N. Y. Supp. 76, 79, 97 App. Div. 163; Bernhart v. Brown, 118 N. C. 700, 24 S. E. 527, 715, 36 L. R. A. 402; Sullivant v. Weaver, 10 Ohio, 278; Sloan v. Thompson, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 419, 23 S. W. 613; Pool v. Lamon (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 363; Bassett v. Sherrod, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 327, 35 S. W. 312; American Building Assoc. v. Matthews, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 425, 35 S. W. 690; Kilmer v. Brown, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 420, 67 S. W. 1090; Byrnes v. Sampson, 74 Tex. 79, 11 S. W. 1073; Talliaferro v. Butler, 77 Tex. 578, 14 S. W. 191; Hardy v. Beatty, 84 Tex. 562, 31 Am. St. Rep. 80, 19 S. W. 778; Kane v. Rock River Canal Co., 15 Wis. 179; Truesdell v. Rhodes, 26 Wis. 215; Gray v. Gates, 37 Wis. 614; Bennett v. Fenton, 41 Fed. 283, 10 L. R. A. 500; Porter Land etc. Co. v. Baskin, 43 Fed. 323; Morris v. Graham, 51 Fed. 53; Bickell v. Farrell, 82 Fed. 220; Ormsby v. Ottman, 85 Fed. 492, 29 C. C. A. 295; Morrison v. Marker, 93 Fed. 692; Connor v. Tennessee etc. Ry. Co., 109 Fed. 931, 48 C. C. A. 730, 54 L. R. A. 687; Johnson v. Hunter, 127 Fed. 219; York County Sav. Bank v. Abbot, 131 Fed. 984; Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137; United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 320; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 727, 734; Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. etc. Co., 130 U. S. 559, 9 Sup. Ct. 603; Mellen v. Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352, 9 Sup. Ct. 781; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557; Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 10 Sup. Ct. 554; Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404, 15 Sup. Ct. 124; Lynch v. Murphy, 161 U. S. 247, 16 Sup. Ct. 523; Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 16 Sup. Ct. 585; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 20 Sup. Ct. 410; Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 221, 20 Sup. Ct. 603; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 24 Sup. Ct. 390.) The statute is not unconstitutional. All presumptions favor its validity. (Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 180; University of California v. Lernard, 57 Cal. 612; People v. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111, 17 Am. St. Rep. 211, 23 Pac. 1, 7 L. R. A. 348; Bates v. Gregory, 89 Cal. 394, 26 Pac. 891; In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 307, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, 28 Pac. 272, 675; Woodward v. Fruitvale Dist., 99 Cal. 554, 34 Pac. 239; De Yoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476, 98 Am. St. Rep. 73, 74 Pac. 28; In re Finley, 1 Cal. App. 198, 81 Pac. 1041; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992, 1257; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 426, 22 Sup. Ct. 425; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 609, 23 Sup. Ct. 168; Cooley on Con

stitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 252.) There is no want of due process of law, by reason of constructive notice therein provided for. (Hahn v. Kelley, 34 Cal. 391, 417, 94 Am. Dec. 742; Eitel v. Foote, 39 Cal. 439; Arnold v. Kahn, 67 Cal. 472, 8 Pac. 36; Crall v. Poso Irr. Dist., 87 Cal. 140, 147, 26 Pac. 797; Otis v. Dargan, 53 Ala. 178; Martin v. King, 72 Ala. 354; Hurlburt v. Thomas, 55 Conn. 181, 3 Am. St. Rep. 343, 10 Atl. 556; Bertrand v. Taylor, 87 Ill. 235; Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321; Quarl v. Abbett, 102 Ind. 233, 52 Am. Rep. 662, 1 N. E. 476; Essig v. Lower, 120 Ind. 239, 21 N. E. 1090; Mason v. Messenger, 17 Iowa, 261; Burlington etc. R. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312, 31 Am. St. Rep. 473, 48 N. W. 98, 12 L. R. A. 436; Gilchrist v. Schmeidling, 12 Kan. 262; Burnam v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 210; Covington etc. R. R. Co. v. Bowler, 9 Bush, 468; Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A. 433; Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 64 Am. St. Rep. 301, 49 N. E. 652, 40 L. R. A. 127; Shepherd v. Ware, 46 Minn. 179, 24 Am. St. Rep. 212, 48 N. W. 773; Corson v. Shoemaker, 55 Minn. 386, 57 N. W. 134; State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571, 89 N. W. 175, 57 L. R. A. 297; United States Trust Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 18 N. Y. 200; Happy v. Mosher, 48 N. Y. 313; People v. Essex County, 70 N. Y. 228; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557; Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 10 Sup. Ct. 554; Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. etc. Co., 130 U. S. 559, 9 Sup. Ct. 603; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 570; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed. 299.) The legislature has power to establish new remedies, or to change common-law remedies, or establish special proceedings, without violating the principle of "due process of law." (Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 292; Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812; People v. Essex County, 70 N. Y. 228; Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 20 Sup. Ct. 890, 1009; Iowa R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 16 Sup. Ct. 344; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 663; Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 289, 2 Sup. Ct. 569.) The requirement or non-requirement of an affidavit of diligence is discretionary with the legislature, and is not involved in "due process of law." No constitutional requirement provides that any fact shall be proved by affidavit. Affidavits of diligence are not required in this state for publi

cation against non-residents. (Anderson v. Goff, 72 Cal. 65, 1 Am. St. Rep. 34, 13 Pac. 73; Furnish v. Mullan, 76 Cal. 648, 18 Pac. 854.) Where no affidavit is required the plaintiff cannot shut his eyes against the means of knowledge of claimants, and treat them as unknown, where reasonable inquiry would ascertain the fact of known claimants, and the duty of such inquiry with ordinary diligence makes the distinction between known and unknown claimants a fair one. (Shepherd v. Ware, 46 Minn. 174, 24 Am. St. Rep. 212, 48 N. W. 773; State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571, 89 N. W. 175; Tricker v. Wells, 12 Vt. 240; Moore v. Quint, 44 Vt. 97; Farnham v. Thomas, 56 Vt. 35.) An "unknown" party must be unknown to all of the plaintiffs. (Kane v. Rock River Canal Co., 15 Wis. 179; Jeffreys' Heirs v. Hand's Heirs, 7 Dana (Ky.) 89.) Ignorance of name must be real and not feigned. (Rosencrantz v. Rozen, 40 Cal. 489.) The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. (Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 143.) The judgment, where the statute prescribes no affidavit of diligence, involves an adjudication that the case was a proper one for constructive service. (Sloan v. Thompson, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 419, 23 S. W. 613, and cases cited; 87 Am. St. Rep. 363, note.) There is no "administrative proceeding" here involved; but the adjudication provided for by the statute in question is an adjudication in a "judicial proceeding," after an opportunity afforded to all claimants to be heard, and is "due process of law" in that regard, although there may be no appearance of adverse parties and no actual controversy. (Robbins v. City of Chicago, 4 Wall. 672; In re Pacific Ry. Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 12 Sawy. 559; Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 10 Sup. Ct. 478; People v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 68 Am. St. Rep. 175, 52 N. E. 910, 44 L. R. A. 801; Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A. 433; State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571, 89 N. W. 175; Worthen v. Ratcliffe, 42 Ark. 330; 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed., 735.) Even ex parte proceedings in courts may involve the exercise of judicial power, though there is no controversy. (In re La Societe Francaise, 123 Cal. 525, 56 Pac. 458; Code Civ. Proc., secs. 1227, 12751279, 1723, 1811; Bruce v. Fox, 1 Dana (Ky.) 447; McAllister v. Hamlin, 83 Cal. 361, 23 Pac. 357; Stevens v. Truman, 127 Cal. 155, 59 Pac. 397; Charles Greer's Son v. Salas, 31 Fed.

106; In re An Alien, 7 Hill, 137; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.) Special proceedings, as well as actions, are judicial proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 20-22, 30.) Any legal application to a court of justice seeking a remedy which the law affords is a judicial proceeding. (Evans v. Evans, 105 Ind. 204, 5 N. E. 24, 718; State v. Newell, 13 Mont. 302, 34 Pac. 28; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 761; Martin v. Simpkins, 20 Cal. 438, 38 Pac. 1092.) Proceedings in rem are usually non-controversial judicial proceedings. (Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 21; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 87 Am. St. Rep. 98, 67 Pac. 282; Good v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552, 63 Am. St. Rep. 145, 51 Pac. 681; Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 79 Am. St. Rep. 100, 61 Pac. 914.) Judicial proceedings against "unknown claimants" are recognized in the statutes of this state. (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 749 et seq., 753 et seq., 814 et seq., 1664; Pol. Code, sec. 3635 et seq.; Stats. 1897, 30; 1899, 106.) Judicial proceedings in rem or in that nature are also fully recognized. (Lower Kings River Dist. v. McCullah, 124 Cal. 174, 175, 56 Pac. 887; Reclamation Dist. v. Sels, 117 Cal. 164, 166, 49 Pac. 131; In re Tracey, 136 Cal. 385, 69 Pac. 20; In re De Leon, 102 Cal. 541, 36 Pac. 864; In re Barton, 93 Cal. 463, 29 Pac. 36.) Judgments in rem bind all persons who might have been parties anywhere in the world. (State v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 233, 81 Am. Dec. 118; Kearney v. Kearney, 72 Cal. 591, 15 Pac. 769; Wm. Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48 Pac. 323; In re Blythe, 110 Cal. 234, 42 Pac. 643; Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457; Rialto Irr. Dist. v. Brandon, 103 Cal. 387, 37 Pac. 484; Crall v. Poso Irr. Dist., 87 Cal. 140, 26 Pac. 797; Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 336, 337, 41 Pac. 458; Scarf v. Aldrich, 97 Cal. 360, 33 Am. St. Rep. 190, 32 Pac. 324; State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571, 89 N. W. 175; Castrique v. Imrie, 4 H. L. 414, 429; Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N. E. 160; Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503; Freeman on Judgments, ch. 28; Chand. on Res Adjudicata, ch. 8.) The act violates no principle of uniformity of operation, and is not special legislation. It is sufficient that it provides for a distinct class of proceedings, suitable to the nature of the case and applicable to all cases and persons standing in the same intrinsic category. (Abell v. Clark, 84 Cal. 230, 24 Pac. 383; Escondido High School Dist. v. Seminary, 130 Cal. 128, 136, 62 Pac. 408; Potwin v. Johnson, 108 Ill.

70; Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 88 Am. St. 357, 61 N. E. 851; McAurich v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa, 338.) The question whether a more general law could be made applicable is matter of legislative discretion and judgment, not open to the courts. (People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 499, 15 Am. St. Rep. 66, 22 Pac. 851; People v. Mallender, 132 Cal. 217, 64 Pac. 299.) Rules of practice made generally applicable to a class of special cases are within the legislative control and not violative of the restriction against special legislation regulating the practice of courts of justice. (McDonald v. Conniff, 99 Cal. 386, 390, 34 Pac. 71; Boggs v. Ganeard, 148 Cal. 712, 722, 84 Pac. 195, 199; Cramer v. Tuttle, 72 Cal. 12, 12 Pac. 869; De Yoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476, 98 Am. St. Rep. 73, 74 Pac. 28; Jensen v. Fricke, 133 Ill. 171, 24 N. E. 515, 516.) The statute has a limited and temporary operation in a case of emergency, and that is a sufficient ground for special classification. (Flynn v. Little Falls, 74 Minn. 180, 78 N. W. 166; Alexander v. Duluth, 77 Minn. 445, 80 N. W. 623, 624; Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112.) The title of the act is not objectionable. (De Yoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 472, 98 Am. St. Rep. 73, 74 Pac. 28.)

Gaillard Stoney, John J. Lermen, John Garber, Amicus Curia, Page, McCutchen & Knight, Amici Curia, A. E. Bolton, C. S. Farquar, and William B. Beaizley, Amici Curia, for Respondent.

The act in question violates the provisions of the state and federal constitutions requiring "due process of law" to divest the citizen of his property rights. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 506.) The nature and not the name of the proceeding is to be considered on the question of "due process of law." (Brown v. Board of Levee Comrs., 50 Miss. 468, 480; State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756, 47 N. E. 551.) The nature of the proceeding called for by the act is that of an action to establish and quiet title to real property, which is not in rem, but rather in personam, or, at most, quasi in rem, in which only parties and privies to the action are concluded. (Black on Judgments, sec. 793; Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 188, 7 Sup. Ct. 165; Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466, 475; McDonald v. McCoy, 121 Cal. 55,