defined limits, the killing or slaughtering of animals the flesh of which is to be sold or offered for sale or eaten. There is no claim that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to show a public offense under the provisions of said ordinance, nor is there on the part of the petitioner any claim that the ordinance, if legally enacted, was not a reasonable and valid exercise of the police power vested in such city. Petitioner's claim is that the purported ordinance has never been legally enacted.

The ordinance was not adopted in the ordinary way, by vote of the city council and approval of the mayor, but by the electors of the city at a general election, at which it was submitted for their approval or rejection, such submission having been compelled by a petition submitted to the council signed by electors equal in number to at least five per cent of the vote cast for all candidates for mayor at the last preceding election. The procedure was in strict accord with what is known as the "initiative" provision of the charter of Los Angeles, which, together with what is known as the "referendum," was made a part of such charter by amendments ratified by the people of such city at an election held December 1, 1902, and approved by the legislature of the state on January 30, 1903. (See Stats. 1903, pp. 555, 572.) The real question presented by this proceeding is, then, as to the validity of this provision of the charter.

The city of Los Angeles is a municipal corporation operating under a freeholders' charter, framed and adopted under the provisions of section 8 of article XI of the constitution, and approved by the legislature January 31, 1889, (Stats. 1889, p. 445). By that charter the legislative power of the city was vested in a council provided for by such charter, subject to the power of veto and approval by the mayor. The initiative amendment of 1902 and 1903, so far as material to the question here presented, provides substantially as follows: Any proposed ordinance may be submitted to the council by a petition signed by registered electors of the city. If such petition is signed by electors equal in number to fifteen per cent of the entire vote cast for all candidates for mayor at the last preceding general election at which a mayor was elected, and contains a request that said ordi

nance be submitted forthwith to a vote of the people at a special election, the council must either,-1. Pass such ordinance without alteration (subject to a referendary vote as elsewhere provided), and if, when passed, it is vetoed by the mayor, and on reconsideration fails of passage by the council, submit it to a vote of the people at a special election; or 2. Call a special election, at which said ordinance, without alteration, shall be submitted to a vote of the people. If the petition is signed by electors equal in number to at least five per cent, but less than fifteen per cent of such vote, the ordinance shall be submitted to a vote of the people at the next general municipal election that shall occur at any time after thirty days from the date when the sufficiency of the petition is officially determined. "If a majority of the qualified electors voting on said proposed ordinance shall vote in favor thereof, such ordinance shall thereupon become a valid and binding ordinance of the city; and any ordinance proposed by petition or which shall be adopted by a vote of the people cannot be repealed or amended, except by a vote of the people. . . . The council may submit a proposition for the repeal of any such ordinance, or for amendments thereto, to be voted upon at any succeeding general election; and should such proposition receive a majority of the votes cast thereon at such election, such ordinance shall be repealed or amended, accordingly."

The accompanying referendum amendment provides: "No ordinance passed by the city council (except when otherwise required by the general laws of the state or the provisions of the charter, respecting street improvements, and except an ordinance for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, which contains a statement of its urgency, and is passed by a two-thirds vote of the council, but no grant of any franchise shall be construed to be an urgency measure, but all franchises shall be subject to the referendary vote herein provided for), shall go into effect before thirty days from the time of its final passage and its approval by the mayor." It is further provided therein that a protest against such ordinance filed during said thirty days, signed by electors equal in number to at least seven per cent of such vote, shall have the effect of suspending the ordinance from going into operation and require the council

to reconsider the same, and, if that body does not entirely repeal it, submit it to the electors at a general or special election, the ordinance to go into effect or not as the majority of the electors voting thereon shall decide.

While no question as to the validity of the referendum amendment is directly involved here, we have briefly set forth its provisions, as the two amendments are simply part of one general plan or scheme looking to a more direct control of local legislation by the people of the city, and, so far as the principal objections here made are concerned, must stand or fall together. Those objections go to the question of the validity, under the provisions of the constitution of the United States and our own constitution and laws, of any provision in a municipal charter which authorizes the electors of the municipality to participate directly in the enacting of local laws. These two amendments, the initiative and the referendum, have the same effect in this respect. In each, it is the vote of the electors at the ballotbox that finally determines whether or not a proposed measure shall be a law at all, and it can make no difference in principle whether the proposition originates with electors or with the council. In each, the electors by their vote at the ballot-box directly exercise legislative power. By these amendments the electors are, except in certain specified cases, given an effectual veto power as to all ordinances approved by the council, and are clothed with authority paramount to that of the council to directly enact such local legislation as they may deem expedient, where the council declines to enact the same.

The charter provision relative to the initiative, which is substantially similar to recently enacted provisions in the charters of other municipalities of the state, is vigorously attacked by counsel for petitioner and other attorneys appearing as amici curia, who claim to see in this curbing of the power of the ordinary legislative body of the city, this vesting in the electors of a municipality the power to enact measures which the legislative body refuses to approve, a violation of our own constitution, and a forbidden departure from the republican form of government guaranteed by the constitution of the United Staten.

The latter objection may appropriately be first considered. Its sole foundation is section 4 of article IV of the constitution of the United States, which is as follows: "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence." The contention here is, necessarily, that any attempt by a state to provide for a direct exercise of legislative power by the people, instead of by representatives of the people elected or appointed for that purpose, is, even in purely local affairs, inconsistent with the republican form of government guaranteed by this provision, and ineffectual for any purpose, the theory being that such provision requires a purely representative form of government not only in the state itself, but also in all its subdivisions, leaving no vestige of power of direct legislation in the people themselves.

If we assume that this claim presents a judicial question rather than a political one to be determined by the Congress of the United States (see, however, Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, [20 Sup. Ct. 1009]), we are brought to a consideration of the question as to what was meant by this guarantee of a republican form of government. For all the purposes of this proceeding, it is sufficient to hold, as we do, that it does not prohibit the direct exercise of legislative power by the people of a subdivision of a state in strictly local affairs. In saying this, we do not wish to be understood as intimating that the people of a state may not reserve the supervisory control as to general state legislation afforded by the initiative and referendum, without violating this provision of the federal constitution. That they may do so has been decided by the supreme court of Oregon in the case of Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, [74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222], which appears to be the only case in which that question has been directly presented. (See, also, Hopkins v. City of Duluth, 81 Minn. 189, [83 N. W. 536].) However this may be, it is clear that the direct participation of the electors of subdivisions of a state in legislation as to local affairs was never intended to be prohibited by the framers of the federal constitution, or the

states adopting the same, and that such power has been exercised by them, where not inconsistent with provisions of their state constitution, in innumerable instances, from the institution of our government to the present day, without interference of any kind on the part of the federal government.

As is universally recognized by courts and writers on constitutional law, it must be assumed that there was nothing in any of the forms of government prevailing in the various states at the time of the adoption of the constitution that was violative of the provisions under discussion. Discussing this question, and speaking of the forms of government then existing in the various states, the supreme court of the United States said, in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 175, 176; "These governments the constitution did not change. They were accepted precisely as they were, and it is, therefore, to be presumed that they were such as it was the duty of the states to provide. Thus we have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form within the meaning of that term as employed in the constitution." It is unnecessary to here do more than to refer to the widely known and well-recognized form of local government that prevailed in several of the states at the time of the adoption of the constitution, known as the New England town government, under which all the inhabitants in town meeting directly exercised such legislative power as was essential to the conduct of local affairs. No difference material to the objection under discussion is to be found in the fact that they did this in public meeting, rather than by secret ballot at the polls, as under the provision before us. The objection here made is that, under the republican form of goverment guaranteed by the federal constitution, such power cannot be directly exercised by the people, and, so far as that objection is concerned, if the people may legislate directly in town meeting, they may do so by their votes at the polls. The constitutional provision was framed and adopted with full knowledge of this system of local government that then obtained in four of the states, and that system was continued under the constitution, without any question as to its validity. It is still to be found not only in several of the New England states, but also in other states (see 1 Bryce's American Commonwealth, pp. 594, 601, 605; 1 Dillon on Municipal Corpora