M. R. March 16, 1838. Parties added by supplemental bill where the original bill might have been amended; defendants to the original bill not made parties to the supplemental bill. HESTER LLOYD v. RICHARD RUSSELL and MAR- (Two causes.) ANNE WOODHOUSE, by her will dated the 2d April, 1809, gave her real and personal estates to her six brothers and sisters, Bridgewater Meredith, John Meredith the elder, Thomas Meredith, the defendant Winfred Beavan, the plaintiff, and the defendant Margaret, the wife of the defendant Richard Russell, and the said John Meredith the elder was her trustee and executor. Bridgewater Meredith was her heir-at-law. She died in 1812. John Meredith the elder died in 1823, and Mary Meredith was his executrix. Mary Meredith died in 1825 intestate. Upon her death, the plaintiff procured letters of administration of the estate of Anne Woodhouse left unadministered by John Meredith the elder. Bridgewater Meredith died in 1821; the defendant Emma Sherrin was his personal representative. Thomas Meredith was also dead. The defendant R. Russell was a solicitor, and he had in that character been employed both by John Meredith the elder and Mary Mcredith to receive and pay monies and to transact business in respect of Anne Woodhouse's estate. The original bill was filed to have the trusts of Anne Woodhouse's will, so far as the same were still unperformed, carried into effect; and it prayed, amongst other things, an account of the defendant R. Russell's receipts and payments, and a taxation of his bill of costs, and that he might be restrained from taking any proceedings at law to recover it. The bill stated that the real estates of Anne Woodhouse had been sold: that after J. Meredith the elder's death, Mary Meredith arranged with her son, the defendant John Meredith, that he should act on her behalf in the trusts of Anne Woodhouse's will, and that the plaintiff was ignorant whether there was any personal representative of Thomas Meredith, but that she would undertake if requisite to procure letters of administration of his estate, to be granted to some one for the purposes of the suit. There were some passages too in the bill, implying that the defendant John Meredith either was, or was to be looked upon, as the personal representative of John Meredith the elder. As regarded the defendant R. Russell, the bill insisted that he had come to no account of his receipts and payments, and that the greater part of his bill of costs ought not to be allowed: and it charged collusion between him and the defendant John Meredith. The answer of the defendants Russell and wife denied that the defendant John Meredith was the personal representative of John Meredith the elder, and it objected that there was no personal representative either of John Meredith the elder or Mary Meredith before the Court: that a personal representative of Thomas Meredith was necessary, and that the heir-at-law of Bridgewater Meredith, who was the heir-at-law of Anne Woodhouse, ought to be a defendant. With respect to that part of the bill which related to the defendant R. Russell as a solicitor, the answer insisted that his receipts and payments had not been of a kind that he ought to be called upon in this Court for an account. The bill of costs, it was contended, was fair. Upon the hearing of the cause (there was no evidence), it appeared, that since the above answer was put in, letters of administration of the estate of John Meredith the elder unadministered by Mary Meredith had been taken out, and that letters of administration of the estates of Mary Meredith and Thomas Meredith had been procured, and that a supplemental bill had been filed with the view of supplying the defects in the first constitution of the suit occasioned by the want of these respective letters of administration. The heir-at-law of Bridgewater Meredith was also brought before the Court by such supplemental bill: but the defendants Russell and wife were not made parties to the said supplemental bill, and they had no notice of the existence of any supplemental suit until the aforesaid objections for want of parties had been put forward as reasons for adjourning the cause. On the behalf of the defendants Russell and wife, it was submitted, that it was contrary to the usual course of the Court to permit a supplemental bill when the end might be attained by amendment: that although the plaintiff, by reason of the several letters of administration, bearing date since the original bill was filed, might perhaps have an option of curing the defect arising out of the absence of personal representatives of John Meredith the elder, Mary Meredith, and Thomas Meredith, by a supplemental bill, yet that the heir-at-law of Bridgewater Meredith ought at all events to have been made a party by amendment of the original bill: that supposing however this could be permitted, yet that the other defendants ought to have been made defendants to the supplemental bill; at any rate, the defendant R. Russell ought to have been a party to it: that no account against him, no taxation of his bill of costs, could be had in a cause where there was present no personal representative either of John Meredith the elder or Mary Meredith, who alone had employed him; and that the supplemental bill possibly contained matters which it might be important for his counsel to be acquainted with. The MASTER OF THE ROLLS thought that the plaintiff's mode of proceeding was not irregular, and pronounced a decree dismissing the bill (for reasons urged in the answer) so far as it sought an account as against the defendant R. Russell, but directing an inquiry under what circumstances his bill of costs had been taxed, such taxation having been finished since the answer was put in. The decree also directed accounts of the real and personal estates of Anne Woodhouse. Mr. Pemberton and Mr. Anderdon for the plaintiff. Mr. Cooper and Mr. Russell for the defendants Russell and wife. See Bignall v. Atkins, 6 Maddock, 369; Greenwood v. Atkinson, 5 Simons, 419. See further Jones v. Jones, 3 Atkyns, 217; also Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 Peere Williams, 349; and Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Molloy, 312. ATTORNEY-GENERAL V. MILLS and others. M. R. August 4, 6, 1838. an end to she attachment non-payment of On the 14th March, 1838, it was ordered that the de- Mode of putting fendants should pay into Court, to the credit of the cause, riff's liability the sum of 7357. 18s. 6d. ; that order not having been before return of complied with, the said defendants were taken by the where he has taken parties for sheriff upon a writ of attachment, but were suffered by contempt in him to go out of his custody upon giving bail. The re- money and let lators having intimated that the sheriff by this course had them go at large on bail. rendered himself liable both for the above sum and all costs of the contempt for non-payment, several applications were made to the Court prior to the return of the attachment, with the view of terminating such liability; and eventually, on the 4th August, 1838, it was ordered that the defendants should be at liberty to pay the said sum of 7351. 18s. 6d. into the Bank with the privity of the Accountant-General of the Court, to the credit of the aforesaid cause, subject to the further order of the Court: and thereupon, and the said defendants having made a deposit of twenty pounds in the hands of the sheriff for or in respect of the relator's costs of and occasioned by the said defendants not paying the said sum of 7357.18s. 6d. into the Bank as directed by the order made in the said cause, dated the 14th day of March, 1838, that the said defendants should be immediately discharged out of custody as to their contempt. Mr. Pemberton and Mr. Cooper for the several parties. See Levett v. Letteney, Beames on Costs, 352; Solly v. Greathead, ibid. 353; S. C. Anon. 11 Vesey, 170; Collard v. Hare, 5 Simons, 10. M. R. June 22, 1838. How payment of costs en forced by and against persons not parties to the suit. Order against two persons jointly to pay costs: the process for giving it effect may be joint of several. SANGAR and others v. GARDINER and others. (Two causes.) ON the 24th April, 1838, the petition presented in these causes (see before, p. 119,) by the plaintiff Sangar and Thomas Cooper (who was no party to either cause) was dismissed by the Vice-Chancellor with costs, to be taxed by the Master. On the 22d June, 1838, a motion was made before the Master of the Rolls on behalf of Mr. Brooks, (he also was not a party,) that the said Thomas Cooper might, within four days after service of the order Not the prac to be made thereon, be ordered to pay to the said Mr. tice to prove the Brooks the sum of 1221. 9s. 8d., by the report of the Master, dated the 6th day of June instant, certified to be the sum at which the bill of costs of the said Mr. Brooks had been taxed by the said Master in pursuance of the said order, dated the 24th of April, 1838; or that in order fixing time default of payment of the said sum within such time, the said Thomas Cooper might stand committed; and that the said Thomas Cooper might be ordered to pay the costs of that application. execution of the power of at'torney to receive costs as a foundation for the succeeding process. No costs of for payment, nor of order to commit in default. The said notice of motion was supported by the affidavit of George Heritage, stating that he did on the 18th day of June instant personally serve the said Thomas Cooper with the said order made in these causes by the Vice-Chancellor, dated the 24th of April, 1838, by delivering to and leaving with the said Thomas Cooper a true copy of the said order, and at the same time producing to him the original order duly passed and entered: |