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a new bill, and so long as a bill is in agitation, and such indorsements are made, all the indorsers and every of them are liable as a new drawer.” That was good law before the passing the stamp acts; but, inasmuch as this note on the face of it had all the force and effect of a valid promissory note, the stamp being once exhausted, the new contract evidenced by the indorsement was inoperative for want of a second stamp. I therefore think the plaintiffs were remitted to their right of action upon the original consideration.
The rest of the court concurring
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
Balls v. StaFFORD. Nov. 14th.
BAYLEY moved for leave to plead (amongst others) There cannot be a partial ap- a plea of payment into court of the sum of 811. 14s., plea either of
the plaintiff to be at liberty to appropriate to that plea the tender or of payment of mo- sum of 811. 14s. out of a sum of 2201. already paid into ney paid into court in lieu of court in this action. The affidavit upon which the motion bail.
was founded stated that the defendant was arrested under and by virtue of a writ of capias issued out of this court on the 28th August last, indorsed for bail for the sum of 2001., and that the said sum of 2001., together with 201. for costs, was on or about the 23rd September last paid into court instead of putting in and perfecting bail, pursuant to the statute 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 71, s. 2; and that the said sum of 2201. remained in court in the cause.
The Court, referring to Stultz v. Heneage, 4 Moore & Scott, 472, where it was held that the court cannot allow part of a sum paid into court in lieu of special bail to be appropriated to the purposes of a plea of tender--the
third section of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 71, expressly pointing out the only mode in which money so deposited can during the progress of the cause be released, viz. by putting in and perfecting special bail-for the reasons there given, refused the rule.
that the defen
ENGLER, Administrator of STULZ, v. TWYSDEN, Bart. Saturday,
Nov. 14th. This was an action brought by the plaintiff as admin- In an action by
an administrator istrator of one George Stulz, deceased, upon a bond in the on
on a bond given penal sum of 6061. 7s. (conditioned for the payment of by the defensa 3031. 3s. 6d.), given by the defendant to the intestate, and testate more
than twenty also to recover 71. 10s. for goods sold and delivered by years ago, and the intestate, in his life time. The defendant pleaded ferest appear
on which no infirst, that the cause of action did not accrue within twenty to have been paid years—secondly, his discharge under the insolvent debtors the defence was act. It appeared at the trial that the defendant had ob- dant had been tained his discharge under the act in the year 1818. This discharged un
der the insolfact was proved, and the certificate of his discharge from vent debtors the Fleet prison produced, by the attorney by whom the fendant having proceedings had been conducted on his behalf upon that obtained a ver
dict, the court occasion. On the part of the plaintiff it was proved, that, declined to refinding amongst the papers of the deceased, a notice that if
tiff from costs the defendant intended to apply for the benefit of the insolvent debtors act, he had caused search to be made in 4, c. 42, s. 31,
notwithstanding the office, but could find no trace of his discharge-nothing the defendant's
schedule was more than that he appeared to have presented a petition not to be found and schedule, which by an indorsement on the back of it in the office of
the court-it purported to have been dismissed, with leave to make a appearing that,
had the plaintiff second application. The defendant produced the minute made due book of Mr. Clarkson, who at the period of his alleged dis
quiry, he would charge was the chief clerk of the insolvent court, which book have discovered
from the register book and the
minute book of the clerk of the court for the time being, that the defendant had obtained his discharge.
under the statute 3 & 4 Will.
search and in
contained an entry of his discharge on the 19th of November, 1818. A verdict was accordingly found for him.
Sir W. Follett, in Trinity Term last, on the part of the plaintiff, obtained a rule calling upon the defendant to shew cause why the verdict should not be entered up without costs, under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 31. The rule was drawn up on reading the record of Nisi Prius only. Lysons v. Barrow, 4 M. & Scott, 463, 10 Bing. 563, was cited and relied on.
Talfourd, Serjeant, shewed cause, upon the affidavits of the defendant and of his attorney, stating the fact of the former having been discharged under the insolvent debtors act on the 19th November, 1818, and that the intestate's name was inserted in the schedule, and notice duly given to him; and that the fact was communicated to the plaintiff as soon as the defendant was arrested: and also an affidavit made by one Waters, a clerk in the office of the court for the relief of insolvent debtors, which stated that there are two public books kept in the office, the one an index book containing the names of insolvents, opposite to whose names is a nuinber referring to the page of the other public book, called a register book; that, in the index book, the defendant's name appeared three times with the several numbers 2141, 2168, and 2223, consecutively placed opposite to his name; that such entry shews that three petitions and schedules were filed by the defendant, the numbers referring to the pages of the register book; that the register book contains also an entry of the names of insolvents, the numbers of their schedules, the prison where they are in custody, when order made, the day of the hearing upon their petitions, whether notices served upon creditors or whether insolvents advertized, whether discharged or remanded, and what was done upon the hearing; that this book has eight
columns, in the form following, and which, as far as related to the defendant, were filled up as under:
That the several words “petition dismissed," “ order for hearing discharged,” and “ lost schedule," and the letter “ D.,” are marked in pencil; that the letter D. so marked in pencil shews that the defendant was discharged; that the letters D. opposite to the names of other persons so discharged are all marked in pencil; that the defendant had been informed and verily believed it to be true that it was the usual custom at the time of the defendant's discharge so to mark the letter D. in pencil, for the sake of expedition : that each schedule has an indorsement thereon shewing what was done upon the hearing of each insolvent's petition; and, in ordinary cases, the custom of the office is, when the party making search has found the name of the insolvent in the index book, for the clerk to refer to the register book which gives the numbers of the schedules, and to hand to the party the schedule itself for inspection, but that, when inquiry is made after one of
the lost schedules, and the party is desirous of ascertaining what was done thereon, not only the register book, but also a certain minute book of Mr. Clarkson, who was in the year 1818 the chief clerk of the court, is referred to, if necessary, for the purpose of affording correct information upon the subject; that the clerks in the office are at all times ready and willing to give every assistance and explanation about the discharge of insolvents, in order that the party applying for such information may arrive at the particulars in any way relating to such discharge; and that it was very evident from the entries in the books that the defendant (although his schedule had been lost) was discharged under the act upon the said schedule in the year 1818; and that such information would have been given to any party requiring it as would have satisfied him of the fact.
The learned Serjeant submitted, that the only effect of the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 31, was, to place executors and administrators plaintiffs upon the same footing with respect to costs as any other plaintiffs, reserving to the court a right, in the exercise of their discretion upon the particular circumstances of the case, to relieve them from costs where they appeared to have acted bonâ fide, and to have been induced to proceed by some misrepresentation or undue concealment on the part of the defendant. In Wilkinson v. Edwards, Ante, Vol. 1, 173, 1 New Cases, 301, it was held, that, where an executor has commenced an action without using due diligence to ascertain that he can proceed with a reasonable prospect of success, or is guilty of any laches so as to cause unnecessary expense or vexation to the defendant, the court will not interpose to excuse him from costs. In Southgate v. Crowley, Ante, Vol. 1, 374, 1 New Cases, 518, the court go a little further, and hold that the discretion given to the court or a judge by this statute is not to be governed by the fact of the action having been properly brought; but it must