new trial, on the ground of misdirection. In Bromage v. Prosser, 4B. & C. 247, 6 D. & R. 296, 1 C. & P. 475, where, in an action for slandering the plaintiffs in their business of bankers, it was proved that one W. said to the defendant, "I hear that you say that the plaintiffs' bank at M. stopped; is it true?" and the defendant answered, “Yes, it is; I was told so; it was reported at C., and nobody would take their bills; and I came to town in consequence of it myself:" upon a motion for a new trial, it was held, that, although malice is the gist of the action for slander, there are two sorts of malice-malice in fact, and malice in law the former denoting an act done from ill will towards an individual, the latter a wrongful action intentionally done, without just cause or excuse; that, in ordinary actions for slander, malice in law is to be inferred from the publishing the slanderous matter, the act itself being wrongful and intentional, and without any just cause or excuse; but, in cases for slander primâ facie excusable on account of the cause of publishing the slanderous matter, malice in fact must be proved. The question here is, whether the communication was privileged or not; for, if not, the law will imply malice: on the other hand, if the occasion of the speaking were justifiable, the plaintiff would be bound to prove express malice. The communication to the plantiff's cousin, beyond all doubt, was perfectly unjustifiable: nor had the defendant any right to repeat the charge to the uncle, Spry; the only course the law would justify, if he bonâ fide believed the accusation and intended to notice it, would be the putting the matter in a course of legal investigation. The object of the defendant, however, was not to put the matter in a course of legal investigation: his object (as the event proved) was, to intimidate the friends of the plaintiff, and thereby extort money from them for compromising the charge. The attention of the jury was confined to the words spoken to Miss Spry; and they were told, that, if they thought the words were spoken bonâ fide to the friends of the plaintiff, the defendant believing them to be true, the occasion was justifiable. In Smith v. Matthews, 1 M. & Rob. 151, it was held, that, where a person originates false reports prejudicial to a tradesman, and, being called on by the employers of the tradesman to examine the matters complained of, repeats to them the false statement, such statements are not privileged communications. A rule nisi having been granted -- Crowder and Butt shewed cause. The jury by their finding, which is well warranted by the evidence, have negatived the existence of malice in fact; the sole question therefore is, whether the occasion justified the speaking of the words, so as to negative malice in law. The law upon this subject is very correctly laid down by Taunton, J., in Blake v. Pilfold; where it was ruled that a letter written by a private individual to a public officer, complaining of the misconduct of a person under him, if written bonâ fide and without malice, was not actionable, though some of the charges might not be true: and the learned judge said, in leaving the case to the jury? "There are certain cases in which communications are what the law terms privileged, and when the occasion on which the communication is made rebuts the inference of malice. I allude to the occasions where a man, on being applied to, gives a character of a servant, or where he gives confidential advice, or where the occasion of the communication is such as primâ facie affords an excuse for making it. In all these cases, a plaintiff must give evidence of express malice." Here, there was nothing whatever to justify an inference that the defendant was actuated by malice. He had reasonable ground for his suspicion of the plaintiff, which was not aroused until after he had given him the written character upon which so much reliance was placed at the trial to shew malice. 1836. HOOPER บ. TRUSCOTT. The communication to the relatives of the plaintiff was cluding the style and character of the language used, whether A. acted bonâ fide, or was influenced by malicious motives (a). Parke, B., in delivering the judgment of the court in that case says: "In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact and injurious to the character of another (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), and the law considers such publication as malicious unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private, duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs in matters where his own interest is concerned. In. such cases, the occasion prevents the inference of malice which the law draws from authorised communications, and affords a qualified defence depending upon the absence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected, for the common convenience and welfare of society (b); and the law has not restricted the right. to make them within any narrow limits. I am not aware that it was ever deemed essential to the protection of such a commuuication that it should be made to some person interested in the inquiry alone and not in the presence of a third person. If made with honesty of purpose to a party who has an interest in the inquiry (and that has been liberally construed-see Child v. Affleck), the simple fact that there has been some casual by-stander cannot alter the nature of the transaction. The business of life could not be well carried on if such restraints were imposed upon this and similar communications, and if, on every occasion on which they are made, they were not protected unless strictly private. In this class of com (a) It was also held that the statement to D. in the absence of C., was unauthorized and officious, and therefore not protected, although made in the belief of its truth, if it were in point of fact (b) See Smith v. Thomas, Ante, p. 546. 1836. HOOPER V. TRUSCOTT munications is no doubt comprehended the right of a master bona fide to charge his servant for any supposed misconduct in his service, and to give him admonition and blame: and we think that the simple circumstance of the master exercising that right in the presence of another does by no means of necessity take away from it the protection which the law would otherwise afford. Where, indeed, an opportunity is sought for making such a charge before third persons, which might have been made in private, it would afford strong evidence of a malicious intention, and thus deprive it of that immunity which the law allows to such a statement when made with honesty of purpose: but the mere fact of a third person being present, does not render the communication absolutely unauthorized, though it be a circumstance to be left, with others, including the style and character of the language used, to the consideration of the jury, who are to deter mine whether the defendant has acted bona fide in making the charge, or been influenced by malicious motives." Bromage v. Prosser is a case of a totally distinct character from the present: Bayley, J., there says: "In actions for such slander as is prima facie excusable on account of the cause of speaking or writing it, as in the case of ser vants characters, confidential advice, or communications to persons who ask it or have a right to expect it, malice in fact must be proved by the plaintiffs and in Edmonson v. Stevenson, Bull. N. P. 8, Lord Mansfield takes the distinction between these and ordinary actions of slander." In Flower v. Homer, 3 Camp. 293, it was held that an action of defamation could not be maintained against a man whose property had been stolen, and who, upon reasonable grounds of suspicion, charged an innocent person with having stolen it. And in Finden v. Westlake, 1 M. & M. 461, in an action for a libel in publishing a handbill offering a reward for the recovery of certain bills of exchange, and stating that A. B. was suspected of hav |