and that he did, on the said 18th of June, personally serve the said Thomas Cooper with the said report made in these causes by the Master, dated the 6th of June instant, whereby the Master certified, that in pursuance of the said order, he had been attended by the solicitors for the aforesaid petitioners and for the said Mr. Brooks, and in their presence had considered the costs of the said Mr. Brooks on the said petition being dismissed with costs, and the bill of such costs, amounting to the sum of 1521. 17s. 10d., he had taxed at the sum of 122l. 9s. 8d., by delivering to and leaving with the said Thomas Cooper a true copy of the said report, and at the same time producing to the said Thomas Cooper an office-copy of the said report, which had been duly filed at the Report Office: and that at the time of serving the said order and report as aforesaid, he did produce and show to the said Thomas Cooper a power of attorney under the hand and seal of the said Mr. Brooks, and dated the same 18th of June instant, by which said power of attorney the said Mr. Brooks did make, ordain, authorize, constitute, and appoint the said deponent his true and lawful attorney, for him and in his name and to his use, to ask, demand, and receive of and from the said plaintiff Sangar, and the said Thomas Cooper respectively, the said sum of 1221. 98. 8d., then due to him from the said plaintiff Sangar and the said Thomas Cooper for costs, in pursuance of the said order and report, and upon payment of the said sum, or any part thereof, to make and give receipts, acquittances, and other proper discharges, in the name of him the said Mr. Brooks, for the same, and generally to do and transact any other act, matter, or thing, for the obtaining or receiving the same sum, as fully as he himself could or might do if he were personally present; a copy of which power of attorney the deponent also at the same time delivered to and left with the said Thomas Cooper: and further, that in pursuance of such power and authority, so as aforesaid given to the deponent by the said Mr. Brooks, he the deponent did, at the time of serving the said order and report, and of producing the said power as aforesaid, demand of the said Thomas Cooper payment of the said sum of 1221. 9s. 8d. : and that the said Thomas Cooper then refused to pay the same: and further, that the said plaintiff Sangar, and the said Thomas Cooper had not, nor had either of them since paid the said sum, or any part thereof, to the deponent, (or as the deponent was informed and verily believed,) to the said Mr. Brooks, or to any other person or persons, for the use of the said Mr. Brooks, but that the same still remained wholly due and unpaid. The affidavit then went on to state the personal service of the above notice of motion upon the said Thomas Cooper. On behalf of the said Thomas Cooper, it was objected, that the order of the Vice-Chancellor dismissing the petition of the plaintiff Sangar and the said Thomas Cooper with costs, to be taxed by the Master, did not justify the course, which it appeared that Mr. Brooks was pursuing, of prosecuting Thomas Cooper alone for such costs: that at law, if judgment is recovered against two persons, execution must also be taken out against them both, although the whole amount may be levied upon one. So in equity, the original order being against two persons, the whole of the subsequent process ought to be against both of them, with the exception of the final order to commit, which might be against both or either: that the affidavit of Heritage was defective, inasmuch as it contained no direct evidence, but only an implication that the power of attorney had been executed: that an alleged copy produced in Court showed that, if executed, it had been executed before a witness, whose testimony ought to have been had and further, that the notice of motion was irregular, first in seeking a committal in default of payment within four days, no previous order having specified the time of payment, and indeed no order having been obtained sub sequent to that of the 24th of April, and the Master's report of taxation: and secondly, in asking for costs. The MASTER OF THE ROLLS was of opinion that Mr. Brooks had the option of taking out process against the plaintiff Sangar and the said Thomas Cooper jointly, or against either of them separately; and that the affidavit of Heritage afforded sufficient evidence of the due execution of the power of attorney, the practice of the Court not appearing to require any evidence at all upon that point as a ground for subsequent proceedings (a). His lordship, however, thought that the application to commit in default of payment in four days was premature, and that there must be previously an order fixing a time for payment, as in ordinary cases (b). He also said, that it was unusual to give the costs either of the application limiting the time of payment, or of the application for the four-day order, which follows (c). The order was, that the said Thomas Cooper, solicitor, should within fourteen days pay to the said Mr. Brooks the sum of 1221. 9s. 8d., by the report of the Master, dated the 6th day of June instant, certified to be the sum at which the bill of costs of the said Mr. Brooks had been taxed by the said Master, in pursuance of an order dated the 24th of April, 1838, made in these causes upon a (a) See before, p. 8. Wilkins v. Stevens, 19 Vesey, 117; Re Isaac, L. C. June, 1838. If the ensuing Order be acted upon, the practice of the Equity Exchequer in this respect is different.13th November, 1762. It is ordered by the Court, that for the future, whenever a motion shall be made for an attachment against any person for non-payment of costs, or other money, to any person authorised by letter of attorney to receive the same, an affidavit be produced to the Court of the due execu tion of such letter of attorney; and that this be a standing order of the Court. Kirkby's Rules and Orders, p. 37. (b) Parkins v. Morris, 2 Dickens, 689; Collins v. Crumpe, 3 Maddock, 390. So in the Equity Exchequer, Lamb v. Withers, 1 Younge & Jervis, 453. (c) Peasnall v. Coultart, 1 Keen, 183. petition of the plaintiff Sangar, and of the said Thomas Cooper, on the said petition being dismissed with costs. Mr. Pemberton for the motion, Mr. Cooper against it. Miscellaneous cases as to mode of compelling payment of costs and money by and against persons not parties to the record.-Vickery v. Stocker, 3 Brown C. C. 372; Anon. 14 Vesey, 207; Re Partington, 6 Maddock, 71 ; Hunter v. 6 Simons, 429. In Bowes v. Lord Strathmore, 12 Vesey, 325, where the bill of costs of a solicitor, no party to the suit, had been taxed under an order made therein, it is said that there should be an order for payment, and afterwards an attachment upon that. This, it is apprehended, is erroneous (a); but it has been lately decided, that in such a case the solicitor enjoys the privilege of taking out the order for commitment in default of payment in four days, without being obliged previously to obtain an order fixing a day for payment; Stocken v. Dawson, 7 Simons, 547. (a) Yet it should seem that formerly, and both before and since the passing of the act for the better regulation of attornies and solicitors, 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, the solicitor could in the above case have had an attachment. See the judgment of Lord Hardwicke in Murfy v. Balderston, Barnardiston C. C. 265; S. C. 2 Atkyns, 114. The words of the aforesaid act (sect. 23) are, that upon the taxation and settlement of the attorney or solicitor's bill or demand, "the party or parties shall forthwith pay to the said attorney or solicitor respectively, or to any person by him authorised to receive the same, that shall be present at the said taxation, or otherwise unto such person or persons, or in such manner as the respective Courts aforesaid (the Courts of Westminster Hall, and other Courts specified in the act) shall direct, the whole sum that shall be found to be or remain due thereon, which payment shall be a full discharge of the said bill and demand; and in default thereof the said party or parties shall be liable to an attachment or process of contempt, or such other proceedings at the election of the said attorney or solicitor as such party or parties was or were before liable unto." ATTORNEY-GENERAL V. The Governors of the V. C. March 17, 1837. nagement and the funds of a charters from Queen Elizabeth and Charles the Second. By a charter of Queen Elizabeth, dated 27th July, 1571, Scheme for alafter reciting that her well-beloved subjects, the inhabitants tering the maof the aforesaid then parish of St. Olave Southwark, of disposition of their godly affection and good disposition for the bringing charity having up, education, institution, and instruction of children and younglings of the said parish, at their no little cost, labour, and charge, in laudable order and form, had of late ordained and erected in the aforesaid borough and parish one grammar school, in which children and younglings, as well of the rich as the poor, being inhabitants within the aforesaid parish, were instructed and brought up liberally and prosperously in grammar, in accidence, and other lower books, to the common utility and profit of all the inhabitants of the parish aforesaid, and that the said inhabitants had made humble application to her that the said school might have continual succession; her said majesty, considering not only the premises, but also the good, godly, and laudable intent of the same her subjects in the premises, and entirely desiring as much as in her lay to augment and increase all and singular those things which might any way concern the bringing up and instruction of children and younglings, of her grace, especial certain knowledge and mere motion, willed, granted, and ordained, for herself, her heirs and successors, that the aforesaid school from thenceforth was and should be one grammar school for the bringing up, institution, and instruction of the children and younglings of the parishioners and inhabitants aforesaid, as well in grammar as in accidence and in other lower books and in writing, at all times |