Selkrig v. Davies, 2 Dow., 230; 2
Rose, 97, 291, approved.
672
Swinton . Bailey, 16 Eng. Rep., 552,
affirmed.
48

Symes v. Cuvillier, 5 L. C. Leg. News,
302, affirmed.
671
Tennent v. Glasgow Bank, 16 Scot. L.
R., 238; Ct. Sess. Cas., 4th Series,
vol. 6, p. 554, affirmed.
395
Tennent. Glasgow Bank, 33 Eng. R.,
395, followed.

Walsh v. Pemberton, L. R., 1
dismissed.

675
Ir., 428,

517
140, re-

12

Ward v. Hobbs, 21 Eng. R.,
versed.
Ward v. Hobbs, 28 Eng. Rep., 142, af-
firmed.
12
Wightman v. Constine, Ct. Sess. Cas.,
4th Series, vol. 5, p. 782, affirmed.
Wild's Case, 6 Coke R., 17, followed.
746
Williams v. Groucott, 4 B. & S., 149,
distinguished.
86

133

Wilson, Ex parte, L. R., 7 Ch. App.,
490, approved.

672

Wood v. Waud, 3 Ex., 748, approved.

91
Wright v. Callender, 2 De G., M. & G.,
652, followed.
810

COLLISION.

See ADMIRALTY, 444.

COLONIES.

See GOVERNOR, COLONIAL, 648, 654 note.

COMPROMISE.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 468,

485 note.

CONDITION PRECEDENT.

See ARBITRATION, 448.

pied by miners' cottages, and under-
neath was coal. When A. purchased
the feu, he was under the impression
that all the minerals under the feu, as
under all the ground surrounding it,
had been reserved to the superior; but
that was a mistake, for in the deed
granting the feu there was no reserva-
tion of coal. The superior granted the
whole property in the coals in all the
surrounding land to R. and C. They,
under the impression that they had
the whole of the coal, including the
coal under the acre and a half, worked
out and disposed of the coal under A.'s
acre and a half; and in doing so dam-
aged the surface.

A. could not have worked the coal
to profit himself; there was no person
to whom he could dispose of it but to
R. and C.; and the element of wilful
trespass, and the element of special
and exceptional need of support to the
surface, were absent.

In a claim by A. for (1) the value of
the coal; (2) a sum for "way-leave"
and the advantage obtained by work-
ing through instead of round the feu;
and (3) for damages done to the houses
on the surface:

Held, affirming the decision of the
court below, that the value of the coal
taken must be the value of the coal to
the person from whom it is taken, at
the time it is taken, and that the best
evidence in the peculiar circumstances
of this case of that value was the roy-
alty paid by R. and C. for the sur-
rounding coal field; therefore A. was
entitled to the lordship on the coal ex-
cavated, calculated at that rate; to-
gether with the payment of a sum for
damage done to the houses on the
surface.

CONFUSION.

1. A. was the owner of a small feu of
about an acre and a half in extent.
The surface of the ground was occu-

CONSIDERATION.

See BANKRUPTCY, 103.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, 673.

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 133, 149 note.

for all, so as to take away any right of
action for subsequent damage against
the defendants, who were held to be
not wrongdoers, but persons exercising
their rights of mining operations over
the land of the plaintiff, subject to pay-
ing compensation for the permanent
injury thereby occasioned to the said
estate. Great Laxey, etc., v. Clague, 86

2. Where a plaintiff had obtained against
a railway company a verdict with dam-
ages sustained by reason of an accident
to a train in which he was a passen-
ger, and a new trial was ordered by the
Court of Queen's Bench on the ground
alone of excessive damages, the finding
as to negligence by the defendant com-
pany being approved by two courts:

Held, that inasmuch as there had
been no misdirection, the judge hav-
ing put to the jury whether all was
done which was reasonably and prac
tically possibly under the circumstances
of the case, and inasmuch as the damn-
ages were not of such an excessive char-
acter as to show that the jury had been
either influenced by improper motives
or led into error, there ought not to be
a new trial. Lumbkin v. South Eastern,
727, 736 note.

etc.

See CONFUSION, 622, 638 note.
LIFE ESTATE, 787, 805 nole.

2.

consequently of the means of provid-
ing for and maintaining his family-
praying that the conduct of the society
might be declared illegal, arbitrary,
and vexatious, and that they might pay
damages £500.

Plea in effect that the defendants
acted upon information which they be-
lieved to be true that the plaintiff was
addicted to intemperance, that they
communicated their refusal to insure,
but not their information, to the defend-
ants, that they did so in good faith, and
without any malice towards the plain-
tiff, without any desire to injure him,
and in the honest belief that the infor-
mation they had received was sufficient
to justify the course which they took:

Held, that such defence (if proved)
was a sufficient answer to the prima
facie cause of action disclosed by the
declaration. The representation made
by the defendants was clearly one made
in the conduct of their own affairs and
in matters in which their own interest
was concerned:

Held, further, that such defence was
established by proof that the defendants
had received such information, and had
reason to believe it to be true, without
conclusively establishing habits of in-
temperance against the plaintiff as upon
a plea of justification. Hamon v. Falle.

166

DEFAMATION.

1. Declaration, that the plaintiff, a certifi-
cated master mariner, having been em-
ployed as master of certain vessels, his
services were retained by the proprie-
tor of ship U.; that he was getting
ready to take command thereof when
he found that the defendant insurance
society had intimated to the said pro-
prietor that if the plaintiff were to take
command of her the society would re-
fuse to continue to insure her; that
he then took certain steps in order to
induce the society to reconsider their
resolution or to give him an opportu
nity of refuting the reasons they might
have for it, but in vain; that by reason
of this proceeding on the part of the
society he had lost his employment,
and that this arbitrary and vexatious
conduct on the part of the society
caused him considerable damage in de-
priving him of his employment, and

1. A. and B., trustees for C. and D., ac-
cepted, as part of a trust estate, stock
in a Scotch banking company. By the
deed of copartnership, there was to be
no limit whatever to the shareholders'
liability. They signed the deed of trans-
fer as trust disponees," and accepted
the stock "as trust disponees foresaid,
subject to the articles and regulations
of the said company in the same man-
ner as if they had subscribed the con-
tract of copartnership." Their names
and addresses were entered in the stock
ledger (the register of shareholders),

followed by the words "as trust dis-
ponees" for C. and D. The individual
names of A. and B. did not appear in
any list of shareholders issued to the
public.

The bank suspended payment with
immense liability. The liquidators
placed A. and B. on the first part of
their list of contributories as liable to
calls "in their own right." In a peti-
tion to rectify the list of contributories,
by transferring the names of A. and B.
from the first part to that part entitled
"second part-contributories as being
representatives of others":

Held, affirming the decision of the
court below, that the trustees, A. and
B., were partners of the company, and
as such were personally liable for pay-
ment of all calls made on them in re-
spect of the said stock.

DISEASED FOOD.

See FRAUD, 12, 26 nole.

DUTCH LAW.

See WILLS, 658.

DUTY.

See FRAUD, 12, 26 note.

E.

EASEMENTS.

See ARBITRATION, 133.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

A railway company purchased, by pri-
vate agreement, without any prelim-
inary notice to treat, certain lands, in
amount nineteen acres, under which
were mines of iron ore. These mines
were specifically conveyed to the com-
pany. By the private act incorporat-
ing the company the railway was to
be finished in 1851. By warrant of
the Railway Commissioners that time
was extended to 1853. The company
had used six of the nineteen acres in
railway works-on certain spots of the
remaining thirteen acres à drain, a
cesspool, and a passage for water sup-
ply had been constructed, but no build-
ings had been erected, nor rails laid
down. The railway was finished, but
at the expiration of ten years from
1853 no sale of the lands took place.
In December, 1849, the company had
let the lands to a tenant from year to
year, and he used them for agricultu-
ral purposes. In August, 1871, the com-
pany let the lands (again under a ten-
ancy from year to year) to an iron min-
ing company under a license to work
the iron ore. In each of these agree-
ments the directors reserved the abso-
lute right (in the case of the iron com-