subsequent year"; and in support of the text is cited Porter v. Stanley, 47 Me. 515; 74 Am. Dec. 501. There a tax-collector was a defaulter, and the selectmen, his superiors, themselves appropriated from moneys received from the tax-collector on later assessments, sufficient to balance the earlier deficiencies, and this appropriation so made by the superiors was held to be manifestly inequitable. In recognition of the same principle was decided the case of the United States v. Eckford, 1 How. 250. There it was the duty of the collector to pay over funds, and the treasury department made disposition and application of them. Say the court: "It is true if the collector shall misapply the public funds, his sureties are responsible; but that is not the question under consideration. The collector does not misapply the funds in his hands, but pays them over to the government, without any special direction. as to their application. Can the treasury officers say, under such circumstances, that the funds currently received and paid over shall be appropriated in discharge of the defalcation which occurred long before the sureties were bound for the collector, and, by such appropriation, hold the sureties liable for the amount? The statement of the case is the best refutation of the argument." But these cases and the principle recognized by them are not here in point, for, as has been said, the act was an affirmative act of misapplication and wrongful appropriation, committed, not by another or a superior officer, but by Hammond himself. And, wherever it appears that a new and independent wrong is committed by the officer during his second term, and financial loss follows, the bondsmen of that term are liable.

The case of Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Parker, 101 Cal. 483, so far from being at variance with the principles above set forth, distinctly recognizes them.

The judgment and order appealed from are therefore affirmed.

Hearing in Bank denied,

[Sac. No. 26. In Bank.-October 5, 1895.]

E. ERLANGER, APPELLANT, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, RESPONDENT.

APPEAL DISMISSAL-JUDGMENT ENTERED PURSUANT TO STIPULATION.— Judgments and orders by consent will not be reviewed upon appeal; and where it appears that the judgment appealed from was entered in pursuance of an express written stipulation of all the parties, which provided that no appeal should be taken from the judgment, the appeal will be dismissed.

MOTION to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. WHEATON A. GRAY, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Lamberson & Middlecoff, for Appellant.

J. W. Ahern, for Respondent.

MCFARLAND, J.-This is a motion made by respondent to dismiss the appeal in the above-entitled cause.

One of the grounds of the motion is, that the judgment appealed from was entered in pursuance of an express written stipulation of all the parties, including the appellant. It appears from the record that such a stipulation was made, and that the judgment was entered in accordance therewith; and that it was further expressly stipulated that no appeal should be taken from said judgment.

It is well settled that judgments and orders by consent will not be reviewed. (Societe Francaise D'Epargnes v. Beardslee, 63 Cal. 160; Thompson v. Connolly, 43 Cal. 636; Mecham v. McKay, 37 Cal. 158, and cases there cited; Meerholz v. Sessions, 9 Cal. 278; Brotherton v. Hart, 11 Cal. 406.) In the cases above cited there was no motion to dismiss, and the judgments were affirmed, because the court would not review a judgment or order made by consent of the appellant. But in Oullahan v. Morrissey, 73 Cal. 297, the appeal was dismissed because

the judgment was entered with the consent of the appellant; and in San Francisco v. Certain Real Estate, 42 Cal. 513, the court, per Crockett, J., said: "It is objected, in limine, that we ought not to entertain this appeal, for the reason that the judgment from which it was taken was entered pro forma and by consent. If the record discloses this fact, it would be our duty to dismiss the appeal, as we have repeatedly decided that we will not review judgments or orders entered by consent."

The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.

GAROUTTE, J., HARRISON, J., VAN FLEET, J., and HENSHAW, J., concurred.

[No. 19452. Department Two.-October 8, 1895.]

THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, APPELLANT, v. STATE LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY, RESPONDENT. TAXATION-TERM SAVINGS DEPOSITS-LOAN AND TRUST COMPANYDE FACTO SAVINGS CORPORATION.-Where a loan and trust company incorporated to do a trust business, a safe deposit business, and a general banking business, has a savings department in which term savings deposits are received upon a specified rate of interest, the corporation, as respects its term savings deposit, is de facto a savings and loan corporation, whether so de jure or not, and is properly assessed for taxation upon the amount of credits, claims, debts, and demands due, owing, or accruing for or on account of such term deposits.

ID. TWO SYSTEMS OF SAVINGS BANKS-CONSTRUCTION OF CODE.There are two plans or systems upon which savings banks may be organized and conducted, in one of which the depositors are the members and the bank is merely their agent, and the members have an interest in the deposits and profits; while in the other plan or system the depositors are mere creditors and have no interest in the profits, and each of these plans or systems accords with the provisions of the Civil Code respecting savings and loan corporations; and the language of section 3617 of the Political Code in respect to taxation is broad enough to include both classes of savings and loan corporations for purposes of taxation.

ID. SAVINGS AND LOAN CORPORATION-NAME IMMATERIAL.-In order to constitute a savings and loan corporation, it is not necessary that the name of the corporation should in any manner express the fact that it is such.

ID.-SAVINGS DEPOSITS-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE-ESTOPPEL.-The requirements of the statute imposed upon savings and loan cor

porations are for the protection of the depositor, and if a loan and trust company which assumes to be a savings bank in obtaining deposits has not complied with the statute in loaning or investing the funds as required of savings and loan corporations, it is estopped to deny that it is a savings and loan corporation, for the purpose of taxation upon the deposits so received, whether that question arises between the bank and the state or between the bank and the depositor.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. LUCIEN SHAW, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

C. McFarland, for Appellant.

The defendant is taxable as a savings and loan corporation upon its term deposits. (Pol. Code, sec. 3617; Burke v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 594; Security Sav. Bank etc. Co. v. Hinton, 97 Cal. 214, affirming Main Street Sav. Bank etc. Co. v. Hinton, 32 Pac. Rep. 6.)

W. P. Gardiner, for Respondent.

The defendant was not incorporated as a savings and loan corporation, and did a general banking business, and was not a savings bank within the definition of the code. (Civ. Code, sec. 571; Morse on Banks and Banking, secs. 3, 617, 618; Mitchell v. Beckman, 64 Cal. 117; Huntington v. Savings Bank, 96 U. S. 388; Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn. 173; Osborn v. Byrne, 43 Conn. 155; 21 Am. Rep. 641.)

HAYNES, C.-This is an agreed case submitted to the superior court under section 1138 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the controversy involves the question whether the defendant is liable for certain taxes levied and assessed against it by the city assessor, for the year 1892, amounting to $900.

On the first Monday in March, 1892, the total deposits held by defendant amounted to $358,847. Of this sum $249,939.01 consisted of ordinary deposits subject to check, or represented by certificates of deposit, while the remainder, amounting to $108,907.99, was composed of interest-bearing deposits, the accounts of which were

kept in separate ledgers, one denominated "Savings Deposits," and the other "Term Savings Deposits," and it was upon said sum of $108,907.99 that said tax was levied and assessed.

The city assessor claimed that, as to these last-named deposits, the defendant was either de jure or de facto a savings and loan corporation, and therefore liable for said tax under subdivision 6 of section 3617 of the Political Code. Said subdivision, after defining the terms "credits and debts," provides as follows:

"But credits, claims, debts, and demands due, owing, or accruing for or on account of money deposited with savings and loan corporations shall, for the purposes of taxation, be deemed and treated as an interest in the property of such corporation, and shall not be assessed to the creditor or owner thereof."

The purposes for which the respondent was incorporated, as appears from its articles of incorporation, were in substance to accept and execute trusts of every nature; to attend to the management and settlement of estates, guardianships, assignments, receiverships, and other trusts; to act as executor and guardian of estates; to do a safe deposit business; to receive on deposit from others trust funds or moneys belonging to states, counties, and other municipal corporations; to do a general banking business; to issue certificates of deposit or indebtedness, upon interest or otherwise, and with or without conditions as to time of payment; to invest or loan money upon commission or otherwise, and to purchase, hold, sell, mortgage, and convey such real estate as may be necessary for carrying on the business of the corporation and such other real property as may be taken in security for or in payment of debts owing to the corporation.

The agreed case further shows that while the acounts of the alleged savings deposits are kept in separate books from the other business of the bank, there is no separation of the moneys received from the different sources, and that the interest paid on these deposits is