Now, we would ask, does this look like a fundamental law of nature, either in its number or expression? The laws, for instance, of astronomical science with all its endless combinations of movement amid "suns and planets and adamantine spheres," are reducible, we know, to four. Shall we then have thirtyseven as the lowest limit of those in Political Economy? Or again to look at the expression of this law. Passing by the singular self-contradiction involved in making "increased facility" of obtaining food a necessary result of cultivating "inferior soils;" what we would ask, entitles such language to be termed a "law." Is it not rather an argument? a statement? a process any thing in short, rather than a primary law of science? A final benefit (to conclude our long critique on the form) that would follow the course we advise, would be making these subjects not only more accessible and more readable (we mean in point of time) but the science itself more popular by bringing it into greater accordance with the common sense of an active, thinking community like our own. Nothing, we are well persuaded, tends so much to expose Political Economy to the sneers of practical men as its multiplicity of words about simple propositions. The public will bear a volume upon the subject of currency, or the best mode of maintaining the poor or correcting the vicious, since these are real questions, involving many complex considerations, and mistakes upon them lead to grievous evil; while from metaphysical abstractions and fussing about terms, and heralding of propositions, which when cleared from their puzzle of words, turn out to be the mere truisms of childhood—from such, men of simple good sense turn aside; and argue naturally, though wrongfully, against the science itself from the language in which it is clothed. For our part, we would advocate precision of language, but not preciseness, and are more inclined to attribute the inconclusiveness of such disquisitions in the hands of most writers to their defective logic, rather than their defective terms. If this be heresy, it is still not without "prima facie " evidence in its favor. The ablest and most conclusive writer on these subjects, (we mean Adam Smith) is unquestionably also the least careful in his language. The truth seems to be that the objects of thought in these and kindred subjects are rather to be comprehended in their essence than seen in their limits, and that consequently, all attempts to pare them down to a precise and certain shape, is but a fanciful operation on our own individual conceptions, and not only individual but transient: by chance alone can others be brought to view the term in the same light, and even to ourselves it changes so soon as we change what may be termed the posture of our minds; and hence unquestionably those vacillations of opinion visible in the successive works of modern economists, who labor after this false technicality, "spinning the thread of their logic finer than the staple of their argument." Such fancied pictures of a perfect science are to be classed among the "Idola Theatri" of which Bacon speaks-pictorial representations of an ideal world, beautiful if true, and satisfactory if enduring, but lasting only while the vision lasts, and destined in the twinkling of an eye to be superceded by some newer version of the same fanciful elements, into some still more ingenious and engaging form. But we proceed at length to the more direct examination of our author's opinions. They may be stated as follows: and with a view to their more distinct apprehension, as peculiar and individual, we will place against them, in parallel column, those generally received in the science. CAREY. 1. Labor is the sole source of value, whether in products or land without exception. RICARDO, SENIOR, &c. 1. Labor is the sole source of value in products, under certain exceptions, but not in land, which has intrinsic value from nature. 2. Rent is but another name 2. Rent is a payment distinct for interest of the capital invest- from interest of capital laid out ed, in making land productive: on land, and is paid for the use there is no payment, having re- of the inherent powers of the ference to the soil itself. soil. 3. Profits of capital advance with the progress of society. 3. Profits of capital decrease with the progress of society. 4. The share of the landholder 4. The share of the landholder is greater in the earliest periods is least in the early periods of of society, and disappears with its society, and grows up with its progress. progress. Our limits forbid us to enter at large on the wide field opened to us by these various novel positions; we shall confine ourselves mainly to the first, from which all the rest may be said to flow as corollaries, and this we shall examine with that freedom of judgment of which, as our author sets us the example, he would certainly be the last to complain. "Labor is the sole cause of value." In the maintenance of this sweeping position, Mr. Carey stands, we think, alone among all known writers of the science. McCulloch, Mill and some others go so far as to apply it to all products of human industry, but admit value to the limited and varied gifts of nature, as land, natural talent, &c. Now as we agree not with McCulloch's limited extension of the term, much less can we with our author's unlimited; our objections to the law, as laid down by him, are manifold. First, as to the fundamental principle, can labor be said to be the "cause" of value? if it were so, then labor would give it to useless, as well as useful, products. The dry well, if it cost as much, would equal in value the living spring, and the vessel that would not float be as valuable as one that would. But this is absurd. Value, therefore, presupposes utility; and combined with scarceness, it is utility that is the "cause" of value. What then is the relation that "labor" holds to "value ?" It is evidently that of a "measure," not a "cause." Among existing values, labor gives the measure of exchange. But passing this by as a metaphysical or verbal nicety, and allowing to our author the benefit of this interpretation, we have still to examine another fundamental objection which cannot be explained into a dispute about terms. Is labor the "sole" cause of value? Let us see how this rule holds. "If (to quote the language of Mr. Senior,) while carelessly lounging along the sea shore I were to pick up a pearl, would it have no value? Suppose that I met with it while eating an oyster? Suppose that aerolithes consisted of gold would they have no value ?" Now to such evident exceptions the only answer that can be given is that they are too few and unimportant to deserve notice. This is our author's defence: "These" says he, "are accidents which do not in the slightest degree militate against the assertion that all value is the result of labor. Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every one thousand parts of those annually created are so, and the exceptions are too slight to be deserving of consideration. They are just sufficiently numerous to prove the rule."-p. 138. Agreeing with him in this statement, we necessarily disagree with him in his previous exclusive language, and respectfully suggest whether such self-contradiction be not unfavorable to the reputation of science. One single exception of "value," not the result of labor, should, we think, have led him to modify the language of his fundamental proposition, that labor is the "sole" cause of value. We have thus seen that chance sometimes reaches the same end, that is "value," as labor. Let us now see whether "time" cannot also attain it under the working of unpaid natural agents. "A merchant puts wine into his vaults or lofts to ripen. It remains untouched for five years, and then comes out worth twice as much as when it was laid in." The question is, has that additional value been given to it by labor? The same may be stated of all the unaided operations of nature-the growing value of timber, for instance, whether left standing or laid up to season—or any other case, in short, in which time adds worth to an article. How can these be brought within the rule of labor alone? According to our author, thus: "It is the labor of the subsequent purchaser that has given to the wine its new value, in having had the use and profit of his capital during the period of its ripening." (p. 278.) But this is evidently a fallacy; the wine may prove sour, then what becomes of the new value which these productive funds have, according to our author, been employed in giving. Besides, is it not infinitely absurd to suppose that the same labor and capital which is fully employed in giving value to corn or cloth, is at the same moment occupied in working out new values upon wine, it may be a thousand miles off or in another country. Had our author said that such average profits of employed capital were a "measure" of the new value given to the wine or to any other article of suspended capital, he would, we think, have stated a sound proposition, but such would not have borne out his principle, that labor is the sole "cause" of value. We thus, therefore, arrive at a second class of exceptions, namely, value from time. But is there not a third? Two artists, for instance, take the same portrait, bestowing upon their work an equal amount of paint and labor, yet, when finished, the value of the one is found to be ten times that of the other. How is labor here the sole source of value? Nor is this to be despised as a solitary All arts, all trades, all forms of productive industry, exhibit a similar disparity. Take two workmen of any kind whatever-poets, lawyers, or cobblers, and try whether the value of their respective products be measurable solely by their labor. Do we see it, for instance, in a novel of Scott's, the product of four weeks' industry balancing in exchangeable value the product of as many years with inferior brains, or the labor of an honest cobbler through a long life? Is it not then evident that natural skill and talent is another source of value besides labor? how does our author avoid this most manifest conclusion? By what seems to us an unwarrantable laxity in the meaning of words, "Labor" is no longer with him a simple, appreciable term; it has "quality" in it as well as "quantity," it may be a pound of gold or a pound of lead, so that one day's labor of a case. Now man of genius, by making up in quality what it wants in quantity, is to be set down as an equal amount of labor with the month or year of an inferior class of workmen. This position he has thus embodied (italicized) in his summary of results. (p. 140.) "III. That the value of commodities at the time of production is measured by the quantity and quality of labor required therefor." Now we ask, is not this extension of the term "quality" of labor a needless mystification of a plain subject, and for no other reason gone into, as we think, than to sustain an exclusive proposition which otherwise flies in the face of facts? Our advice is, to let "labor" mean "labor" in Political Economy as in common speech, and to let skill, learning, and talent stand on their own ground, let what will become of the dogmatic and exclusive proposition that "Labor is the sole source of value." But there remains to be yet examined the last and most important exception. Has land no intrinsic value? Our author answers "none." All value in land is due to labor-its returns are the result of labor, and its exchangeable value is measured by the labor past or present, that has been laid out either upon it or near it, in bringing it closer to a market; and the result of all is, that the payment for the use of it hitherto termed "Rent," is but the interest of such invested capital-land having in itself no intrinsic value. Now, this is a bold and novel theory; and one that if true, would rank its author among the greatest discoverers of the science. But we regard it as so radically unsound, that we trust to be able in few words to exhibit to our readers not only the error of fact it involves, but even to the candid mind of our author, the fallacy on which it runs. Not to misstate his argument we quote from one of his frequent repetitions of it: "A person who sees before him two fields possessing equal 'advantages of situation' one of which yields a large Rent, while the other is lying waste, can with difficulty satisfy himself that the value of the first is not due to the superiority of the soil." He asks "If difference of fertility be not the cause of difference of value, why is not one as valuable as the other? We do not contend that equal quantities of labor will give equal value to all land but only that all which exists is due to the labor applied to its improvement. When the first was taken into cultivation it was waste and of no value. Labor has rendered it valuable." (p.134.) And again in a previous passage: "We trust that the reader is satisfied that Rent is only interest for capital invested and that the value of all landed property is due like that of all |