And Lord Eldon says, in Attorney-General v. The Mayor of Bristol,204 that although a charity is not barred by the statute of limitations, an adverse enjoyment for a long time is a very material consideration in construing an instrument under which the claim is made. And where complaints are made against the conduct of trustees, at such a length of time as to render it difficult to make such defence as they otherwise might have done, the inquiry will not be enforced.205 In re Chertsey Market,206 the fact that the company had enjoyed the surplus of the funds arising from a charity for a long time, with the general acquiescence of those interested, was held to be sufficient ground for confirming such use. 87. In Attorney-General v. Catherine's Hall,207 Lord Eldon said, that where estates had been given to different colleges in Oxford, charged with the payment of certain sums to the fellows, which these colleges had paid, "and the surplus has been enjoyed, according to usage, for a long course of years, which may be taken as evidence of the terms on which they were accepted," the court ought, before it changes this usage, to be perfectly sure" such was the intention of the testator. 66 And in Mayor of South Molton v. Attorney-General,208 Lord St. Leonards said: "I think this is one of those cases that ought not to be encouraged. Here is a case in which, after a century and a half, there has been an attempt to disturb an arrangement which nobody ever thought of impeaching before. . . . . There has been plenty of opportunity of doing it. I do trust that this will be the last case in which an made to unsettle any of those ancient attempt will be charities." 204 2 Jac. & W. 321. 206 Shelford, 498. 206 6 Price, 261, 285. 207 Jacob, 381. 208 27 Eng. L. & Eq. 17, 34. And the same view is taken upon this point of the force of usage for a long period, in showing the true import and proper construction of the instrument of donation, by Lord Cranworth, in Attorney-General v. Dean and Canons of Windsor: 209"I feel that such a continued usage is not to be overlooked, when we are trying to discover what was the intention of those who founded the charity." 88. And in Attorney-General v. Skinners' Co., 210 the ViceChancellor, Shadwell, said, where the company, during the lifetime of the donor, and for a long time afterwards, applied the surplus income of a charitable fund to their own use: "I have the authority of Lord Eldon for saying, that long enjoyment ought to protect this body in the possession of that which it has held uninterruptedly; and also of Lord Holt, who was of opinion that, even where the matter is obscure, long enjoyment without interruption is great evidence of right." And Lord Brougham adopted the same view of the question, when the same was before the House of Lords. 89. And in Attorney-General v. Coventry,211 it was said, there is "no statute of limitation against God and religion. . . . . And although charity is not barred by length of time or any statute of limitations, yet it is an evidence that the surplus belonged to Coventry." And by the English statute,212 the Attorney-General is barred from interfering in the administration of a charity after twenty years' acquiescence.213 It seems to have been the practice of the English courts, so far as I can learn, without a single exception, to hold long acquiescence in a particular construction of a devise to charity, and enjoyment under 2096 Jur. N. s. 833, 843. 2105 Sim. 596; Attorney-General v. Brazen-Nose College, 2 Cl. & Fin. 295. 211 2 Vern. 397. 213 3 & 4 Wm. 4, ch. 27. 213 Attorney-General v. Payne, 27 Beav. 168. such construction, conclusive of the right to continue the same. 90. Long-continued use in the application of a religious charity will have great weight in giving construction to doubtful terms in the instrument of donation.214 214 Dublin Case, 38 N. H. R. 459. CHAPTER XVI. FOR WHAT PERIOD INCOME MAY BE ACCUMULATED. 1. Accumulation allowed for the same term an executory devise may be deferred. 2. The history of the occasion of passing the Thelluson Act, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 98. 3. The term of twenty-one years after the death of the settlor how reckoned. 4. Trusts for accumulation beyond the allowed term void before the statute, but since, only for the excess. 5. The rule under the statute as to debts and portions which are excepted. 6. The destination of the income thus released from accumulation. (1.) Where there is a present gift, it remains as if no direction for accumulation were made. (2.) Avoiding the accumulation does not hasten the vesting of the estate. (3.) Residue directed to be accumulated, the income will go to the heir or next of kin. (4.) The income of accumulations follow the same rule as the income of the fund. 7. The rule against accumulations applies to implied as well as express directions. 8. The payment of premiums of life policies does not necessarily amount to accumulation. 9. This species of investment is more obnoxious to the charge of gambling, perhaps. 10. The rule adopted by the courts in New York under their statute. 11. Valid trusts not defeated by invalid ones, unless they are inseparable. § 72. 1. It seems to have been an acknowledged rule of law, from the earliest times, in England, that the income of an estate might be accumulated so long as the vesting of an estate might be deferred by an executory devise.1 This was not found 1 Ante, § 65, pl. 30; § 71, pl. 71, n. 172. embarrassing in practice until the case of Mr. Thellusson's will.2 2. The testator in this case having availed himself of the full license of the rule, by which he was enabled to lock up his large estate from all enjoyment by those entitled to inherit it, during the entire period of lives in being at his decease, and for twentyone years more; thus accumulating a most princely fortune for those in or for whom, in the nature of things, he could not have the remotest personal interest or affection; and whose sole prevailing motive for so absurd an act must therefore have been the mere gratification afforded by the indulgence of his own strange conceit, seemed to have presented the just occasion for restraining the period of remoteness for accumulation of income within narrower limits.3 3. The twenty-one years under the statute or at common law is to be computed exclusive of the day of the death of the testator. And even where the accumulation does not begin until many years after the death of the testator, it must cease at the period of twenty-one years from his death. And the settlor cannot direct an accumulation both for twenty-one years and the period of the minority of the person entitled; and if this is done, it will be good only for the former term.6 2 Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Vesey, 227. 6 3 Statute 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 98. This statute, commonly known as the Thellusson Act, restricts the term for accumulation to the life or lives of the grantor or grantors, settlor or settlors, and the term of twenty-one years after such death, or during the minority of such person or persons as would otherwise be entitled under the will. The statute, in terms, renders any direction for a longer accumulation void, with an exception of funds provided for the payment of debts and portions for children. Gorst v. Lowndes, 11 Sim. 434, citing numerous earlier cases; Toder v. Sansam, 1 Br. P. C. 468; Lester v. Garland, 15 Vesey, 248, and other cases. Attorney-General v. Poulden, 3 Hare, 555; Shaw v. Rhodes, 1 My. & Cr. 135, 154; Webb v. Webb, 2 Beav. 493; Nettleton v. Stephenson, 3 DeG. & S. 366. • Wilson v. Wilson, 1 Sim. N. s. 288; Rosslyn's Trust, 16 Sim. 391; Ellis v. |