word of the greatest extension, and comprehends every species of property, real and personal,181 and will carry a fee unless restrained. It describes both the corpus and the extent of interest. 182

49. But general words of devise without words of inheritance or anything in the will to show that an estate of inheritance was intended, will only pass a life-interest.133 The words "all I possess indoors and outdoors," will carry a fee.134 And any other words which show such intent.135

50. The word "appurtenances" may have a more extended operation in carrying distinct and independent interests in a devise, than it could have in a deed.136 And a condition attached to the devise, as that the devisee shall do some act, as to convey land to another, either a part of the same land, or other land, it will have the effect to enlarge a general devise, so as to pass a fee, 187

51. It was held in the Supreme Court of the United States, 188 that a bequest to the testator's wife of "all my personal estate," &c., "which personal estate I give and bequeath unto my said.

131 Lambert v. Paine, 3 Cranch, 97; Archer v. Deneale, 1 Pet. U. S. 585; Beall v. Holmes, 6 Har. & J. 205; Jackson v. Delancey, 11 Johns. 365; s. c. 13 Johns. 537.

12 Davies v. Miller, 1 Call, 110; Kennon v. M'Roberts, 1 Wash. 96; Watson v. Powell, 3 Call. 306; Wyatt v. Sadler, 1 Munf. 537; Johnson v. Johnson, id. 549; Philips v. Melson, 3 id. 76.

13 Beall v. Holmes, 6 Har. & J. 200; Edelen v. Smoot, 2 Har. & G. 285; Owings v. Reynolds, 3 Har. & J. 141; Lyles v. Digge, 6 id. 364; Smith v. Poyas, 1 Dessau. 156; Keith v. Perry, id. 353; Hall v. Goodwyn, 2 Nott & McCord, 383; Lindsay v. McCormack, 2 Marsh. 229.

134 Tolar v. Tolar, 3 Hawks, 74.

135 Campbell v. Carson, 12 S. & R. 54.

138 Otis v. Smith, 9 Pick. 293; Jackson v. White, 8 Johns. 59; Grant v. Chase, 17 Mass. R. 443.

137 Gibson v. Horton, 5 Har. & J. 177; Beall v. Holmes, 6 id. 205; Decker v. Decker, 3 Ham. 157.

138 Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68.

wife, to and for her own use and benefit and disposal, absolutely; the remainder of said estate after her decease to be for the use of Jesse Goodwin," testator's son; that those words gave the remainder of the estate after the wife's decease to the son with as much certainty as the preceding words gave the whole estate to the wife; that the intent to make a provision for the son was as clearly expressed, upon the face of the will, as that of making a provision for the wife; that if full effect is given to the latter, the former is expunged from the will; that all the words of the will were equally the language of the testator; that the court were not at liberty to set aside the last words of the instrument, any more than those that came earlier; that the whole will is to be taken together, and so construed as to give effect to every portion of it, if possible; "the limitation in remainder shows, that in the opinion of the testator the previous words had given only an estate for life; this was the sense in which he used them; and it was his intention to give the personal estate to his son, after the death of his mother."

52. A power of sale attached to a life-estate will not have the effect to enlarge it to a fee.189 And a direction that the devisee shall have the sole use of the estate, and that at her death it shall go to her children, but if they are not raised, then to her husband, and others, creates only a life-estate in the first devisee.140 And a devise of land to the testator's son, without words of limitation or perpetuity, except a provision that the testator's wife shall be master of one third of the estate, during life and widowhood, and after her marriage or death, "to be and belong to my aforesaid son," was held to create only a life-estate.141

53. The expression "worldly goods of all sorts and kinds,"

129 Dean v. Nunnally, 36 Miss. (George) 358. 140 Jossey v. White, 28 Ga. R. 265.

this

141 Van Derzee v. Van Derzee, 30 Barb. 331. The American cases upon point are too numerous to be digested in an elementary treatise, as they neither create or illustrate a new principle, or in a new form, and are no guide to the determination of other cases.

though very general, has been held to be properly applicable to personal estate only.142 But that and similar expressions, in the preamble of a will, showing a purpose of disposing of all one's estate, may often aid the construction of other portions of the instrument,143 and will have the effect to convert a general devise of real estate, without words of inheritance, into a feesimple.144 But such aids are resorted to only, as a general rule, where the language of the will is obscure or ambiguous.145 But general prefatory words in a will are inoperative in themselves, unless there are subsequent words which they aid in giving a definite import.146

54. It was held, in a very late case in Pennsylvania, that where the testator devised all his estate, real and personal, to his wife for life, and then provided, that after his death she should have full power to do with his property "as she pleases," that this created an absolute gift of the personal estate.147

55. A devise of one seventh of the testator's estate to his insolvent son, in trust for his children, at his decease, with power to invest the same in business for the benefit of the trust, without subjecting the same to any debts, except such as should be contracted in the execution thereof, and providing, that if the son should execute personally the trust thereby committed to him he should be allowed a reasonable support out of the trust fund for his personal services rendered, was held to vest in the son no beneficial interest which was liable to execution for his debts.148

14 Bradford v. Bradford, 6 Whart. 236.

143 Busby v. Busby, 1 Dall. 226.

144 Clark v. Mikell, 3 Dessau. 168; Goodrich v. Harding, 3 Rand. 280; Watson v. Powell, 3 Call, 306; Winchester v. Tilghman, 1 Har. & McH. 452.

145 Howland v. Union Theological Seminary, 3 Sand. S. Ct. R. 82; Davies v. Miller, 1 Call, 127; Beall v. Holmes, 6 Har. & J. 205; Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. S. C. 346; Olmstead v. Harvey, 1 Barb. 102.

146 Weidman v. Maish, 16 Penn. St. 504.

Diehl's Appeal, 36 Penn. St. 120, citing in re Maxwell's Will, 24 Beav. 246. 149 Brown v. Williamson's Exrs. 36 Penn. St. 338. See also Williams v. Leech,

56. And where by a will which evidently contemplated the distribution of the whole of the testator's real and personal property among his children, certain real estate was given to one of them, charged with the payment of an annuity to the testator's widow, and sundry payments to his other children, it was held the devisee took an estate in fee-simple, although there were no words of inheritance, and the will provided that if any of the devisees should die unmarried, or without issue, his or her share should revert to the testator's general estate.149 And in a very late case in the same state, where the testator devised all his real and personal estate to his widow, "so long as she lives, for her maintenance," adding, "she shall have the choice of selling it or not, as she believes best for her," and as "to one third part of his estate she could do and bequeath to whom she pleases," it was held to create an estate for life in the whole, and the absolute ownership of one third.150

57. But in a case 151 where the testator directed his executors to account for and pay over to his three daughters, half yearly, "and to each of them, during their natural lives, the income of their share of the residue, and after the death of either then to

28 Penn. St. 89, which was here held to have no application, unless a beneficial interest vested in the first taker. See also Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts, 547; Ashhurst v. Given, 5 W. & S. 323; Norris v. Johnston, 5 Penn. St. 287; Eyrick v. Hetrick, 131 Penn. St. 488.

149 Schoonmaker v. Stockton's Adms. 37 Penn. St. 461. See also Brown's Estate, 38 id. 289.

150 Musselman's Estate, 39 Penn. St. 469.

161 Haldeman v. Haldeman, 40 Penn. St. 29. The argument of the court by which this result was reached is entirely sound, if we consider their purposes, but it seems to us the facts of the case were such that the court might have regarded the word "descent," with reference to the children of the daughters, as defining the transmission of the estate from the testator to them, and not from the mother to her children; under which construction the children would have taken as purchasers under the will, upon the termination of the life-estate of the mother, and thus the intention of the will would have been much more surely effected.

descend and go to the child, and if children, share and share alike; should, however, either of my daughters die, and leave no lawful issue, then such share or portion is to fall back again to the residue, and form a part of the same." It was held that the daughters took an estate-tail in the residue, which, by the statute of that state, became a fee-simple.

58. But in a later case,152 where the testator devised one equal ninth part of his estate to one of his daughters, during the term of her natural life, and at and immediately after her death, to "her children in fee, but if she should die without leaving children, then to her brothers and sisters, their heirs and assigns forever," and at the time the will was made, and up to the death of the testator, she had no children, but had children afterwards; it was claimed on her part that she took an estate-tail, but the court held that she took only a life-estate, and that her children took the remainder as purchasers under the will.

59. And in another case, 153 where the devise was to the testator's son, during his natural life, and that of his present wife, and directed, that after their decease, "the said tract of land descend to their heirs jointly, and their heirs and assigns forever, or to such of them as may be then living," it was held to create a fee-simple, in the first takers, upon the ground that there was not sufficient to control the natural force of the word "heirs," which must, therefore, be construed as one of limitation, and not of purchase. The only comment which it is needful to make upon the last three cases is, that they were all unquestionably intended to create life-estates in the first devisees, with estates over in remainder in fee; and that two of them, by a professed, and, probably, an actual adherence to the force of a technical rule, were decided contrary to the actual intention of the testator. This is a result not always to be avoided, but one always to be regretted, and avoided if possible.