vendor parts with the manual possession of them. In order to divest the consignor's right to stop them, the goods must have got into the actual possession of the consignee or his agent at their ultimate destination under the contract, or a new direction must have been given to them by the vendee—as in Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East, 175, and Morley v. Hay, 3 M. & R. 396. In Rowe v. Pickford, the goods had no known destination beyond the waggon office, which for this purpose was the warehouse of the vendee. In Foster v. Frampton, as also in Leeds v. Wright, 3 B. & P. 320, 4 Esp. 243, the delivery was complete. Mills v. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457, and Coates v. Railton, 6 B. & C. 422, 9 D. & R. 493, are precisely in point. In the former, A., living at N. in Devonshire, ordered goods of B., in London, who sent them by ship via Exeter, consigned to A., and advised him thereof. On their arrival at Exeter, the goods were delivered to C., a wharfinger, who received them on A.'s account, and paid the freight and charges. After their arrival, A. wrote to inform B., that, in consequence of his affairs being deranged, he should not take the goods, and telling him that they were at Exeter. At this time A. had committed an act of bankruptcy, upon which he was afterwards declared a bankrupt. B. applied to C. for the goods, and tendered him the freight and charges due, upon which C. promised not to deliver them out of his custody, but afterwards did deliver them to the assignees of A. It was held that B. had a right to stop the goods in the hands of C., and might maintain trover against him for their value. And in Coates v. Railton, goods were purchased by a commission agent at Manchester for A., to be sent to Lisbon. A. had no warehouse at Manchester, and the vendor delivered the goods to the commission agent, who was to forward them to Lisbon: it was held that the transitus continued until the goods reached Lisbon, the place named by the vendee to the vendor as the place of ulterior destination, and that the

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latter had a right to stop them in the hands of the agent, the vendee having become insolvent. In Stokes v. La Riviere, 3 East, 397, n., under circumstances precisely the same as the present, Lord Mansfield says: "The Duhems bought goods of the plaintiff, which were ordered to be delivered to the defendants to be shipped to Duhems, who are since become insolvent, after the goods were sent to a factor at Ostend. The defendants who have got them back again stand as they originally did. No point is more clear than that if goods are sold, and the price not paid, the seller may stop them in transitu: I mean in every sort of passage to the hands of the buyers. There have been a hundred cases of this sort. Ships in harbour, carriers, bills, have been stopped. In short, where the goods are in transitu, the seller has that proprietory lien. The goods are in the hands of the defendants to be conveyed; the owner may get them back again." [Tindal, C. J.-The stoppage in this case is not disputed by the vendee: what right, then, has this defendant to interpose?]

2. The defendant is at all events bound by the engagement entered into by his clerk, to hold the goods subject to the order of the owners; any subsequent recognition of the act of Coates will entitle Nicholls to avail himself of the stoppage; and the defendant is not in a situation to urge an objection.

Bingham, in support of the rules.-1. What is the ultimate destination of the goods, is not always the question in cases of this sort. If any act of ownership is exercised upon the goods in any part of the journey, either by the consignee or his agent (other than a mere wharfinger or carrier), the transitus is at an end. Here, it is true, Guernsey was the place of ulterior destination of these goods, and not Southampton: but the defendant had a general authority from Le Couteur, the vendee, to take charge of all goods that might arrive for him at South

ampton; and these goods were addressed to the care of the defendant. The goods arrived at Southampton on the 10th May, and, the waggoner's charges being paid by the defendant, they were shipped by the defendant on the 14th in obedience to the vendee's orders; and on the following day the vendee's instructions to delay the shipment were received. In Mills v. Ball, Lord Alvanley says: "If, in the course of the conveyance of the goods from the vendor to the vendee, the latter be allowed to exercise any act of ownership over them, he thereby reduces the goods into possession, and puts an end to the vendor's right to stop them." So, in Foster v. Frampton, Bayley, J., says: "If the consignee, before the goods reach their ultimate destination, postpones the delivery, or does any act which is equivalent to taking actual possession of them, the transitus is at an end." So, payment of warehouse rent by the vendee to the vendor (Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452), or to a third person (Wright v. Lawes, 4 Esp. 82), the vendee's putting his mark upon the goods (Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464), or taking samples from them (Foster v. Frampton), or the fact of their being shipped at a wharf where they have been delivered by the vendee (Noble v. Adams, 7 Taunt. 59, 2 Marsh. 366, Holt, 248), or by his agent (Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East, 175): all these circumstances have been held to determine the transitus. Boutillier's letter was beyond the scope of his authority: and therefore the defendant is not bound by anything contained in it.

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2. Then, as to Nicholls's goods, they were stopped Second point. without his authority: and the question is, whether, the subsequent ratification by him of this act of Coates, renders the latter the implied agent of Nicholls in the transaction. The doctrine of ratification has never yet been carried so far. The difficulties it would lead to are almost inconceivable. At least the ratification should come before

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the commencement of the action. If the defendant had
delivered the goods to the present plaintiffs, he would have
been liable in trover to Le Couteur, provided the latter did
not assent to the act of Coates-Wilson v. Anderton,1 B.
& Ad. 450. The general principle is well laid down in Doe d,
Right v. Cuthell, and confirmed by Doe d. Mann v. Wal-
ters. In Doe d. Right v. Cuthell, where a lease for twenty-
one years contained a proviso, that, in case either landlord
or tenant, or their respective heirs and executors, wished
to determine it at the end of the first fourteen years, and
should give six months' notice in writing under his or their
respective hands, the term should cease: it was held that
a notice to quit signed by two only of three executors of
the original lessor, to whom he had bequeathed the free-
hold as joint tenants, expressing the notice to be given on
behalf of themselves and the third executor, was not good
under the proviso, which required it to be given under the
hands of all three; and, the notice to quit being such as
the tenant was to act upon at the time, no subsequent re-
cognition of the third executor would make it good by
relation; nor was his joining in an ejectment evidence of
his original assent to bind the tenant by the notice. Lord
Ellenborough says: "The person to whom the notice is
given ought to be assured at the time he receives it, and
when he is to act upon it, that, if he deliver up possession
at the end of the six months, he will be acquitted of all fur-
ther claims in respect of the remainder of the term. But,
if two only of the three joined in the notice, how could the
defendant be assured of this? How could he be assured
that the third might not disavow the notice afterwards,
and claim the defendant still as a tenant to him?" (a)
[Tindal, C. J.—I should have felt the difficulty you put,
had it appeared that the consignee had set up any claim.]
That observation would have applied equally in Right v.

(a) See Siffken v. Wray, 6 East, 371.

Cathell.

The defendant had a right to know with certainty what particular course of conduct he could justify.

TINDAL, C. J.-Had I felt the slightest doubt or difficulty in these cases, I should have desired to reserve the matters for further consideration. But I am of opinion that the special circumstances disclosed here leave untouched all the cases cited in the course of the argument. The first question is, was there a stoppage in transitu-was the transitus at an end? The answer to that depends upon what was the destination of the goods. It appeared from the evidence (and this is applicable to both cases) that one Le Couteur, a trader at Guernsey, purchased the goods in question, for the purpose of their being consigned to him there. The goods were accordingly packed and sent to the care of the defendant at Southampton. Resting there, one would suppose that the defendant was not in the general sense of the word an agent for Le Couteur, but merely the hand to forward the goods to Guernsey. But it is not left to us to conjecture what the authority of the defendant was; for, a letter of instructions was produced, dated the 14th August, 1830, by which the defendant was directed to take charge of and forward all goods that might arrive at Southampton for Le Couteur, whether addressed to the care of the defendant or of any other agent: and the general course of business appears to have been for the defendant, on the arrival of any goods at Southampton for Le Couteur, to take them from the waggon office (paying the charges), and to send them on to Guernsey. There was nothing to shew that the goods on arriving at Southampton received any new direction. It has been urged that this case is varied from the ordinary course by the fact of the carriage and warehouse charges at Southampton being paid by the defendant, and of his chusing the ship by which the goods were to be forwarded. The same thing, however, is done by every shipping agent.

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