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take the refreshment before stated, and that he was on his return to his house as before stated, and had in no manner otherwise deviated from the straight and continued course of his aforesaid return: and that his object in selecting the house aforesaid for obtaining such necessary refreshment, in preference to any more remote from his path, was to obviate any question as affecting his privilege aforesaid, by the least deviation from his right course: and the deponent believed Mr. Allen was well aware of the deponent being on his return home from his duty in the House of Lords, Mr. Allen having admitted to that effect to the deponent at the time, and alleged as his justification for such arrest, that the deponent had gone into the said house: And the deponent thereupon gave him notice that he should apply to the Lord Chancellor for his discharge, on the ground of such violation of his the said deponent's privilege as aforesaid, and on the following day he the deponent gave a similar notice to Mr. Kensit, the solicitor of the said defendants: and that he the deponent was the only person employed as such agent on behalf of the said Wm. Farran, as in the said deponent's former affidavit mentioned, he the said deponent having been, for many years before such appeal, the solicitor and agent of Wm. Farran, and having exclusively received all the instructions from him touching the said appeal, and corresponded with him and his partner Mr. Hunter on the occasion, and having also exclusively attended the said two hearings, and paid all the fees thereupon out of his own pocket.

On the 14th April the Lord Chancellor, upon hearing the above two affidavits read, ordered, that the said George Watkins be discharged out of the custody of the Warden of the Fleet, unless the defendants, having notice hereof, shall, on Saturday the 15th April instant, at the sitting of the Court, show unto his Lordship good cause to the contrary.

On the 15th April it was moved before the Vice-Chan

cellor that this order might be made absolute. Other affidavits were filed, both on the part of Watkins and the defendants; but the facts as stated above were not thereby materially varied.

Mr. Bethell, for the defendants, insisted that the application to discharge ought to be made to the House of Lords; List's case, 2 Vesey and Beames, 373:-that Watkins not having taken out his certificate was entitled to no privilege; and that if he were, the going into the house in Dover Street put an end to it.

Mr. Cooper, for Watkins. The party arrested may apply either to the tribunal in which the proceeding is depending that confers the privilege, or to the tribunal out of which the process issues upon which the arrest takes place; Walker v. Webb, 3 Anstruther, 941; Randall v. Gurney, 1 Chitty, 679; S. C. 3 Barnewall and Alderson, 252; Ricketts v. Gurney, 1 Chitty, 682; S. C. 7 Price, 699; List's case is also reported, 2 Rose, 24. It is plain Lord Eldon was at a loss to know why the judge had not directed the discharge. If parliament had been prorogued the next day Watkins must remain in custody until next session. A parliamentary agent need not be a solicitor. The orders of the House of Lords do not require that the gentlemen conducting business before it should be solicitors. Some most extensive Scotch and Irish agents, it is said, are not solicitors. But, supposing this were a proceeding before a Court, in which it would be requisite that Mr. Watkins should be a solicitor, the absence of the certificate is no ground for denying the privilege, which is for the benefit, not of the legal adviser, but of the client. The certificate is a mere fiscal regulation, an expedient for raising revenue; an omission to take it out is visited with a penalty of 50l. and an incapacity to sue for fees; 25 George 3, c. 80, and more recent acts; Welch v. Pribble, 1 Dowling and Ryland, 215, and many other similar cases. Besides, it is immaterial in what character Watkins attended, provided he was there

for the bonâ fide purpose of assisting one of the parties. The privilege is not confined to solicitors, it embraces barristers going the circuit. It would protect any one of us coming from Lincoln's Inn to Westminster Hall, although not if directing our steps to one of the Club Houses. Who can doubt that a solicitor's clerk, entrusted with the management of a cause, would have the benefit of it? His presence is often more important than that of the solicitor himself. Witnesses, although served with no subpoena to testify, may claim the privilege. It comprises attendances for various quasi judicial purposescreditors attending to prove debts before Commissioners of Bankrupt this was not so formerly, but Lord Eldon thought it good policy to enlarge the rule-petitioning creditor attending a meeting in bankruptcy to watch proceedings. The principle is to give every facility to the effective administration of justice; and a man of science (as in patent cases), a friend, a steward, a servant, ought to be privileged, although not subpoenaed, if it can be shown they were present for the purposes of the trial; Brooke's Abridgment, Privileges, 1, 6, 40. Such was the old law; but in our days no privilege such as there described is requisite; Meekins v. Smith, 1 H. Blackstone, 636. There has been no deviation such as can cancel the privilege; Lightfoot v. Cameron, 2 W. Blackstone, 1113; Sidgier v. Birch, 9 Vesey, 69; Pitt v. Coomes, 5 Barnewall and Adolphus, 1078.

Watkins was discharged.

The ensuing account of the prior proceedings in this cause will, it is thought, be found useful:

On the 3d December, 1833, the above-mentioned information was filed at the relation of one Henry Milne. On the 30th January, 1834, an order was made by the ViceChancellor, upon an affidavit that Milne was a waterman Poor relator and fellowship porter earning only 3s. or 4s. a-day, that must give secuhe should procure security for costs, and that the defend

rity for costs.

under the cir-
cumstances

whether solicitor
authorized to
use relator's

name, although

ants should have a month's time to plead, answer, or demur, after such security given.

Mr. Watkins was the solicitor who filed the information, and pending a correspondence on the subject of the security the defendants were told by Milne that the information had been filed without his directions or knowledge; whereupon a notice of motion was given, that the information might be taken off the file, as having been filed without the knowledge or authority of the said Henry Milne ; and that the costs of the defendants of and incidental to the information and to the order of the ViceChancellor of the 30th January, 1834, and of that application, might be ordered to be paid by Mr. Watkins; and that Mr. Watkins might be ordered to answer the matters contained in the affidavits to be read in support of such application, or that it might be referred to the AttorneyGeneral to consider and report to the Court whether, under the circumstances, the information ought to be taken off the file, and if so, by whom the costs ought to be paid.

On the part of Watkins there were affidavits tending to show authority from Milne, who besides made an affidavit retracting and explaining what he had said to the defendants; but upon the whole, the fact of any previous auIssue directed thority was doubtful. And on the 28th July, 1834, the Vice-Chancellor ordered the parties to proceed to a trial at law upon the following issue," whether Henry Milne authorized George Watkins to use his name as relator in such telator af- this information." From this order there was an appeal knowledged the to Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, who, on the 18th March, 1835, after some hesitation, affirmed it. On 4th December, 1835, the issue was tried, when the jury found in the affirmative of it; but in the course of the trial it transpired, that on the 2nd December, 1833, Watkins had written to Milne a letter to this effect:-"In consequence of your having authorized me to use your name as relator any information or other proceeding against any of the

terwards ac

authority.

in

corporations or chartered companies which may prove necessary for the redress of abuses reported by the Parliamentary Commissioners, I hereby engage to indemnify you against any costs that may be incurred in respect thereof."

relator an in

the file. Costs

In January, 1836, a notice of motion, founded on this letter, was served, and on the 21st March, 1836, it was ordered, that notwithstanding the verdict of the jury Solicitor giving given on the trial on the 4th December, 1835, the infor- demnity, information should be taken off the file, and that the costs of mation taken off the Attorney-General and of the defendants of and occasioned by the information of the several orders of the 30th January, 1834, and the 28th July, 1834, and the 18th connected with March, 1835, and of and occasioned by the trial and that application, should be paid by the relator, Milne, and Watkins, the solicitor filing the information.

of

of the informa

tion and of other proceedings

it ordered to be

paid by the rela

tor and the soli

citer.

a party to the

suit,

The costs were taxed at the sum of 2761. 3s. 6d. Milne having undergone the usual process, sought the benefit of the Insolvent Act (a). Upon this the defendants proceeded against Watkins. On the 21st November, 1836, he was Mode of proceeding to compersonally served with a copy of the order of the 21st pel payment of March, 1836, and also with a copy of the Master's report costs by one not or certificate of the costs; and the original order and an office copy of the report or certificate were at the same time exhibited to him, and payment was demanded in virtue of a letter of attorney under the common seal of the Skinners' Company. And on the 9th December, 1836, upon affidavit of these facts, and of service of a notice of motion upon Watkins, it was ordered, that Watkins, the solicitor filing the said information, should, within a fortnight after service of that order, pay to the defendants, the Skinners' Company, the said sum of 2761. 3s. 6d., their taxed costs, pursuant to the order dated 21st March, 1836, and in default thereof it was ordered that he should stand committed to his Majesty's prison of the Fleet. The

(a) Nadin v. Battie, 5 East, 146; S. C. 1 Smith, 362,

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