ter, where it is not easy to determine whether a specific legacy is created or not, it is referred to the intention of the testator. And where it is said, as it is in many of the cases, that the courts incline against treating bequests as specific, all that is meant is, that the courts naturally feel a reluctance to have a provision intended obviously by the testator to have been effective, and especially where it is made on behalf of a child, or any person naturally dependent upon him, fail, through any merely accidental circumstance not anticipated by him. When, therefore, the court clearly perceive an intention on the part of the testator to have the legacy paid at all events, and some unexpected contingency has occurred, whereby the fund referred to for its payment has failed, or is likely to become deficient, it is natural and proper to give the words of the will such a construction as will render the bequest general, or demonstrative, instead of specific, so far as that can be done consistently with the natural and primary import of the words. 25. In some cases legacies are charged so exclusively upon real estate, that the personal estate is held not liable to their testator continuing up to the time of his decease to retain the same specific chattel, that "to make a legacy specific its terms must clearly require such a construction." This view may be sound, although going somewhat beyond most of the modern cases. But we think, in most cases, like that of Everett v. Lane, supra, if the testator had disposed of the carriage owned at the date of the will, and procured another before his decease, it would be regarded as reasonable to allow the bequest to carry the one last owned by the testator, he having but one at the same time. And we cannot say that making such a bequest mean a carriage instead of the carriage, would not be more in accordance with the probable intent of the testator, in a case where, from any cause, he should happen to have no carriage at the time of his decease, than the opposite view. The question is here very carefully reviewed, and ably discussed, both by Mr. Justice Johnson and Mr. Justice Willard, who gave a dissenting opinion. One thousand dollars out of money in the safe-keeping of A B, being in lieu of dower, was held to be so far in the nature of a specific legacy, as to carry interest from the decease of the testator. Parkinson v. Parkinson, 2 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 77. See also Pierrepont v. Edwards, 25 N. Y. Ct. App. 128; Ludlam's Estate, 13 Penn. St. 188. payment. This, in the early cases, was held only to result from an express declaration to that effect. But it is now well settled, that the exoneration of the personal estate from the payment of legacies, for which it is the primary fund, may be effected in any mode which shows a plain intention on the part of the testator to do so.47 26. Questions often occur as to how far a residuary bequest is to be regarded as specific. It is certain that a bequest of all a man's personal estate is not a specific but general legacy.48 But it has been held that a bequest of all the testator's personal estate, at a particular place, is a specific legacy; and, if there is a deficiency of assets to meet other legacies, this will not abate on that account.49 So a bequest of all the residue of the testator's estate in the Island of Jamaica, is specific ; 50 so also of all the testator's goods and chattels in a particular county; 51 and so of all plate, linen, and furniture, in my house at A, or which shall be there at the time of my decease.52 Vice-Chancellor Wigram said, in Pickup v. Atkinson,58 "a general residuary * Dickin v. Edwards, 4 Hare, 273; Hancox v. Abbey, 11 Vesey, 179. Sir William Grant, M. R., said here, and in Watson v. Brickwood, 9 Vesey, 447, "That it might have been better, if what I understood to be the old rule had been adhered to, that nothing but express words should operate to exonerate 452 Wms. Exrs. 1054; 1 Roper, Leg. 215. So a gift, "of all my real estate, personal property, houses, furniture," &c., to the testator's widow for life, and after her death the property remaining "I request to be divided among my surviving children," naming those then living, creates a general and not a specific bequest. Calkins v. Calkins, 1 Redf. Sur. Rep. 337. Sayer v. Sayer, 2 Vern. 688; s. c. Prec. Ch. 392. Nisbett v. Murray, 5 Vesey, 149; Robinson v. Webb, 17 Beav. 260. Moore v. Moore, 1 Br. C. C. 127, 129, and notes. Gayre v. Gayre, 2 Ver. 538. 534 Hare, 624, 628. Sir J. L. Knight Bruce, V. C., in Sutherland v. Cooke, 1 Coll. 498, 502. A bequest of all the testator's goods in a particular room, is specific. Moore v. Moore, 1 Br. C. C. 127. And it has been held in some of the American cases, that a bequest of the whole personal estate of the testator, clause is not the less general because it contains an enumeration of some of the particulars of which it may consist." 27. It has sometimes been held that a bequest of certain enumerated articles and of all the residue of the testator's estate, when expressed in different sentences, and of such a manner as to be entirely separable, might be fairly regarded as two separate bequests, the former being specific and the latter general and residuary.54 But in general, where there is nothing to characterize the bequest as anything but a residuary bequest, with a partial enumeration of the articles of which it consists, it has been treated as one entire bequest, and of a general or residuary character.55 And where the testatrix, after making two specific bequests of sums in the long annuities, gave the residue of her property, all she did or might have in the funds, copy or leasehold estates, to her sisters during their lives, and the testatrix's property, after satisfying the specific legacies, consisted in part of £150 per annum in the long annuities, Sir C. C. Pepys, M. R. held, that as to the copyhold or leasehold estates, there being no question but they were specific, it might with equal propriety be regarded as specific, as to the funds, and decreed accordingly.5 56 28. It is a general rule of the English courts of equity, where personal property is bequeathed for life with remainder over, and the bequest is not specific in its terms, and there is nothing or of the residue thereof, after deducting specific legacies, is a specific legacy. Warley v. Warley, 1 Bailey, Ch. 397; Godard v. Wagner, 2 Strobh. Eq. 1. And in one case, where certain articles were specifically enumerated, and “all the estate not before devised" added, it was held not to amount to a general residuary devise, but only to carry property of the same kind as that enumerated. Minor v. Dabney, 3 Rand. 191. Clarke v. Butler, 1 Mer. 304. 65 Taylor v. Taylor, 6 Sim. 246. Bethune v. Kennedy, 1 My. & Cr. 114. But this is not regarded as, strictly speaking, a specific legacy. 2 Wms. Exrs. 1058, and note. See also Pickering v. Pickering, 4 My. & Cr. 289; Hubbard v. Young, 10 Beav. 203; Harris v. Poyner, 1 Drew. 174. in the will to show the expression of an intention or preference that the tenant for life shall enjoy the specific property left, and in the form in which it is left, to convert it into three per cents, subject, in the case of a real security, to an inquiry whether it will be for the benefit of all parties; and the tenant for life is entitled to hold only upon that principle.57 This rule is called "the rule in Howe v. Lord Dartmouth," having been acted upon in that case, although not originating there.58 Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 Vesey, 137. See also Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195; Alcock v. Sloper, 2 My. & K. 699; Crawley v. Crawley, 7 Sim. 427; Mills v. Mills, id. 501. * 2 Wms. Exrs. 1058; Pickering v. Pickering, 4 My. & Cr. 289, 298. The learned judge here said: "All that Howe v. Lord Dartmouth decided — and that was not the first decision to the same effect is that, where the residue or bulk of the property is left en masse, and it is given to several persons in succession, as tenants for life and remainder-men, it is the duty of the court to carry into effect the apparent intention of the testator. How is the apparent intention to be ascertained if the testator has given no particular directions? If, although he has given no directions at all, yet he has carved out parts of the property to be enjoyed in strict settlement by certain persons, it is evident that the property must be put in such a state as will allow of its being so enjoyed. That cannot be unless it is taken out of a temporary fund and put into a permanent fund. But this is merely an inference from the mode in which the property is to be enjoyed, if no direction is given as to how the property is to be managed. It is equally clear that, if a person gives certain property specifically to one person for life, with remainder over afterwards, then, although there is a danger that one object of his bounty will be defeated, by the tenancy for life lasting as long as the property endures, yet there is a manifestation of intention which the court cannot overlook. "If a testator gives leasehold property to one for life, with remainder afterwards, he is the best judge whether the remainder-man is to enjoy. The intention is the other way, so far as it is declared, and the terms of the gift, as a declaration of intention, preclude the court from considering that he might have meant that it should be converted." In Morgan v. Morgan, 14 Beav. 72, Sir John Romilly, M. R., said: “Where property of a perishable nature is given to be enjoyed in succession, the object of the testator can only be effected by converting the property into permanent annuities and giving each person in succession the dividends of the fund." See 29. From the view of the law presented in the last case referred to, it is apparent that where there is anything in the will from which it may fairly be inferred that the testator expected the tenant for life to enjoy the property specifically, it cannot be converted into money or public funds, but the remainder-man must take his chance of anything remaining after the termination of the life-estate. And where the devise is specific, this is always to be so understood.59 cases. 30. It seems scarcely necessary to go much into detail in regard to the American cases as to specific legacies. They profess to pursue the principles already indicated in the English Any bequest limited to a particular debt or chattel, as the amount to be recovered in a certain suit,60 or the avails of a certain bond and mortgage, is specific. But it was held, reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court,62 that the bequest of also Hinves v. Hinves, 3 Hare, 609, where Vice-Chancellor Wigram says "the court have leant against conversion, as strongly as is consistent with the idea that the rule is well founded." See also Mackie v. Mackie, 5 Hare, 70, 77. But notwithstanding the inclination of the English courts against this rule of converting perishable property into a permanent fund, producing such an annuity as the funds will purchase during the continuance of the several successive lives to which it is bequeathed, the rule must still be regarded as eminently just and highly convenient, as an instrument for carrying into effect the probable intention of the testator; and it still maintains its ground in the English courts. See Crowe v. Crisford, 17 Beav. 507; Marshall v. Bremner, 2 Sm. & Gif. 237; Blann v. Bell, 5 DeG. & Sm. 658; s. c. 2 DeG., M. & G. 775; Murton v. Markby, 18 Beav. 196; Hood v. Clapham, 19 Beav. 90; Jebb v. Tugwell, 20 Beav. 84. But we have not known of any case of conversion of a fund for a similar purpose by order of an American court. And from the far greater uncertainty of investments and the greater difficulty of procuring annuities readily and from a responsible source, we should not expect the courts of equity in this country to act upon the rule, for the present at least. 69 Collins v. Collins, 2 My. & K. 703. See note 55, ante. Chase v. Lockerman, 11 G. & J. 185; Gilbreath v. Winter, 10 Ohio, 64. 62 Giddings v. Seward, 16 N. Y. Ct. App. 365. See also Walls v. Stuart, 16 Penn. St. 275, 281. A bequest of all the testator's right, interest, and property, |