioners of the Admiralty are
authorised to make regulations re-
quiring the exhibition of such lights
by such classes of vessels, whether
steam or sailing vessels, within such
places and under such circumstances
as they think fit; and provides, that
all owners and masters or persons
having charge of vessels shall be bound
to take notice of such regulations, and
shall exhibit such lights, and no others,
at such times, within such places, in
such manner, and under such circum-

stances as are injoined by such regula-
tions; and that, in case of default, the
master or other person having charge
of any vessel, or the owner of such
vessel, if it appear that he was in
fault, shall for each and every occasion
upon which such regulations are in-
fringed forfeit and pay a sum not ex-
ceeding 201.

And the 28th section of the statute
provides, that, "in case any damage to
person or property be sustained in con-
sequence of the non-observance of any
of the said rules, the same shall in all
courts of justice be deemed, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, to
have been occasioned by the wilful de-
fault of the master or other person
having charge of such vessel, and such
master or other person shall, unless it
appear to the court before which the
cause is tried that the circumstances of
the case were such as to justify a de-
parture from the rule, be subject in all
proceedings, whether civil or criminal,
to the legal consequences of such de-
fault."

A count in case, after setting out the
26th section of the above statute, and
averring that the commissioners had
made a regulation that "all sailing
vessels at anchor in roadsteads or fair-
ways shall be bound to exhibit, between
sunset and sunrise, a constant bright
light at the mast-head," proceeded to
allege that the plaintiffs were possessed
of a certain steam-vessel called the A.,
then proceeding, between the hours of
sunset and sunrise, down the river
Thames, in a certain roadstead or fair-
way thereof, called Gravesend Reach;
that the defendant was then possessed
of a certain sea-going and sailing vessel
called the V., then being at anchor in
the Thames, in the same roadstead or

fairway, between the said hours of sun-
set and sunrise, and under the care and
management of the servants of the de-
fendant; that it was their duty to ex-
hibit a bright light at the mast-head of
the defendant's vessel; but that they,
not regarding their duty in that behalf,
neglected to exhibit such bright light,
&c.; and that, while the said steam-
vessel of the plaintiffs was so proceed-
ing, &c., the same, by and through the
carelessness and neglect of the defend-
ant, in not exhibiting the bright light
at the mast-head of the vessel of the
defendant, ran foul of and struck the
vessel of the defendant, and greatly
broke and damaged the said steam-
vessel of the plaintiffs :—

-

Held, on demurrer, that the declara-
tion disclosed no breach by the defend-
ant of any duty imposed upon him by
the statute; and that, striking out the
allegations as to the statute, the de-
claration shewed no cause of action, it
being consistent with the statements
therein that the damage resulted from
the plaintiff's own negligence. The
General Steam Navigation Company v.
Morrison, 581.

Sub-Contractor.]-5. If one employs
another to do an act which may be
done in a lawful manner, and the latter
in doing it unnecessarily commits a
public nuisance, whereby injury re-
sults to a third person, the employer
is not responsible. Peachey v. Row-
land, 182.

6. A. employed B. to construct a
drain in a public highway; B. em-
ployed C. to fill in the earth over the
brick-work, and to carry away the sur-
plus: C., in performing his work, left
the earth raised so much above the
level of the road, that D., driving by
in the dark, was thereby upset, and

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