local regulations were concerned, subject only to the control of general laws. What was said in the case must be read in the light afforded by a knowledge of the precise question under consideration, and, so read, the quotation above set forth is direct authority upon the proposition that the legislative power of a city operating under a freeholders' charter is just where it is placed by the charter.

The effect of the provisions of the Los Angeles charter, as amended, is to give the legislative power vested in the city to the council and mayor, subject to such control by the electors as is given them by the initiative and referendum provisions.

The reserved power of the electors to directly enact such ordinances as the council refuses to enact, as well as their power to effectually veto ordinances adopted by the council, is made paramount to the power of the council and mayor, the council being without power to repeal or amend an ordinance so enacted, and the objection that under the initiative we have "two equal co-ordinate lawmaking bodies, the one absolutely independent of the other," is therefore without foundation. This feature renders the decision in Ex parte Anderson, 134 Cal. 69, [86 Am. St. Rep. 236, 66 Pac. 194], a decision strongly relied on by petitioner, inapplicable, for the only thing decided therein was that there could not be under our system of government two equal, co-ordinate lawmaking powers, "each existing without any restrictions the one upon the other."

It is urged that the effect of the provisions of the initiative amendment is to interfere with and suspend the exercise of the police power granted by section 11 of article XI, in that as an ordinance adopted by the people is repealable or amendable only by the people, and as special elections on such questions can be held only at intervals of six months, and the council itself can submit propositions for repeal or amendment only at a general municipal election, the making of necessary changes in the local laws of a police nature may be unreasonably delayed. The amendment does not purport to restrict or suspend in the slightest degree the exercise of the police power vested in the municipality, having reference. solely to the manner of its exercise. Any ordinance enacted by the people may at any time be repealed or amended in the

manner provided in the charter. The rule against the suspension of the police power invoked by petitioner means no more than that the power is a continuous one, reposed somewhere, and one that cannot be barred or suspended by contract or irrepealable law, and never has been held to mean that a law enacted in the exercise of the police power must ever be open to instantaneous alteration. There are provisions in the nature of police regulations in the state constitution itself, and these cannot be repealed or amended except by the slow process of amending the constitution. The legislature of the state at each of its biennial sessions enacts numerous laws in the exercise of the police power of the state, which laws can be repealed or amended only at a succeeding biennial session, except in the rare case of an extra session. The freeholders' charters of the various cities of the state contain many provisions which are essentially police regulations, and these can be amended or repealed only with the assent of the majority of the electors at an election, which elections can be held only at intervals of two years (Harrison v. Roberts, 145 Cal. 173, 179, [78 Pac. 537]), and with the approval of the state legislature. So far as the objection here made is applicable to the provisions in city charters, it was overruled in People v. Williamson, 135 Cal. 415, 417, 418, [67 Pac. 504]. So far as this objection is concerned, there can be no distinction in principle between the case of a provision in the nature of a police regulation in the city charter and one to the same effect in an ordinance. In each case it is ever amendable or repealable in the manner provided by the organic law-in the one case the organic law of the state, in the other the organic law of the city. This, as was said in People v. Williamson, must satisfy the courts. The same objection might, as is suggested, be made with the same degree of force to the numerous provisions in freeholders' charters and acts of the legislature relative to municipal corporations which prohibit the passage of an ordinance on the day of its introduction, or prevent its taking effect until after publication.

The claim that the power to make police regulations upon a subject covered by an ordinance adopted by the people is taken from the city by the adoption of such ordinance finds its source in the erroneous assumption, which is the basis of many of

petitioner's arguments, that the city council is the "city." It is urged that the initiative and referendum amendments are hopelessly in conflict, in that under the referendum amendment certain emergency ordinances take effect immediately on passage, and need not be referred to the people, while there is no exception declared in the initiative amendment. There is no claim that any emergency ordinance passed by the council is in conflict with the ordinance here involved, and it is unnecessary here to determine what the situation would be in such event. Obviously, however, the law would be construed either as making the emergency ordinance paramount, and precluding the application of the initiative to the subject-matter thereof, or as making the initiative ordinance paramount. We cannot see any legal objection to either method, or any unconstitutional interference by either with the exercise of the police power.

It is suggested that the proper exercise of the police power may be prevented by reason of the absence of sufficient funds to pay the expense of an election necessary to the adoption of an ordinance which repeals or amends some prior ordinance adopted by the people, section 18 of article XI providing that no county, city, etc., "shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two thirds of the qualified electors, etc. The same argument might with as much force be made as to a provision of law requiring the publication of an ordinance before its taking effect, or as to any requirement in connection therewith involving expense, however small. Surely a method adopted for the passage of ordinances cannot be declared unconstitutional upon any such ground. It is to be presumed that the municipality will provide the funds necessary for the administration of its government. If there be any offender against the rule invoked by petitioner in this connection, it is the constitutional provision cited by him.

The contention is made that the initiative amendment is in violation of section 13 of article XI of the constitution, which is as follows: "The legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation, company, association, or individual, any power to make, control, appropriate, super

vise, or in any way interfere with any county, city, town, or municipal improvement, money, property, or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or assessments, or perform any municipal functions whatever."

So far, at least, as the prohibition concerning the delegation by the legislature to any "special commission" to perform any municipal function is concerned, it is clear that the whole object of the provision was to prevent the state legislature from interfering with local governments by the appointment of its own special commissions for the control of purely local matters. It was said in People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618, that it was the manifest intent of this and other sections "to emancipate municipal governments from the authority and control formerly exercised over them by the legislature." (See 2 Debates and Proceedings Constitutional Convention, p. 1066.) Certainly there is nothing in the language used which could be held to prohibit provision in the organic act framed for the government of a city for such commissions, special or otherwise, to be appointed or elected by the city as might be deemed necessary for the proper conduct of municipal affairs.

Under no circumstances, however, could the aggregate body of qualified electors of a municipality be held to be a "special commission" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Any claim to the contrary appears so frivolous as not to merit discussion. Nor is there anything in the claim that the electors signing the petition for the submission of a proposed ordinance to the vote of the electors either constitute a "special commission" or perform any "municipal function." Certainly they perform no act of legislation. Whatever "municipal function" is performed in the matter of the adoption of an ordinance under the initiative is per formed either by the council, when it enacts the ordinanc without submitting it to the electors, or by the electors, when it is submitted by the council. As in People v. Ontario, 148 Cal. 625, [84 Pac. 205, 207], the petition of the electors is merely an initiatory step, accomplishing no more than to compel a consideration of a proposed matter by those qualified to act and perform municipal functions, and does not itself constitute the performance of a "municipal function" in any proper sense of those words.

Aside from the prohibition as to "special commissions" contained in this section of the constitution, the utmost effect of the section is to prohibit the granting to private agencies, as distinguished from public agencies, the power to control in any degree the property or improvement work of a local subdivision or municipality, or to levy local taxes or assessments, or to perform any municipal function. Assuming the applicability of this provision to a freeholders' charter, as it is claimed was held in Yarnell v. Los Angeles, 87 Cal. 603, [25 Pac. 767], it is manifest that the electors of a municipality, in their capacity as such, do not constitute any such prohibited private agency.

It is earnestly urged that the initiative provision of the charter is inconsistent with the form of municipal government prescribed by title III of part IV of the Political Code (sec. 4354 et seq.). These sections constituted part of the original code, and provided a general form of government for cities. By section 4355, the legislative power of the city was vested in a common council. It is said that this is a general law with which the provisions of the freeholders' charter must be consistent. As to municipal affairs, it is sufficient if the provisions of a charter are consistent with the constitution. As we have shown, the method of exercising the legislative power of a municipality is a municipal affair. But were it otherwise, this provision of the Political Code could not be held to constitute one of the general laws with which charter provisions must be consistent. The old Political Code sections invoked were intended merely as a plan under which cities might be organized and governed, if so desired, and this was the sole object of their enactment. (Ex parte Simpson, 47 Cal. 127.) Except where specially made part of a city's charter by reference (Ex parte Mauch, 134 Cal. 501, [66 Pac. 183]; Buck v. Eureka, 109 Cal. 504, [42 Pac. 243]), they have not been held applicable. The sections of the title relative to refunding a bonded indebtedness, held applicable to Los Angeles in Los Angeles v. Teed, 112 Cal. 319, [44 Pac. 580], were part of a much more recent act of the legislature, intended, as this court held, to have general application. The old sections of the Political Code as to the form of government of cities stand, then, in precisely the same class of laws as does the Municipal Corporation Act