that he had been mistaken, and the next day went into court and retracted his former statement. The other physicians were not satisfied, and to settle the matter sent to a neighboring town and had a leg that had been amputated and buried, exhumed and brought into court, and, on comparing the two specimens, every one was convinced that the bones were not human. This dampened the public ardor somewhat, and it is probable that Jesse would have been discharged, but that on Saturday he made a statement that he believed | Colvin had been murdered, and that his brother Stephen was the murderer. That Stephen had told him the previous winter that he (Stephen) and Colvin were hoeing in what was called the "Glazier lot," that they had a quarrel and Colvin attempted to run away; that he struck him on the back part of the head with a club and fractured his skull; that he (Jesse) did not know what had become of the body, but mentioned several places where it might be found. Whether it was to save himself, or some other consideration, that induced Jesse to make this statement, was never known, but it added immensely to the fuel which was already in a blaze of excitement. The next day, Sunday, nearly all the people for miles around turned out to search for the remains of Colvin. Stumps were overturned, cellar-holes examined and the side of the mountain back of the premises carefully searched, but all to no purpose; nothing resembling human remains was found."

In September following, an indictment was found against both Stephen and Jesse, the principal witness being a man who was confined in the jail with them, and who testified that Jesse made a confession to him. It was said to have been made in the night when Jesse awoke appearing much disturbed.

While they were in jail, they were visited by many persons, and were told by men of character and influence, and by officers of the law, that the case was clearly against them, that to confess was the best thing they could do, and that if they confessed, an attempt would be made to have their sentence commuted. Thereupon, Stephen made a written confession, that he killed Colvin, but claimed that it was done in a quarrel, and that Colvin struck him first. The confession coincided substantially with what circumstantial evidence there was.

The trial took place in November, before Chief Justice Chase and Judges Doolittle and Brayton. State's attorney Sheldon appearing for the prosecution, and Richard Skinner, Wellman and Leonard Sargeant, for the respondents. The evidence against the prisoners was entirely circumstantial, and mostly unimportant, with the exception of the confessions, which were objected to by the prisoner's counsel on the ground that they were extorted by undue influence, but they were admitted. The case was ably argued by the various counsel, and submitted to the jury. The jury, after an absence of one hour, returned a verdict of murder against both prisoners,

and they were sentenced to be executed on the 28th of January, 1820.

Strenuous efforts were made to secure a commutation of sentence, but failed.

The Boorns thereupon protested their innocence, and urged that efforts be made to discover the missing man. An advertisement was inserted in the Rutland Herald, and widely copied by other papers, asking information of said Colvin. The notice was copied in the Evening Post of November 29th,1819, and came to the attention of a Mr. Chadwick, of New Jersey, who recognized the description as that of a man living with his brother-in-law, at Dover, in his State. He communicated the fact to the parties in interest, and the man was identified as the lost Colvin. He was brought back to Vermont, and was fully recognized and identified by scores of those who had known him. He was partly insane, and had no excuse for his absence, but freely admitted that the Boorn brothers had neither hurt him nor frightened him away. Of course, the Boorn's were released, although the court was at a loss to know what course to pursue, to effect the discharge.

There were many who pretended to believe that Colvin was really murdered, and that the man supposed to be him was an impostor, but no one who examines the proofs of the identity of Colvin can believe it for a moment.

The confession of Jesse was no doubt made with the purpose of screening himself and of casting the guilt upon his brother, and that of Stephen was designed to save them both from the punishment which they were assured would certainly follow unless the confession was made. "Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee," is popularly considered the very highest species of judgment, but this case strongly illustrates its fallacy.

CURRENT TOPICS.

It is stated by a Washington correspondent and very likely correctly, that the President will not make an appointment of chief justice until congress meets. In the first place, he does not consider there is any public need of such an appointment, as the business of the court will go forward in just as satisfactory manner for the short time it will be in session before convened as though the bench was full, Associate Justice Clifford of Maine will preside as the senior justice of the court. No cases of general public interest are to be immediately decided. If a chief justice were to be appointed and take his seat before confirmation, he would incur the risk in some important case of disappointing the members of the senate belonging to the party in majority, or if his decision were pleasing to that majority, it might subject him to charges from the other political party of partisan action and subserviency that would be unpleasant. A chief justice, by sitting before confirmation, would

have his action submitted to the senate for reviewal, practically, for that body, if not agreeing with his decisions, could in effect exercise the power of reviewal by refusing to confirm, while in such complications as would probably arise in the present instance there seems to be no need of fixing a precedent from which future harm may result. The fate of John Rutledge is a sufficient justification for this delay.

The Boston Daily Advertiser has been investigating Mr. Conkling's antecedents, with a view of testing his capacity for the chief justiceship. It finds that he was born in 1829, and could not have been admitted to the bar before his majority, in 1850. He was then elected district attorney of Oneida county. In 1858, he was mayor of Utica, and in 1859, when only thirty years of age, he was elected member of congress, where he remained three terms. In 1867, he was elected to the Senate, where he has since remained. The Advertiser is also informed that Mr. Conkling's practice, always very small, has been almost entirely confined to the trial of cases before a jury. One certainly is led to wonder, in what period of his life Mr. Conkling could have made himself such a lawyer as the position of chief justice of the United States requires. The law has always been considered a jealous mistress, and it is generally believed that a good lawyer is made so, only by years of hard labor in his profession, and not in politics. There is something, however, in the argument of the Troy Daily Times - an advocate of Mr. Conkling's appointmentthat he will undoubtedly make a good judge after five or ten years' experience—that is, we can plant the politician on the bench, and he may, eventually, grow into a jurist.

The Democratic Convention for the Third Judicial District on Wednesday nominated the Hon. Theodore R. Westbrook, of Ulster county, for Justice of the Supreme Court. Mr. Westbrook is an able lawyer and an honest man. The Republicans of the Seventh District have nominated the Hon. David Ramsey for the Supreme bench. Judge Ramsey was appointed by the governor to succeed the late Judge Johnson.

The proposed amendments to the constitution providing for an appointive judiciary, were not directly passed upon in either of the State conventions. The subject appears to be one in which politicians do not feel very safe. The republican judiciary convention of the seventh district have, however, declared against the amendment, on the ground "that the people of the State of New York have made better selections than we could expect under a system of appointments." While we admit that the selections by the people have, on the whole, been quite as good as we could expect under the other system, we still believe

The lawyers of Philadelphia have set about correcting certain professional evils in downright good earnest and in a very judicious manner. A special committee, appointed for the purpose of devising means to restrain the unprofessional and disreputable practices of certain members of the profession, has reported in favor of having the entire Bar of Philadelphia incorporated, in which corporation the "characteristics of unity, authority and dignity as well of numbers as of influence, could not fail, by the adoption of wise and thorough supervision and regulation, to assist in restoring our profession to its once universally honored name and usefulness."

"The report was adopted and a general meeting of the Bar has been called, with a view to forming an incorporated organization. The profession of the city will be much more likely to be restored to its traditional glory by this means than by means of a closed corporation.

NOTES OF CASES.

After an abstract of recent bankruptcy decisions was in type, we received the opinion of Judge Dillon of the United States circuit court, reversing the decision of Judge Treat In re Clemens. Judge Dillon decided that an accommodation indorser cannot be forced into bankruptcy for a failure to pay the paper indorsed under the thirty-ninth section of the bankrupt act; that such paper is not "his commercial paper." In harmony with this decision are Re Nicodemus, 3 Bankr. Reg. 55; Innes v. Carpenter, 4 id. 139; Re McDermott Ball Co., 3 id. 33, and Re Lowenstein, 2 id. 99. On the other side is Re Chandler, 4 Bankr. Reg. 66. All of these decisions are of the district court.

The United States supreme court, in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Hamilton, decided at the last term, held that a nominal partner had an insurable interest in the effects of the partnership. The firm in that case were commission merchants, and the insurance effected on the goods consigned. The court held that the interest of the nominal partner in the liabilities of the firm were such as, in the absence of fraud, to entitle him to join with the other members of the firm in effecting insurance on the property of the conceru.

THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Of

A meeting of several eminent publicists was convened, by invitations issued by M. Rolin Jacquemyns, agreeably to previous arrangement, at Ghent (Belgium), on 8-12th of September. The result was the inauguration of a permanent Institute of International Law. The number of members is limited to fifty, of whom thirty-eight have been elected. these thirty-eight, five are from America, viz.: Mr. Lawrence, President Woolsey, Mr. Washburn, Professor Wharton and Mr. Field. Mancini, of Italy, was elected President; Bluntschili, of Germany, and de Parieu, of France, Vice-Presidents; Rolin Jacquemyns, of Belgium, and Pierantoni, of Italy, Secretaries. The first meeting is to be held at Geneva in 1874. Three subjects have been submitted for consideration on that occasion: 1st. Arbitration. 2d. The three rules of the Treaty of Washington; and 3d. Codification, by means of treaties, of the fundamental rules of private International Law.

In connection with this subject we have the pleasure of publishing the following correspondence between those eminent publicists, M. Rolin Jacquemyns and Mr. William Beach Lawrence:

[Translation.]

GHENT, 30th of July, 1873.

Dear and Honored Sir: You will receive by the to-day's mail the following communications, which are entirely private:

(a) A confidential note concerning a proposed plan of International Conference, having in view: 1. To put into form certain principles of international law; 2. To constitute a permanent corps or Academy for the study and advancement of International Law.

(b) A report on the opinions expressed in answer to this note by Messrs. Asser (Amsterdam), Montague Bernard (Oxford), Blunschili (Heidelberg), Carlos Calvo (Paris), R. de Mohl (Carlsruhe), Drouyn de Lhuys (Paris), Goldsmith (Leipzig), Vernon Harcourt (London), Heffter et de Holtzendorff (Berlin), le vicomte d' Itajuba (Paris), de Laveleye (Liege), Lorimer (Edinburgh), Chs. Lucas (Paris), Mancini (Rome), Moynier (Geneva), de Parieu (Paris), Sir Robert Phillimore (London), Pierantoni (Naples), Count Sclopis (Turin), Chs. Verge (Paris), Westlake (London).

(c) A (projet) of statutes of the Institute or International Academy of the law of nations.

(d) A (projet) of statutes of the International Association for the progress of the law of nations.

(e) An article which appeared in the last number (III, 1873) of the "Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee" on the necessity of organizing permanent scientific action to promote the study and progress of international law.

All these papers (pieces) are, as you will see, connected with a project which has been welcomed with great sympathy by the eminent Europeans to whom I submitted it in the first instance. The conclusions of the majority of them are that a meeting should be held at Ghent, in the month of September, to deliberate upon the organization of a collective scientific action in international law, and particularly with respect to the establishment of an international institute of the law of nations.

Making myself the medium of communication of their common wishes, I unite with the honorable European friends who have hitherto co-operated with

me, in praying you to join us. Your name is naturally pointed out among the most eminent representatives of the science of the law of nations, as well in America as in Europe, and to whom it belongs to take the initiative in the affair. I, therefore, invite you to take part in a private conference which will be opened at Ghent, in the "Hotel de Ville," on Monday, the 8th of September next, and will continue during the following days.

Order of the day: I. Organization of a collective permanent and scientific action for the purpose of promoting the study and progress of the law of nations. Discussion of the principle of that organization and of the propositions communicated or which will be communicated by the members relative to the constitution: (a) of an international Institute or Academy of the law of nations; (b) Of an International Association for the advancement of the law of nations.

II. In case the institute should be constituted with the members present: (a) Organization; (b) Propositions to be made for the addition of new members; (c) Distribution of the subjects to which the labors of the society ought first to be directed; (d) Different measures of execution.

I venture to hope, dear and honored sir, that in acknowledging the receipt of this letter you will inform me, as soon as possible: 1. If you will personally be present, agreeably to my invitation. 2. If, in case you shall be prevented from attending in person, you will give full power to represent you at the conference to one of your friends who are also invited and who may intend to be here. (The persons in the United States who are invited, beside yourself, are Messrs. Bancroft Davis, D. Dudley Field, F. Wharton, and Woolsey.) 3. What is your opinion on the fundamental idea which is to be discussed in the conference, and on the proposed mode of its execution.

Accept, dear and honored sir, the assurance of my high consideration and sincere devotion.

G. ROLIN JACQUEMYNS.

P. S.-I have the honor to send you, besides the "pieces" herein mentioned, the "compte-rendu” of the third volume of your "Commentaire" which I wrote for the "Revue de Droit International." I hope you will be satisfied with it.

I would like very much to see you in Ghent in September. We retain the most agreeable remembrance of your first visit. This time you would meet with several distinguished men, some of whom you know, and the others you would certainly deem as worthy to be added to the number of those with whom you maintain relations. What a pity that our excellent friend Lieber cannot be present!

[Translation.]

OCHRE POINT, NEWPORT, R. I. Į 29th of August, 1873.

My Dear and Eminent Confrere:

It is only to-day that I renounce, with the deepest regret, the hope of replying in person to your very flattering invitation to take part in the assembly of illustrious publicists who are to meet at Ghent. With several of these gentlemen I am personally acquainted, and with all of them I have had agreeable relations arising from the similarity of our studies, and the conformity of our principles in that science of which I ana an humble votary.

It is unnecessary to premise that I agree with you entirely on the necessity of " 'organizing permanent

scientific action to aid the study and progress of international law." I will add, that there is nothing in the programme which I could wish to change.

"La Revue de droit international et de legislation comparie," during the four years of its existence, while making known to us the comparative legislation of the different states of christendom, has largely contributed to the reform of the municipal institutions of the world. We find the most important of these reforms in the late judicial changes in England, which have put an end to the unphilosophical distinction which existed between law and equity. And I cannot speak of the reform in the jurisprudence of our mothercountry, without recalling the work accomplished among us in the same line, by our confrere Mr. Field, who will enjoy the advantage, of which I am deprived, of assisting in your deliberations. As for the law of nations, it is only in your book that may be found the ablest discussions concerning the principles of international law, as well as to those practical questions which have occupied special attention during the period which we are considering. It is to the chief editor himself that we owe several of the most important of the elaborate articles which passed under his inspection. In my "Commentaire," I have shown by numerous references to your review how much I owe to your great labors. Nowhere so well as at Ghent, the seat of the science, could an Institute of International Law be inaugurated.

Although it is impossible for me to avail myself of this new opportunity to enjoy your hospitality, I should be ungrateful, were I to forget the delightful visit to Ghent, the recollection of which, thanks to you and to Madame Rolin Jacquemyns, always affords me pleasure.

Apart from my legitimate desire to assist in the proceedings of your illustrious assembly, there are some points of international law constantly arising, which are of practical application, and to which I would wish to draw the attention of the members invited to the learned congress.

Nothing cau interest the civilized world more than the maintenance of the rights of neutrals, and in promulgating their decision upon these questions, it is the duty of publicists to follow what Sir William Scott affirms that he had done in the judgments rendered by himself (a statement which, by the by, is not always in conformity with the fact). "It was his office," he said, "not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to base his conclusions upon those eternal principles of the law of nations which commend themselves to the approbation of every people."

If new wars are to break out, it is the belligerents alone who should bear the evils which they bring in their train, and the commerce of neutrals should meet with no restrictions that is not absolutely necessary in order to prevent any intervention by third parties of a nature to influence, any manner whatever, the result of the conflict.

As for the United States, the recent civil war placed them in an abnormal position, and, at the close of it, they found themselves engaged in discussions with England, in which they put forward pretensions at variance with those doctrines which, although they❘ had been modified by the respect of their tribunals for the adjudications of the mother-country, went back, at least on the part of the legislative and of the execu tive departments of the government, to the very origin

of our institutions. On the other hand, the English would seem to have become the most ardent defenders of the rights of neutrals. The result was that the United States, under the influence of the extreme excitement arising from the peculiar character of a civil war, forgetting that during eighty of the ninety years of their national existence, they were neutrals, they themselves proposed as belligerents, apparently in order to obtain a pecuniary indemnity from England for damages claimed against her, for not sufficiently regarding neutral duties, to introduce into the law of nations certain principles which might lay them under a burdensome obligation, during an indefinite future to maintain a naval police throughout the whole extent of their coasts, both on the Atlantic and Pacific

oceans.

This system of maritime law would be no less prejudicial to the country of the illustrious jurist who presided at the conference at Geneva than to my own country. If I should go to Ghent, however bold it might be in me to oppose the authority of Count Sclopis, I could not consent to recognize as an integral part of the International Law the three rules established by the Treaty of Washington, to govern the decisions of the arbiters in the "Alabama Claims. " They have even become less acceptable than their original text purported, on account of the interpretation given by the council at Geneva to the term "due diligence," and which would seem to make neutrals responsible to one belligerent for the acts of the other belligerent. "The due diligence," it is said, “referred to in the first and third of said rules, ought to be exercised by neutral governments in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed, from a failure to fulfill the obligations on their part."

I would also have liked to draw the attention of the congress to the encroachments made upon the neutral commerce by the unjustifiable application of the law of blockade to vessels seized at the moment of their departure from a neutral port, bound for another neutral port, however remote it may be from a blockaded port, under the mere suspicion that their cargoes, after having been discharged at a neutral port, may be ultimately destined for a blockaded port, or otherwise placed at the disposition of the enemy. This pretense carried to the extreme would annihilate the commerce of neutrals; it is totally opposed to the doctrine of the Declaration of Paris, which, by requiring a force before the blockaded port sufficient to effectually prevent ingress to it, would appear to indicate that it is only in the surrounding waters that the police of the blockade can be exercised.

The opposition made by English courts of admiralty to "continuous voyages "owed its origin to the rule of "1756," which has now become obsolete in consequence of changes in the colonial policy of Great Britain. It is unnecessary to remark that this rule could never have existed in our times, if the doctrine had been maintained, which required that a previous notice of the blockade should be given to every vessel, a doctrine sustained by the publicists of the continent, and to the time of our civil war by the United States, who have moreover repeatedly given to it the sanction of treaties. It was our rule during the war with Mexico, and, however it may since have been disregarded by the tribunals, it was likewise declared to be the rule by the proclamation of the president, and in the communications of the Secretary of State with Lord Lyons at the beginning of the recent war.

Considering as exceptional those decisions rendered by the supreme court during the war of secession, under the influence of that excitement which exists to a greater degree during a civil war than during any other war, I believed that I could serve my country in no better way than by making every possible effort before a tribunal, which is invested with the authority to revise even the decisions of the highest courts of England and of the United States, to prevent decisions so opposed to our permanent interests and so injurious to the rights of neutrals from being recognized as precedents in the law of nations.

That is my apology for having undertaken to argue before the Mixed Commission now meeting in this city, a case in which certain questions of maritime law arise that cannot fail to interest every individual who considers the maintenance of the rights of neutrals as essential to civilization. I cannot better make known my views than by sending to you and to our illustrious "confrères" the pamphlet which contains my argument in the case of the "Circassian." In granting indemnities to the owners of the vessel and of the cargo, the decision of the arbiters may well be considered as a reversal of the decree of the supreme court, in so far as it depends upon an International Tribunal.

I cannot close this communication without alluding to the necessity of calling the notice of those governments which are about to establish Mixed Commissions to some suggestions relative to their constitution, and to the mode of deciding the questions which may be brought before them. I cannot but believe that such regulations are essential to the recognition of arbitration as a permanent system for the purpose of settling international contests. The arbiters, as well those who are citizens or subjects of one or other country as the foreign members, should be regarded as vested with a judicial character, and should be confined as the rule of their decisions to the generally recognized principles of international law, or to such rules as may be established, in particular cases, by the authority of the parties in litigation. Their decisions should, moreover, in every case, be furnished in writing to the respective governments.

Such reports would be of incalculable value in the elaboration of an International Code, which can only be advantageously adopted after a previous assimilation of the rules of conduct of the different States of Christendom.

The arbitrations which the United States had with Great Britain, previous to the Treaty of Washington, met with little success. It would even appear that the question of ascertaining how far the arbiters are judges of the powers which are conferred upon them, is not yet settled. The arbitrament of the King of Netherlands, to whom recourse was had in the case of our north-east boundary, did not succeed, because the award went beyond the limits of the reference. Our late arbitrament of the "Alabama Claims" at Geneva, nearly failed on account of the "Indirect Claims." A statement which appears to be taken from a report of Mr. Henry Bellaire, "à la séance du Congrès de l'alliance universelle de l'ordre et de la civilisation," and which has been extensively published, has been brought to my notice. This statement contains so many mistakes that I have had a memorandum prepared to point them out. I inclose it, though the memorandum itself may not be quite exact.

Accept, my dear and honored confrère, the assurance of my highest consideration. Yours truly,

W. B. LAWRENCE.

P. S.-I have just received from Mr. Wharton a letter, written under the expectation that I would go to Ghent. He desires me to express his thanks for the honor conferred upon him by the invitation to the meeting. He is very anxious for the success of the plan, and regrets the impossibility of being present at the Congress.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

BRIDGE.

Construction of statute.-Under (Chap. 388, Laws 1837) the act incorporating "The Leicester Bridge Company," a bridge was built by such company over the Genesee river, in the county of Livingston. By section 9 of the act, it was provided that if the bridge should be destroyed and not rebuilt, as specified therein, "the bridge shall thereupon become a public bridge, and may be maintained at the expense of the county of Livingston." The bridge was swept away and abandoned by the company. The county rebuilt it, and the adjoining towns of Geneseo and Leicester, thereafter, kept it in repair. Plaintiff repaired said bridge under a contract with the commissioners of highways of said towns, and brought this action against their successors in office to recover the contract price.

Held, that the word "may," in the statute, was mandatory, and imposed upon the county the obligation to repair; that the commissioners had no authority over the bridge, could not bind their towns for its repairs, and, therefore, plaintiff could not recover. Phelps v. Hawley et al., Commissioners, etc. Opinion by Peckham, J.

CATTLE IN HIGHWAYS.

1. Action to recover possession of some cattle belonging to plaintiff and alleged to have been unlawfully detained by defendant. The cattle were found by defendant trespassing upon his lands, they having entered from the public highway. Defendant took them into his custody, and the next morning in pursuance of the provisions of the act "to prevent cattle from running at large in the highway," (chapter 459, Laws of 1862, as amended by chapter 814, Laws of 1867), he complained on oath before a justice of the peace, a summons was issued by the justice returnable October 20, 1867, but it did not specify the place for the return, and the summons was not posted as required by the statute. Before the return day specified in the summons, plaintiff demanded the cattle. Defendant refused to deliver them up unless plaintiff paid the penalty under the statute.

Held, that defendant held the cattle by virtue of the original seizure as authorized by the act, and his right to hold them was not affected by any irregularity in the summons issued by the justice to whom the complaint was made, nor by an omission to post the summons as required by the act. Leavitt v. Thompson. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. The right to detain the cattle is not terminated until the owner has paid the justice the several sums specified in the act (section 4), and until such payment is made, this right is not affected by a refusal on the part of the holder to deliver the cattle, except upon condi